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ABSTRACT
The study deals with the Asian currency crises, in which the causes and consequences 
of the crisis ar e analysed. The two hypotheses which, are often viewed as competing, 
fundamental and panic and herd behavioiu’, are also examined. The first hypothesis 
states that fimdamental imbalances triggered the Asian currency and financial crisis in 
1997. The crisis occurred because the economies had deteriorating current accounts, a 
slowdown in growth rates and short-term debt approaching a dangerous level, wliile 
the second hypothesis states that sudden shifts in market expectations and confidence 
were the cause of the initial financial turmoil. Wlien the crisis erupted it caused panic 
in domestic and foreign investors.
A major focus of the study is to evaluate these two approaches and to examine 
whether there was evidence of insolvency prior to the crisis. A solvency index as 
originally popularised by Cohen (1991) is then calculated for each country. An 
econometric analysis of the trade sector is undertaken in which tlie Engle-Granger 
two-step procedure is employed, and the short-run dynamics are described by the 
EiTor CoiTection Mechanism (ECM). The Johansen Maximum Likelihood test is also 
employed as a comparison to the Engle-Granger Two-Step model. Subsequently the 
price elasticities obtained from the export demand model together with the GDP 
supply elasticity ar e used to calculate the index.
From the results, it appeal's that all coimtries were solvent prior to the crisis in wliich 
the percentage of actual debt service paid (in 1997) was greater than the percentage 
that needs to be paid to be solvent. This suggests that a further external credit could 
have solved the problem, as it was a matter of short-term liquidity difficulties and 
panic, rather than insolvency.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Oveiview
The last centuiy marked a major transition in economic ideology from the tenets of 
command to free market economies, which has been climaxed with frirther progress 
towar ds liberalization and global integration of national economies. As expected, the 
landscape for business and finance has been underlined by gradual transformation 
from domestic to international markets, with major challenges arising in the demands 
for economic management.
The evolution of challenges in economic management varies from simple proactive 
change in strategy to national crises, and in the extreme, regional crises that affected 
the entire world economy. Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999) offer very 
illmninating views on the Asian crisis, which precipitated significant changes in real 
exchange rates in the South East Asian region, which also caused deterioration in the 
trade balances of tire United States and Western Europe by about $40-50 billion.
The crisis, whose implications engulfed the world economy, has its origins in the 
months of financial turbulence that triggered speculative activities in the foreign 
exchange maricet. The landscape began to change when Thailand was came under 
pressirre to float the balit on 2nd July 1997 when it become apparent that rolling over 
its short-term debt had done nothing to mitigate the depletion of net foreign exchange 
reserves. The alarm sounded through out the region as Thailand experienced
13
unprecedented currency turmoil, with the balit losing a third of its value, which also 
triggered retaliatory devaluation in the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia.
These events marked a turning point for the East Asian countries that had been 
admired for their rapid progress towards industrialisation, which imderpinned rapid 
economic growth and, consequently, high living standard of their populations. The 
acceleration of economic progress in the region had also elevated these countries to 
role models for many other developing countries that had made very little progress, 
despite many year s of reform and adjustment supported by the IMF and World Bank.
The economic meltdown in South east Asia could not have been predicted because 
countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia had shown a spectacular record 
of economic growth supported by macroeconomic stability, characterised by low 
inflation rates, high saving rates and a strong export growth. The possible occurrence 
of a foreign exchange problem in Asia was therefore a complete anathema as their 
economies were considered to be fundamentally sound. Specifically, from the 1960’s 
all the way tlnough to the mid 1990s, East Asia countries experienced an average 
growth rate of GDP per capita at 4.6% as shown in table 1.1, below.
Table 1.1: Real GDP/capita and Growth rate of Real GDP/capita
Real GDP/capita ($1990 international) Percent a year
Coimtry/year 1950 1973 1996 1950-1973 1973-1996
Malaysia 1696 3167 7764 2.8 4.0
Philippines 1293 1956 2369 1.8 0.8
Indonesia 874 1538 3464 2.5 3.6
Thailand 848 1750 6112 3.2 5.6
Singapore 2038 5412 20983 4.3 6.1
Source: Asian Development Bank (1997)
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Within a year, the dramatic downturn in the economies of the region following the 
floatation of the Thai baht in early July 1997, had transformed the world’s fastest 
growing economies into distressed economies. Rising curiosity into the factors that 
precipitated the East Asian problems, has led to a consensus that they were “the 
victims of their own success”, [see among others Kocchar, Loungani and Stone 
(1988)].
A common feature of these coimtries is that the spectacular record of economic 
performance throughout the 1990s was not promptly accompanied by policies suitable 
for the management of economies with a high export-oriented and investment-led 
growth. First, since Japan had become less profitable while Europe experienced 
sluggish economic growth, the resulting search for investment opportunities was 
reflected in massive capital inflows since the begimiing of 1990s. Between 1990 and 
1996, the share of capital inflows to GDP in Asia averaged about 10 percent 
compared to 4 percent in the late 1980s (see IMF: 1997 and also table 2.1). This build 
up of excess liquidity (especially foreign funds) resulted in lower rates of interest, 
which set the stage for a classic boom-bust cycle.
The trends and implications of foreign capital inflows only helped to magnify internal 
anomalies the countries were already experiencing. According to the World Economic 
Outlook by IMF (1997), these economies were already overheating as a result of large 
external deficit, inflated property and stock market values. This was aggravated by tire 
weak financial systems, weak management and poor control of risks, lax enforcement 
of prudential rules and inadequate supervision in the banking and financial system. 
These factors combined to put pressure on the quality of banlcs’ loan portfolio, while
15
poor corporate governance and the political uncertainties that ensued exacerbated the 
crisis of confidence, which resulted in foreign creditors declining to roll over short­
term loans.
The monetary policy regimes prevalent in these countries, which relied on existence 
of an exchange rate peg, generally, made it difficult to defend against speculative 
attack, particularly as the financial system remained weak. Upward revision in interest 
rate, which might have been required to shore up the exchange rate, could not be 
caiTied out while authorities remained obsessed with the promotion of enteiprise 
lending at low interest rates.
Exchange rate anchors also caused distortions in the financial system. The exchange 
rate peg gave an implicit guaiantee for stability in the currency value, irrespective of 
changing fundamentals, a factor that stimulated a rising appetite for more borrowing 
in foreign cuirencies. Under these circumstances, a guaiantee of convertibility was 
limited to the availability of international reserves, which were already on the decline. 
This compelled the countries to borrow fresh foreign resouices abroad, a factor, which 
led to the accumulation of short term, speculative capital inflows.
The gravity of the scenario has been explained by fundamental wealmesses that 
prevailed in the export sector in the mid 1990s following the appreciation of the U.S 
dollai' against the yen, and the devaluation of the China yuen in 1994, which resulted 
in a major trade shock to the region. The establisliment of the North America Free 
Trade Agreement also led to the loss of some markets, while the decline in the price
16
of main exports of these countries, i.e semiconductors and an increase in world oil 
prices in 1996, aggravated the problems.
The worsening export situation resulted in a yawning cunent account deficit which 
remained unsustainable against the background of capital flight (see table 1.2)
Table 1.2: The Four Asian Countries’ Current Account Deficit
(Percent of GDP)
Country 1995 1996 1997(preliminary)
Malaysia -10.0 -4.9 -5.8
Indonesia -3.3 -3.3 -2.9
Philippines -4.4 -4.7 -4.5
Thailand -8.0 -7.9 -3.9
Source: IMF (1997)
Putting everything together, the weakness of the financial system, the growing short­
term external debt, the appreciation of real exchange rate, the size of the external 
cuiTent account deficit all exerted a strong pressure on the foreign exchange maiicet, 
and finally, these countries’ exchange rates collapsed. The depreciation of the 
currency during the period fiom 1 July 1997 to 16 February 1998 is presented in table 
1.3.
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Table 1.3: Depreciation of Currency 
(July 1,1997 -February 16,1998)
Country Depreciation of 
the currency vis a 
vis the dollar
Changes in the 
share price Index
Changes in 
interest rate
Malaysia 55.43 -58.41 373.00
Indonesia 231.00 -81.74 2398.00
Philippines 51.37 -49.17 0.00
Thailand 87.09 -48.37 -25.00
Source: IMF (1998)
1.2 Objectives of the Study
From the above overview, the Asian crisis may be attributed to current accoimt 
deficits, which brings up the issue of sustainability. To assess current account 
sustainability, the notion of solvency is usually used, which sometimes adopts 
traditional measures such as debt/GDP, debt/export, etc. However, these measures do 
not take into account, the dynamics of economic activity and shifts in major 
fundamentals, i.e. growth rate and interest rates.
The aim of this study is therefore to develop solvency models for the four ASEAN 
countries on the basis of which a solvency index can be calculated. To be able to do 
this, the price elasticities of exports demand ai e needed, as well as the price elasticity 
of GDP. Thus, the foreign and GDP supply models are also developed.
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To accomplish these objectives, this thesis will aim at a number of goals, chief among 
them will be the task of giving a general view of the Asian crisis, examination of the 
background to the crisis, the causes and consequences. The thesis will also identify 
and examine the relevant theoretical literature, as well as the application of the 
empirical literature to the various approaches used to evaluate the potential indicators 
of currency crises. This thesis will also develop a foreign trade model and estimate the 
income and price elasticities for the four Asian countries.
1.3 Methodology
Although a descriptive approach is used, this study emphasises a time series 
econometric application, which evaluates the foreign trade of the four Asian countries. 
All variables influencing exports and imports demands are used in the estimation. 
There is difficulty, though, in operationalising such a model because the data used is 
time series data, which creates the problem of non-stationarity. This problem is 
tackled by using the co-integration analysis in which, although variables are non- 
stationary there is a linear' relationship among them, ensuring that the regression is not 
spurious. Appropriately, therefore, the Engle-Granger two-step procedure is employed 
as well as the Johansen Maximum Likelihood model as a basis of compar ison with the 
Engle-Granger Model.
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1.4 Organisation of the Study
Chapter 1 provides the analytical background of the study. In addition, an overview of 
the Asian crises is presented.
Chapter 2 presents in general the background of the crisis in which the causes and 
consequences of the crisis are discussed. The two main views explaining the crisis are 
also discussed. The first view is the ‘fundamental approach’; while the second view is 
the ‘self-fulfilling or lierd-behavioui’ approach. This analysis is mostly descriptive 
and supported by tables and figures.
The literatuie review, which consists of previous studies on the issue, is discussed in 
chapter 3. This includes theoretical and empirical studies. Specifically, the theoretical 
studies discuss the first generation, the second generation and also the ‘twin crises’. 
For the empirical literature, a review of recent studies is given.
Chapter 4 discusses the macroeconomic fundamental for the foui* Asian countries 
prior to the crisis. The foreign debt accumulation is also analysed.
A foreign trade model for the four Asian countries is presented in chapter 5. The 
Engle-Granger two-step Procedures and the Johansen Maximum Likelihood approach 
are employed to estimate the price and income elasticities of export and import 
demand of each country. A review on foreign trade estimation, of cointegration 
analysis and tlie error coiTectiOn mechanism are also presented.
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In chapter 6, solvency indices are estimated for the four Asian countries prior to the 
crises, to determine whether they were solvent.
Chapter 7 presents the main conclusion, based on the empirical findings, and policy 
implications. Areas for finther research are also outlined.
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CHAPTER TWO 
BACKGROUND TO THE ASIAN CRISIS
2.1 Introduction
The economic backslide that began with the devaluation of the Thai Baht remains 
today the nucleus of the financial crisis that erupted in South East Asia in early July 
1997. As pointed out by Radelet and Sachs (1998a), since the debt crisis of 1982, the 
Asian crisis has been described as the sharpest financial crisis to hit the developing 
coimtries.
According to McNeill and Bockman (1998), it was the most serious financial and 
economic crisis in the world since the Second World War. It is also renowned as the 
largest financial bailout in history with financial packages totalling of US$114.2 
billion provided to three countries; Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand.^ A 
characteristic feature of the crisis is that it spread tlrr ough several other economies in 
Asia thereby dampening investor sentiment toward the emerging market while the 
spill-over effects reverberated tlnough out the global financial market.
This chapter examines available evidence on cmrency crises followed by a discussion 
of the causes of the Asian crises in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 enumerates the factors 
that precipitated the contagion. Section 2.4 discusses the economic and social 
implication of the crisis followed by the Malaysian case prior to the crisis in 
section2.5. The impact of the crisis on Malaysia is discussed in section 2.6. Section
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2,7 presents the recent economics performance of tlie fom* Asian countries that were 
at the centie of the crisis. A summary is provided in section 2.8.
2.2 Causes of the Crisis
The sudden reversal of capital flows is identified as the fundamental stai'ting point for 
events that developed into the Asian crisis. Duiing the preceding period, especially 
from the early to mid 1990s, most of the Asian economies had experienced the 
imusually successful performance associated with the rapid growth of net capital 
inflows to the countries. For example, net private capital flows into South Korea, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia were recorded at US$97.1 billion in 
1996 compared to only US$37.9 billion in 1994. However, in the second half of 
1997, these inflows was reversed with net private capital flows timiing to -US$11.9 
billion; a turnaround of US$109 billion^ which was equivalent to approximately 10 
percent of the pre-crisis GDP of these countries.
As a substantial portion of the capital was str uctured with very short-term maturities, 
it was able to leave the region so quickly. Most of this swing occurred in commercial 
bank lending, followed by short-term portfolio flows, whilst foreign direct investment 
(FDI) remained constant. Portfolio flows turned out to be negative in 1997 with an 
outflow of more than US$ 10 billion. Almost conciuTently, international bank credit, 
which had reached the highest levels among private flows, with about US$ 50 billion 
both in 1995 and 1996, was dramatically reversed in 1997 with an estimated outflow 
of US$ 20 billion. As the scale of lending grew rapidly, together with shorter 
matmity, these economies became more vulnerable to a loss of confidence. In mid
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1997, Indonesia and Malaysia had about 60% of their claims maturing in less than a 
yeai'’s time. Specifically, at the onset of the crisis, the ratio of short-term debt to 
international reserves ranged from 0.6 for Malaysia to 2.1 for South Korea.^ This was 
a chaiacteristic feature of the countiies’ heavy dependency on foreign creditors to roll 
over existing short-term credit at a time when exports were stagnating. Accordingly, 
the surge in capital outflows is a very important factor in the evolution of the Asian 
crisis.
Besides this aspect, there are several otlier hypotheses that have been advanced to 
explain the origin of the crisis. The two hypotheses which, aie often viewed as 
competing, are frmdamental and herd behaviour and panic. The first hypothesis states 
that it was the fundamental imbalances that triggered the Asian crisis in 1997. The 
crisis is believed to have occurred when the economies had a deteriorating cuiTent 
account, a slow down m growth rate and acceleration of short-term debt to dangerous 
level. The second hypothesis states that the sudden shifts in maiket expectations and 
confidence were the cause of the initial financial tuimoil. The basis if  this theory is 
that when the crisis erupted, it tended to provoke financial panic among investors to 
withdraw from the region, a process which was aggravated by demands for 
repatriation of short-term capital as well.
As stated by the ‘fundamentalist’ hypothesis, the cause of the Asian crisis can be 
explained by the growing current account deficits. This view is challenged by the fact 
that the ciment accoimt deficit is not a problem as long as it is sustainable. 
Sustainability, in this case, is explained by the notion of solvency and uses indicators 
such as debt/GDP or debt/export to measure the debtor’s ability to repay. These
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measures are considered weak because they do not take into accoimt the dynamic 
aspect of the solvency issue, which includes groivth trends in the economy, and the 
dynamics of interest rates.
The view of Radelet and Sachs (1998a, 1998b) is that creditor panic was the principal 
cause of the crisis. According to them the changes in international factor or domestic 
development could not substantiate the Asian crisis, while the wealc fundamentals of 
the Asian economies at both macroeconomic and microeconomic level were not 
strong enough to prevent tlie crisis from erupting.
Krugman (1997) stated that the Asian crises were mainly related to a burst of a 
financial bubble in a context of low and declining returns to investment. The short­
term bursting of the ensuing bubble appeared in a framework of low and declining 
capital returns,
Ki'ugman (1998a, 1998b), Dornbusch (1998), Corsetti et.al (1999) and IMF pointed 
out that the weaknesses in the financial systems, as well as governance and poor 
economic policies, were the main causes. Bhagwati (1998), Stiglitz (1998a, 1998b) 
believe that capital account liberalisation was the main cause as the opening to 
volatile short-term debt international capital flows induced a panic-self-fulfilling crisis 
to occur. ‘Market failures’ i.e. moral hazard which occuiTed when the party that 
assessed the level of risk of a given transaction received the gains from, but did not 
beai* the full costs of, the risks taken, was the main concern.'^
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Wade (1998) and Wade and Veneroso (1998) also pointed out that capital 
liberalisation was the root cause of the crisis. But they did not stress moral hazard. 
While Lim (1999) agreed that capital opemiess as a root cause of the crisis, he finds 
policy eiToneous because of persistent macro economic wealaiesses, chief among 
them overvaluation of cuirencies and liigh ciment account deficit.
As stated by Radelet and Sachs (1999), the weaknesses in the Asian economies, 
corruption-cum moral hazaid, and the initial devaluation were the main cause of the 
crisis that were pointed out by most observers. But as time passed by, the wealaiesses 
in international financial market aie much more widely recognised. In fact, Paul 
Krugman also has changed his view on the causes of the crisis. Initially Krugman 
(1998), stated that the cause were problems within the Asian economies, together with 
corruption and moral hazaid which led to over-investment and boom-bust cycle. 
However (Kingman, 1999) argues that the blame should be on financial panic and 
overly liberalisation in international and domestic financial system rather than the 
factors above.
2.2.1 Fundamentals
A rising number of resear chers, however, attribute the crisis to weaknesses within the 
Asian economies. The starting point is that Asian countries experienced an average 
real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate in excess of 9% during 1992-1995. 
Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia particularly experienced average growth rate above 
7 percent during this period.^ Although the Philippines has experienced the lowest
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growth among these countiies, the country experienced accelerated growth in the mid 
1990’s with average growth rising to above 5% by 1995-1996. (See figiue 4.1).
One of the factors that had attracted foreign investment to these countries was rapid 
economic growth that was outward-oriented. These economies also experienced 
remarkable macroeconomic stability, with modest inflation rates, at least by the 
standard of developing countries. Thailand was exceptional at the coimtry experienced 
government surpluses between 1988/1996, although the Philippines continued to incui' 
a persistent general govermnent deficit.
There were sizeable cuirent accoimt deficits especially in Malaysia and Thailand, but 
these were the outcome of the shortfalls of private saving in relation to private 
investment, and not necessarily public sector dis-saving. These deficits were not a 
matter of policy concern because the monetary policy stance appeal's to have been set 
appropriately (IMF 1997). It is also argued that the private saving shortfalls were 
associated not with low savings but extraordinai'ily high investment levels associated 
with high growth performance and the projected foreign exchange earning potential.
As pointed out in tlie World economic Outlook (1997), these successes brought mixed 
results. Absorption of the capital inflows posed challenges, i.e. in terms of their 
productive deployment and their sensible intermediation tlirough financial systems 
that were not well developed or sophisticated enough. The potential variability of the 
inflows also imposed challenges for macroeconomic policy, and exchange rate 
management in particular. It was therefore incumbent upon the macroeconomic 
policies and the soundness of financial systems to deal with the difficulties.
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There was also a stark contrast in term of inflows of funds because foreign direct 
investment (FDI) dominated net private inflows in countries such as China and 
Vietnam while tlie short-term inflows were substantial for countries such as 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. In the case of Thailand, the short-term 
inflows became increasingly dominant rising to the equivalent of 7-10 % of GDP each 
yeai' during 1994-1996. (See table 2.1). The worsening scenaiio is evident fiom the 
fact tliat Malaysia’s short-term capital was 4-4.5% of GDP while its foreign direct 
investment (FDI) was at 5% of GDP duiing 1995-1996.
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Table 2.1:Capital Flows for the Four Asian Countries 
(Percent of GDP)
Countiy 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Malaysia
Net private capital flows ^ 11.2 15.1 17.4 1.5 8.8 9.6 4.7
Net direct investment 8.3 8.9 7.8 5.7 4.8 5.1 5.3
Net portfolio investment - - - - - - -
Other net investment 2.9 6.2 9.7 -4.2 4.1 4.5 -0.6
Net Official flows 0.4 -0.1 -0.6 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Change in reserves^ -2.6 -11.3 -17.7 4.3 2.0 -2.5 3.6
Indonesia
Net private capital flows^ 4.6 2.5 3.1 3.9 6.2 6.3 1.6
Net direct investment 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.4 2.3 2.8 2.0
Net portfolio investment - - 1.1 0.6 0.7 0.8 -0.4
Other net investment 3.5 1.4 0,7 1.9 3.1 2.7 0.1
Net Official flows 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.1 -0.2 -0.7 1.0
Change in reserves^ -2.4 -3.0 -1.3 0.4 -0.7 -2.3 1.8
Thailand
Net private capital flows^ 10.7 8.7 8.4 8.6 12.7 9.3 -10.9
Net direct investment 1.5 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.3
Net portfolio investment - 0.5 3.2 0.9 1.9 0.6 0.4
Other net investment 9.2 6.8 4.1 7.0 10.0 7.7 -12.6
Net Official flows 1.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.7 4.9
Change in reserves^ -4.3 -2.8 -3.2 -3.0 -4.4 -1.2 9.7
other net investment may include some official flows 
 ^A minus sign indicates an increase
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Table 2.1: continued
Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Philippines
Net private capital flows^ 1.6 2.0 2.6 5.0 4.6 9.8 0.5
Net direct investment 1.2 1.3 1.6 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4
Net portfolio investment 0.3 0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.3 -0.2 -5.3
Other net investment 0.2 0.6 1.1 2.5 2.4 8.5 4.5
Net Official flows 3.3 1.9 2.3 0.8 1.4 0.2 0.8
Change in reserves^ -2.3 -1.5 -1.1 -1.9 -0.9 -4.8 2.1
‘ other net investment may include some official flows 
 ^A minus sign indicates an increase 
Source: IMF (1997)
A lar ge proportion of short-term flows came from the international banlc lending, with 
Eiu'opean and Japanese banks being particularly active in the emerging market 
economies of Asia (see table 2.2)
Table 2.2: International Bank Lending to East Asia 
(In billion of US Dollars)
Country Malaysia Indonesia Thailand Philippines
US banks 2.3 5.3 5.0 3.9
Japanese
Banks
8,2 22.0 37.5 1.6
European 
Union banks
9.2 21.0 19.2 6.3
Total Int’l 
Lending
22.2 55.5 70.2 13.3
Source: IMF (1997)
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It was also argued that the macroeconomic performance of the South East Asia 
economies during the eaily to mid 1990s concealed various elements of overheating, 
which triggered questions about sustainability of the exchange rate policy. For 
instance, in Malaysia and Thailand there were signals of higher inflation in output 
prices, and substantial and growing external current account deficits - which mdicated 
that the growth of domestic demand was putting pressing on external liquidity. Also 
the inflation rate that prevailed during 1993-1996 was somewhat higher than the 
weighted average of trading partners’ inflation rates, therefore signalling erosion of 
external competitiveness.
The exchange rate problem can be traced to the early 1990s when most government of 
Asian countries kept the exchange rate fixed, and expressed every hope that such 
policies would be sustained. This encouraged short-term capital inflows, as investors 
did not expect losses from exchange rate movements. In addition, the price of tradable 
goods and services were kept relatively fixed while the prices of non-tradable goods 
and services rose as a result of the investment boom. Consequently, the real exchange 
rate began to gradually appreciate as no adjustments were made to cater for domestic 
inflation. Radelet and Sachs (1999), estimate the overvaluation to be in the range of 
20% in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.
The trigger to financial panic was increased when governments of the Asian countries 
ran down their foreign exchange reserves to defend pegged cuiTencies, which, 
according to Radelet and Sachs (1999) first gave undue over confidence to investors; 
second, allowed an overvaluation in real term and third, set the stage for financial 
panic.®
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Financial Sector and Other Structural Weaknesses
The problem of low quality investment is attributed to financial sector and other 
structmal wealaiesses in these countries. Inadequate regulation and supervision and 
also weaknesses in governance at a general and fundamental level are believed to 
have permitted misallocation of credit and inflated asset prices. As stated by Kocchai', 
Loungani and Stone, “the reforms in the area of regulatory fiameworks and 
institutions failed to keep pace with the changes of global capital flows and in general 
they were not in line witli international accepted best practices.”’
Although financial reforms were intioduced during the 1980s and 1990s the 
enforcement of regulation of the financial sector did not keep pace; a significant 
proportion of credit was being allocated to unproductive or speculative investment. A 
study by Kaminsky and Reinliart (1996) found that for the period 1970-1995, 
financial liberalisation followed by a private lending boom played a significant role in 
raising tlie probability of a banking crisis. Thus problems in the banking system can 
be used as an indicator to predict currency crises.
External Economic Environment
The changes that emerged in the external economic environment of the economies 
concerned are one of the factors that led to the build-up to the recent crisis. In the 
early to mid 1990s there was a decline in asset yield in the industrial economies, 
which contributed to the rise in capital inflows to emerging markets. The weak 
economic performance in most of industrial countries led to accommodative monetary
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policies, abundant liquidity, and low interest rates, which caused an increase in the 
stock markets. The declined in assets yield in industrial countries made the emerging 
markets an increasingly attractive investment oppoitmiity. In addition, a sharp 
narrowing of yield spreads indicated an increased preference among asset holders for 
emerging market investments.
Besides the factors mentioned above, the movements in exchange rate among the 
major currencies have also been another significant external factor, with a crucial 
effects on the international competitiveness of four* Asian countries. These countries 
gained competitiveness as their ciuTencies depreciated in trade-weighted terms when 
the dollar' weakened during 1994 and eat'ly 1995. But beginning in mid 1995, the 
dollar' had recovered most markedly against the yen, and these countries suffered 
substantial losses in competitiveness.  ^As results of these swings in competitiveness, 
both the ciment account and capital account of the balance of payments were affected.
These countries also experienced a marked slowing down in the growth of their export 
mar’kets^ as shown in figure 2.1, thus causing a sharp slowing down of export 
revenues in most East Asian Economies. A slower export growth may have created 
concerns on the part of creditors about futui'e growth prospects and ability of Asian 
firms to continue to service their debts. Moreover, the establishment of North 
America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) increased the affected countries export 
competition particularly from China and possibly from Mexico.
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Figure 2.1: Export Market Growth for the Four Asian countries 
(Annual Percent Change)
Malaysia
Indonesia
Thailand
Philippines
o>
Year
Source: IMF (1997)
2.2.2 Creditors Panic/Herd Behaviour
It has been argued that the crisis was caused by self-fulfilling panic of creditors and 
investors. Although the Asian countries were vulnerable due to problems such as 
weak financial system, the slowing down of export growth, the overvaluation of the 
real exchange rate, these were not strong enough to cause the crisis to erupt. As stated 
by Radelet and Sachs, it must come from the investors’ incentive to pull out their 
money, as they believe other investors were also doing the same thing. Self-fulfilling 
panic can occur when the level of short-term foreign liabilities relative to a short-term 
foreign asset is high. Every creditor then knows that he should withdraw capital ahead 
of other creditors. Creditors know that the last short-term creditor to withdraw funds 
will not be repaid on time, as the available short-term assets cannot cover all of the
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short-term liabilities. Accordingly there ai e several pieces of evidence in favour of the 
panic interpretation in Asia, both direct and indirect.
There is also considerable debate on factors that are responsible for the spread of 
causes across countries. Once again tlie question arises of whether the weakness of the 
economic fundamentals in afflicted countries justify the transmission of crisis or is it 
the panic and herding behaviour of investors in fear of financial losses? Radelet and 
Sachs (1998a, 1998b) argued that the region is regai'ded as a single entity and 
therefore many international lenders expected other countries in the region to 
experience the same problem as Thailand. As stated by Radelet and Sachs (1998b) 
“herd behaviour is the action of creditors which is based on the actions of other 
creditors, and not on the basis of the debtors’ fundamental behaviour as perceived by 
the individual investor”. Here, contagion is driven by the irrational behaviour of 
international lenders. While Corsetti et.al (1999) pointed out that the reason for the 
spread was a natuial inseparability, derived from tiade links and financial links 
between the countries, and the retaliatory economics of competitive devaluation.
2.3 Contagion
As stated by Radelet and Sachs (1998), one of the featur es of the Asian crisis was the 
speed and the extent to which the crisis spread from Thailand to other countries. For 
the last few years, many studies have been carried out to analyse the reasons and 
causes for financial crisis to spread across countries.
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Specifically, as stated in the literature, causes of contagion can broadly be categorised 
into four groups/"^ They aie; i) ‘fundamental contagion’, ii) ‘real integration 
contagion’ iii) ‘herding contagion’ and iv) ‘institutional contagion’. The first two 
groups are based on real factor in an economy, while the other two aie related to 
financial phenomena.
i) ‘Frmdamental contagion’ indicates that the transmission of a crisis occurs if 
the affected countries have similar economic fundamentals or if they face 
common external shocks. Once a financial crisis occuired in one coimtry, 
investors and speculators become more sensitive to the risks in other countries 
and lessen their exposure in tliese countries that have similaiiy weak 
fimdamentals as the country where the crisis originated, hence spreading the 
crisis across economies.
ii) ‘Real integration contagion’ is the phenomenon in which investors and 
speculators become more cautious and reduce their exposure in those 
economies, wliich are closely integrated either as trading partners or as 
competitors with a country where a crisis occurred. Although Üiose countries 
may have soimd economic fundamentals, a government of one country might 
want to devalue its currency to regain competitiveness once a currency 
collapsed in a closely related coimtry.
iii) ‘Herding contagion’ refers to the behavioin of investor who follow other 
investors without forming Üieir own expectations or gaining first-hand 
information that could rationalise the change of their actions. Herding 
behaviour' is rational in the sense that acquiring information that is required for 
making more informed decision may be costly. It is rational for smaller
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investors to follow large investors who have superior information. Herding 
behaviour can therefore explain how a few large investors and speculators can 
move markets and how a few individual pessimistic expectations can develop 
into a vicious cycle of self-fulfilling,
iv) A financial crisis in one coimtry is usually accompanied by a decline in stock 
market returns. ‘Institutional contagion’ refers to the behaviour of investors to 
reduce asset holding in other countries, even if those are initially not affected. 
Fund managers may lower asset holding in other countries either to balance 
portfolios and to optimise the overall risk/return ratio, or to raise cash to meet 
redemption that results from investors withdrawing fimds.
As stated by Fratzcher (1998), empirically, many studies link the onset of the crisis 
with the fundamental contagion. However, there are few studies that attempt to 
identify sources of other types of contagion. For instance, Frankel and Sclimukler 
(1996) look at the prices and net asset values of country fimds for Latin American and 
they find out that the speed of the Mexican crisis to other Latin American maiket is 
based on herding and institutional contagion. By contrast, Calvo and Reinliai't (1996) 
argue that the stock market crash during the Latin America crisis 1994-95 can be 
explained partly by economic fimdamentals and are partly due to high financial 
integration with Mexico. Eichengreen et.al (1996) show that trade integration and 
linkages are the explanation for the spread of currency crisis among industiialised 
countries.
Fratzcher (1998) finds that the transmission of Asian crisis is based on contagion that 
has nothing to do with Hie strength of the economic fundamentals of affected
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coimtries. The spread of the crisis across country is explained by high financial 
integration and close tiade integration. Goldstein (1998) pointed out that it is imlikely 
to be the bilateral trade or investment share with Thailand. Given the size of Thailand, 
these bilateral relationships are too small to generate such wide-ranging contagion 
(see table 2.3). Besides, if it were bilateral linkages with Thailand that are 
predominant for the pattern of contagion, one would expect to see Malaysia, 
Singapore and Taiwan more affected than Indonesia or South Korea. Accordingly 
there are two explanations for the spread.
Table 2.3; Bilateral Trade Shares with Thailand (1996)
Country Export to Thailand 
(as a% of total exports)
South Korea 2.0
Indonesia 1.8
Malaysia 4.1
Philippines 3.8
Singapore 5.7
Taiwan 3.1
Hong Kong 1.0
Source; Goldstein (1998) p. 18
The first explanation for the spread is the ‘wake-up call’*® hypothesis which says that 
Thailand acted as a wake-up call for investors to reassess the creditworthiness of 
Asian borrowers. Wlien tliey did that reassessment, they found that a few of the Asian 
economies had weaknesses similar* to those in Thailand i.e. large external deficits, 
appreciating real exchange rates, declining quality of investment, a slow down in
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exports and over-expansion in certain key industries. Reassessment of 
creditwoiiliiness is therefore the explanation for the spread of the crisis.
The second explanation is the dynamics of competitive devaluation. It simply say that 
when one by one country in a region undergoes a depreciation of its currency, the 
countries that have not devalued would experience a deterioration in competitiveness 
and thus their currencies become more susceptible to speculative attacks. Devaluation 
therefore becomes their only remedial action as well.
Table 2,4: Asian Intra-regional Trade (1996)
Export Share (as a % of total exports)
Country Emerging Asia Japan
South Korea 37.8 12.3
Indonesia 26.4 28.8
Malaysia 46.8 13.4
Philippines 25.7 17.9
Thailand 36.8 16.8
Hong Kong 47.2 6.6
Source: Goldstein (1998) p.20
As can be seen in table 2.4, the Asian emerging economies have important trade linlcs 
with each other and they also compete in third country markets. This is in line with 
the ‘real integrated contagion’ theory discussed earlier.
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As stated by Lougani, Koclihar and Stone (1998), since the Asian countries tend to 
compete in the same maiket, a crisis in one country can affect the macroeconomic 
fimdamentals of other countries through trade or capital maiket linlcages. A 
devaluation of one currency will have an adverse effect in the international 
competitiveness of other comitries, which may lead to downwai'd pressuie on these 
currencies. Also, these countries also tend to export similar goods to the same 
destinations. For instance tlie bulk of exports of the four Asian countries to the U.S 
can be divided into two product clusters; (i) semiconductors and capital goods 
industries, (ii) apparel, footwear and household goods (see chart 2.1). Clearly export 
competition among coimtries have increased as these countries moved in the direction 
of increasing tlieir shares of semiconductor goods/capital goods while reducing their 
shares of appar el, footwear and household goods (sour ce: see Appendix C).
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Chart 2.1: Share of Exports Products to the U.S
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2.4 The Economic and Social Implications of the Crisis
2.4.1 Impact on Economic Growth.
Prior to the crisis, the East Asia coimtries were not only successful in term of per 
capita income but also achieved substantial reduction in poverty. As reported by Ranis 
and Stewart (1998) there was a strong decrease in the proportion of the population 
that was classified as poor based on their private income. For instance, in Indonesia 
the proportion dropped from 57 percent in 1970 to 15 percent in 1990. While in 
Malaysia the figui'e was 50 percent and 15 percent respectively. Accordingly, the 
success in poverty reduction was achieved tluough tlie outward-oriented growth 
strategy in which these economies focused on rapidly group labom-intensive exports. 
Until the first half of the 1990s, most of the countries experienced high national 
income growth rate, which were aroimd 8 percent. However, this was not long lasting. 
The crisis that erupted in tlie mid 1997 reversed the region’s history of high growth. 
Most countiies experienced negative growth rates. For the case of Indonesia, the 
effect was severe as the country also suffered from political instability and adverse 
climatic condition. Specifically, the growth estimates for 1998 is given in table 2.5. 
Based on UNCTAD (1999) estimation, Indonesia was the hardest hit and only the 
Philippines showed a positive growth. (The recent estimation is given in section 2.7).
42
i
Table 2.5: GDP Growth Rates of Asian Four (1998)
Country 1998(1) 1998(2)
Malaysia -6.2 -7.5
Thailand -8.0 -8.0
Philippines -0.5 +1.0
Indonesia -13.7 -15.3
Source: UNCTAD (1999)
2.4.2 Impact on Trade
In 1996 Asia contributed about 26% of world merchandise exports, however for 
machinery and transport equipment, automotive products, textiles and clothing the 
share was higher. (See: UNCTAD, 1998). Similarly, Asian countiies are also major 
importers and accounted for about 25% of world merchandise imports in 1996. 
Specifically, the A S E A N i s  the third largest group of importers, following Eur opean 
Union and the USA. The compositions of import have mainly been on primary 
commodity such as fiiels, food, ore and metals and agricultmal materials. Asia is tlie 
second largest exporting and importing region with regard to conmiercial service 
ti’ade.
As stated in UNCTAD 1999, the volmne and prices of tr aded good have been affected 
by the crisis. The import volume for the five Asian economies fell in 1998. Percentage 
drop in the Philippines, Korea and Indonesia was 13%, 21% and 27% respectively. 
The import values have dropped even more dramatically. For the first nine months of 
1998, Asia imports fell by 16%, while for the five most affected economies import
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values fell on average by one-third (see UNCTAD 1999). In 1998, Korea, the 
Philippines and Thailand experienced positive export volume growth; conversely 
Indonesia and Malaysia had negative export volume grovrth. With regard to primary 
commodity prices, the prices of agricultural raw materials, timber, metal and energy 
products were affected by the decreased in demand resulting from the crisis.
2.4.3 Social Implication of the Crisis
As previously mentioned, the poverty reduction in Asia was mainly based on high 
growth rates. In line with this, the most significant impact on poverty levels talces the 
form of a reduction in private income. This effect takes place tlirough rising 
unemployment and falling wages. Clear ly, since the onset of the crisis, unemployment 
in the region has increased drastically. For instance, in Thailand the unemployment 
rate had increased from an annual average rate of 2.2% in 1997 to 6.0% in 1998 (see 
ILO, 1998). Table 2.6 shows miemployment rates (%) in the pre-crisis period and at 
the end of 1998.
Table 2.6: Unemployment Rates (1997-1998)
Country Pre-crisis Late 1998
Malaysia 2.6 (end 1997) 5.2
Indonesia 4.9 (August 1997) 15.0
Thailand 2.2 (Feb 1997) 6.0
Korea 2.3 (Oct 1997) 8.4 (Sept 1998)
Singapore 1.8 (end 1997) 4.5 (Sept 1998)
Source: Jones (1998)
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Besides unemployment, the increases in price and interest rates also have an impact 
on living standards. The increase in food price in the wake of the crisis depressed real 
wages. Consequently, households would have to spend a higher proportion of their 
income on food.
2.5 Malaysia Prior to the Crisis.
Prior to the crisis in 1997, there were many favourable features of the Malaysian 
economy. As compare to other economies, Malaysia had a relatively low external debt 
of US$ 45.2 billion or 42% of GDP as at June 1997. The debt service ratio was only
6.1 percent of exports at the end of 1996. The inflation rate was around 3.8%, 
miemployment rate for 1996 was only 2.5% and GDP growth averaged 8.7% per 
amiimi. Although Malaysia’s position was not as bad as other economies, the 
nervousness of the market over some issues in comitries such as Thailand, Indonesia 
led to the ‘contagion’ effect that cause economic crisis. Nevertheless, prior to the 
crisis there were some distmbing signs tliat need attention.
2.5.1 Economic Growth Above Potential Output
Since eaily 1990s, the Malaysian economy has been consistently growing above its 
potential growth path. The potential output is a measme of the fill employment output 
given existing resomces. When actual output drops below potential output, 
unemployment of resomces occms. Conversely, when actual output exceeds potential 
output, this causes over employment of resomces. The output gap is zero when actual 
and potential GDP aie equal in size. Dming 1994-1996, the output gap increased as
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actual GDP increased faster than potential GDP. As a result inflation increased, 
particularly in the form of wage increases above productivity gains. Instead of 
improvements to efficiency, growth dming this period was primarily brought about 
tlnough augmenting inputs -  which is not sustainable in the longer term. It is 
worsened when both capital and labour were imported.
2.5.2 Loss of Efficiency in the Economy
The efficiency in the utilisation of resources in tlie economy is indicated by the rate of 
total factor productivity (TFP) and the incremental capital output ratio (IGOR). Based 
on the TFP growth, it is obvious that it had been decreasing over the years. Basically, 
the Malaysian growth has been driven primarily by a high rate of capital stock 
accumulation. Specifically the IGOR rose from 3.0 in 1988 to 6.5 in 1997. The 
increasing level of IGOR indicate that the use of capital have been increasingly less 
efficient. With a constant IGOR, the economic growth would have been much higher. 
The rising IGOR might also suggest that investment used for capital-intensive 
projects, which need much longer gestation periods, leakage and under-utilised 
capacity. (For a fiill discussion on TFP see chapter 4 -  section 4.3.1.1)
2.5.3 Rising Current Account Deficit
As previously mentioned, the deficit in tlie cmrent accomit is caused by the saving- 
investment gap. Malaysia experienced a cmrent account deficit due to its high 
investment rate (see table 2.7). For some of the years, the current account deficit was 
paitially financed by net long-term capital inflows.
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Table 2.7: Savings-Investment Gap (RM million)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997p
Public gross domestic capital formation 23,760 24,833 27,844 27,970 32,183
Public savings 27,339 32,733 32,763 39,729 47,204
Deficit/suiplus 3,579 7,900 4,919 11,759 15,021
Private gross domestic capital fomiation 38,700 52,070 67,305 75,799 86,499
Private savings 27,195 29,400 40,561 51,788 58,078
Deficit/surplus -11,505 -22,670 -26,744 -24,011 -28,421
Gross domestic capital fonnation 62,460 76,903 95,149 103769 118682
(as % of GNP) 39.8 42.5 45.7 43.6 45.1
Gross national savings 54,534 62,133 73,324 91,517 105282
(as % o f GNP) 34.7 34.4 35.2 38.5 40.0
Balance on current account -7,926 -14,770 -21,825 -12,252 -13,400
(as % of GNP) -5.0 -8.2 -10.5 -5.1 -5.1
Source: National Economic Recovery !Plan (1998).
2.6 Impact of the Crisis on Malaysia
A depreciation of ringgit, enhanced Malaysia’s competitiveness. Malaysia’s real 
effective exchange*^ rate declined starting from July 1997. Consequently, Malaysia’s 
goods became relatively cheaper and more competitive than its trading partners did. 
As discussed in previous section, the impact of the crisis can be seen in the trade 
sector.
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2.6.1 Trade Balance
As a result of the currency depreciation, the cunent accoimt imbalances improved. 
Exports grew faster than import, as the Ringgit became cheaper, eventually this 
helped to reduce the size of the cmrent account deficit.^**
With respect to exporters, the depreciation of the Ringgit boosted exports of 
Malaysia’s products. The value of exports in 1997 grew by 12.4 percent in Ringgit 
term but only 0.5 percent in USD term compared to the previous year. In August 
1998, export growth grew by 44.5 percent in Ringgit term compared to the same 
period in 1997.
2.6.2 Primary Commodities
There was little effect on the Ringgit depreciation on rubber prices since they were 
quoted in Ringgit. The price of rubber (RSSl) increased slightly from 279.3 sen per 
kg in June 1997 to 287.3 sen per kg in April 1998. Tliis was owing to exporter 
adjustment as this increment would be negligible in US dollai* term. Witli regal'd to 
palm oil, the price had risen significantly from RM1215 per tonne in June 1998 to RM 
2366 per tonne in April 1998.
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2.6.3 Manufacturing Exports
The manufacturing sector exports contribute about 80 percent of Malaysia’s total 
exports and they are largely from non-resource based industries. Although, the 
Ringgit depreciated, the private sector did not benefit much from the devalued 
currency. Most firms were already operating at full capacity and could not increase 
exports quickly to take advantage of the depreciating Ringgit. As commonly loiown, 
there is a time lag before the beneficial effects of the currency depreciation trickle 
down to the real economy. Besides that, the cost of inputs that go into manufactuied 
exports increased substantially and this offset the benefit of depreciation.
Sectors that heavily depend on imported machinery and material had been hit most by 
currency depreciation. The cement production for instance, faced a high production 
costs as it used imported input such as coal, gypsum and other raw material. Based on 
the exchange rate of RM 4.00 to US$ 1, the mcrease in cost was about RM 180 
million.
2.7 Recent Asian Four’s Economic Performance.
All countries aie predicted to have positive growth rates in 1999 and 2000 (See report 
by IDE, 2000). For Malaysia, after experiencing a growtli rate of -7.5% in 1998, it 
began to gain back its momentum toward recovery in 1999. Net exports in January- 
August of 1999 amounted to RM46.3 billion -  showing an increased from RM32.5 
billion registered in the same period of previous year. The real teim export to the 
Asian countries and to the United States increased by 11% in 1999.
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As for the year 2000, the Malaysian economy is predicted to have recovered on a 
more solid path. With an increasing world-wide demand for semiconductors and other 
electronics products, it is predicted that Malaysia will experience a growth rate of 
10.5%.
On the other hand, private investment is expected to increase again especially in the 
electronic industry and is forecast to increase by 10.9% in 2000. For the public 
investment, it is expected to increase by 4% in 2000, which this comes from 
investment from infrastiucture improvements. Combining together the above factors, 
the Malaysian economy is forecast to experience a stable growth of 5.6% in 2000. 
(see table 2.8)
Table 2.8: GDP Growth Rate (%)
Countiy 1998* 1999 2000
Malaysia -7.5 4.5 5.6
Indonesia -13.2 0.1 4.5
Thailand -10.0 3.7 4.9
Philippines -0.5 4.9 4.6
Notes to table: * Actual Figures 
Source: IDE (2000)
For Indonesia, 1999 had been a turbulence year for the comitry as there was a series of 
political and social events i.e. the presidential election, independence of East Timor, 
general elections, etc. With this instability conditions, the foreign direct investment 
have continued to flow out, and the net outflow reached to US$230 million in the first 
quarter of 1999. The net outflow of foreign direct investments for the whole year is 
predicted to reach US$1.42 billion. At the same time, the dollar-dominated customs
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cleared exports of goods also decreased by 9.5% for the period of Jaiiuaiy-August 
1999. Private consumption was forecast to increase by 2.4% as income rises. In 
addition, 44% gain in crude oil prices over 1998 boosted government revenues from 
taxes on oil and other related operations. Therefore govermnent consumption 
increased by 7.0% in 1999. Combining together all tlie above factors, Indonesia 
economic growth was ai'ound 0.1% in 1999. As for the year 2000, the Indonesia 
economy is predicted to be 4.5% as Indonesia investment climate improve as well as 
the political and social stability. Exports also aie expected to rebound from negative 
growth experienced in 1998. Total investment also is forecast to increase by 5.0%.
For Thailand, the growth rate for 1999 was 3.7%. With the IMF bailout package, 
which has been in effect since August 1997, Thailand’s macroeconomic management 
is canied out under the guidance of the IMF. Thailand exports of goods and services 
aie expected to increase by 8.0% compared to 5.5% in 1998 owing to an improvement 
in exports to Japan and other East Asian countries. For the year 2000, it is expected 
that Thailand will experience a recoveiy of 4.9% growth rate.
For the Philippines, it is predicted that the economy will make a rebound from —0.5% 
growth rate in 1998 to a positive growth rate of 3.1%.
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2.8 Summary
In this chapter, the causes of the Asian crisis aie analysed. Basically, this can be 
categorised by internal and external factors: massive capital inflows, macroeconomic 
mismanagement, financial sector and other structural weaknesses, and external 
economic factors. However, in term of pinpointing the root of the crisis, there are 
several views i.e. fundamental, creditors panic, capital liberalisation, etc. Different 
views suggest different policy response i.e. if capital liberalisation was die main cause 
then capital control should solve the problem. The issue of contagion is also 
discussed. Generally there are foui* types of contagion in the literature. Based on study 
done by Fratczlier (1998) the Asian crisis can be explained by financial integration as 
well as trade integration. This chapter also analysed the impact of the crisis, which 
can be divided into economic and social implications. Clearly, the Asian crisis has 
seriously affected the region in many ways.
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NOTES
* See Nixson and Walters (1999).
 ^See Radelet and Sachs (1998).
 ^See Jones (1998).
Moral hazard can be identified at the corporate, financial and international level. At 
the corporate level moral hazard arises when government extends guarantees to 
promote both public and private investment by eliminating ceilain risk component. 
Wliile in the financial sector, moral hazard arises because banks have an implicit 
bailout guarantee from the government. As banks reap the benefits of high returns 
but do not necessarily absorbs all the losses in bad times, they are encouraged to 
take on very high-risk projects. At the international level moral hazard arises when 
international creditors over-extended credit to Asian coimtries in the belief that the 
IMF would bail out any trouble countries. See Krugman (1998a, 1999). Also see 
Corsetti et.al. (1999a) where they present a systematic articulation of the moral 
hazar d structural view.
 ^See World Economic Outlook (1997).
 ^For further explanation see Radelet and Sach (1999).
 ^See Kocchar’, Lougani and Stone for the key features of the prudential and regulatory 
framework before the crisis.
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 ^Kocchar, Lougani and Stone (1998) show the conelation coefficient between the yen 
depreciation and real export growth.
 ^The weighted average of export volume growth of partner countries: the weight for 
each partner country is the share of the indicated country’s exports to that partner 
in the total exports of the indicated country.
See Alimad and Loungani (1998) on evidence of the importance o f term of trade 
movement and also changes in oil prices for output fluctuations in Asian 
economies.
** Direct evidence has three main parts; 1) coimtries that were hit were the one that 
had high levels of short-term foreign debt relative to short-term foreign assets. 2) 
coimtries that were hit have different economic structure and fundamentals. 3) 
Even the crisis eased up after about one year even though several fundamentals 
still not improved. Indirect evidence has two main parts; 1) the crisis was 
imexpected, meaning that it can not be explained by fimdamentals. 2) It is hard to 
explain the depth of the crisis based on fundamentals.
See Radelet and Sachs (1998b).
See Frairkel and Schmukler (1996), Calvo and Reinhart (1996) and Eichengreen 
et.al (1996).
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Many have attempted to analyse the reasons and sources for financial crises to 
spread across economies, for instance Franlcel and Schmukler (1996), Calvo and 
Reinhart (1996).
15 See Banerjee (1992) for an example of herding behaviour, also see Calvo (1995).
Goldstein refers to the ‘wake-up call’ as private creditors and rating agencies fell 
asleep prior to the crisis as creditors did not have accurate information on the 
creditworthiness of Asian borrowers, and creditors were awalce but expected 
govermnent (or the IMF) to bail them out in case of tr ouble.
ASEAN economies consist of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, the 
Philippines, Brunei Darussalam and Vietnam.
18 For further detail see Robb (1998).
This rate is most important in determining the international competitiveness of a 
coimtry. It corrects for inflation differential and the market price of the Ringgit 
weighted by some combination of curr encies of Malaysia’s trading partners.
With an exchange rate of RM4.00 to US$1 importers have to pay about 37.5 
percent more compared to pre-crisis when the exchange rate was RM2.50. This 
rate was around mid-Jime 1998.
55
CHAPTER THREE 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
3.1 Introduction
Currency crises have been the subject of an extensive economic literatuie both 
theoretical and empirical. In the 1990s the world has seen currencies crises in Europe, 
Mexico and Asia which have attracted the attention of both academics and policy 
malcers. Researchers tend to undertake new theoretical and empirical analysis in 
explaining these events. The focus has mainly been on the identification of the causes 
and symptoms of the crisis and accordingly the consequences and policy responses.
The question most researchers try to answer is whether these events could be 
predicted tlirough systematic early warning signs or whether they are unpredictable 
like the stock market crashes. By looking at the previous models, it is hoped that the 
causes of currency crisis can be well understood. Specifically this chapter reviews the 
existing work on currency crises. In section 3.2 the theoretical literature is presented 
in which the first, second generation models are discussed as well as the ‘twin crises’. 
Section 3.3 presents recent work on currency crises followed by die empirical 
literatiue in section 3.4. Finally, summary is provided in section 3.5.
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3.2 Theoretical Literature
The theoretical literatme on balance of payment crises has been well developed 
following Kingman’s seminal paper of 1979. Originally, the literature stated that 
crises were caused by wealc economic fundamentals, i.e. the acceleration in the 
domestic credit expansion related to the monetization of fiscal deficit was the main 
factor that explained the loss of international reserves and ultimately, to a speculative 
attack on the currency. This attack depleted reserves and forced the authorities to 
abandon the parity.
However recently many have aigued that tlie authorities might have abandoned the 
parity for reasons otlier than a depletion of official international reserves. The 
authorities may be concerned about the adverse consequences of policies needed to 
maintain the parity i.e. through higher interest rates or other economic variable such 
as the employment level.
Recent models also have suggested that crisis may occur witliout any noticeable 
change in economic fundamental. An important assumption in these models is that 
economic policies were not predetermined but responds to changes in the economy, 
and people considered this relationship in forming their expectations. At the same 
time, economic agents’ expectations and actions affected some variables to which 
economic policies respond. Accordingly, this circularity created the possibility for 
multiple equilibria and the economy may move from one equilibrium to another 
without a change in the fundamentals.
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3.2.1 The First Generation Model
Basically tlie early work on cuiTency crises called the ‘first generation’* was 
developed in response to cmrency crises in developing countries [i.e. Mexico (1973- 
1982) and Argentina (1978-1981)]. This model was derived from the work done by 
Stephen Salant  ^and Dale Henderson (1978), which focused on speculative attacks on 
the govermnent-conti'olled price of gold. Following this, other reseai'chers realised 
that similar logic could be applied not only to speculative attacks on commodity 
boards trying to stabilise commodity prices, but also to central banlcs trying to 
stabilise exchange rates. Soon after the Salant-Henderson model, the currencies crises 
model was designed by Krugman (1979) and was then refined by Flood and Garber 
(1984). They constructed a linear* model simplifying Krugman’s account and extended 
the model to a stochastic environment. Following this Garber and Blanco (1986) 
developed an ear*ly structural test of the first generation model. Since then the model 
has been widely extended.  ^The logic of cmrency crises was similar* to a speculative 
attack on commodity stock."*
Specifically, according to Krugman (1979), under a fixed exchange rate a persistent 
loss of international reserves occms when the domestic credit expansion is in excess 
of the growth in money demand, therefore leading to speculative attack on the 
currencies. Under* these circmnstances, reserves deplete and the authorities are forced 
to abandon the parity. The process then ends with an attack as economic agents 
apprehend that the fixed exchange rate regime will eventually collapse, and therefore 
without an attack they would suffer* a capital loss on their holdings of domestic 
money. The period preceding a cunency crisis tlien is characterised by a gradual but
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persistent decline in international reserves and a rapid growth of domestic credit 
relative to the money demand. In short, the model shows how a fixed exchange rate 
policy combined with excessively expansionary pre-crisis fimdamentals can push the 
economy into crisis.
3.2.2 Second Generation Model^
Generally, the ‘second generation’ model was designed to deal with the speculative 
attack in Einope and Mexico in the 1990s. As pointed out by Flood and Marion 
(1998), these attacks are differed from the one observed in the ‘first generation’ model 
in two ways; (i) some of those speculative attacks in Europe, seemed to be mirelated 
to the economic fundamentals predicted by the ‘first generation’ model, (ii) The 
traditional methods could not be used to support the exchange rate parities, as the 
countries experiencing the attack are handcuffed by the partner’s monetary policies, 
i.e. the business cycle, the banking system, and tight borrowing.
Basically, the focus of the ‘second generation’ models is the importance of 
govermnent’s role. In these models of currency crisis government rationally choose, 
on the basis of their assessment of costs and benefits in term of social welfare. In 
other words, the study dealt with how the government policy reacts to changes in 
private behaviour or when government faces an explicit trade-off between the fixed 
exchange rate policy and other objectives. Specifically, the government has a choice 
whether or not to defend a pegged exchange rate; it needs to use monetary policy to 
defend a pegged exchange rate (i.e. the interest rate). However, the increase in interest 
rates to ward off speculative attack leads to slower economic growth. Given a
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pai'ticulai* constellation of macroeconomic fundamentals and reserves, govermnent 
may become unwilling to defend the cuirency and the speculative attacks become a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. As pointed out by several authors, the East Asian comitries 
does not fit well into either ‘first and second generation’ models of cuiTency crisis 
[see Corsetti et.al (1999), Krugman (1998)]
3.2.3 ‘Twin Crises’
A third proposition Icnows as tlie ‘twin crises’, focuses on the interaction between 
banldng crises and balance of payment crises.^ Here the role of the banking sector and 
the reversal flow prior to financial crises are emphasised. Many of the balance of 
payment crises are preceded by a rapid expansion in banking activity and they often 
coincide with domestic banking crises. A study by Kaminsky and Reinliait (1996) 
shows that financial liberalisation and deregulation are closely related to the 
emergence of banking crises.
3.3 Recent Work on Currency Crises
There have been a growing volmne of literatuie on the causes and effects of the Asian 
crisis. A list of potential market fundamentals has been provided by recent theoretical 
work. However, since the relative importance of various fimdamentals varies over­
time for a single country and also varies across countries, it is quite difficult to draw a 
conclusion fiom these results.
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Before the 1990s, the staiidai'd ‘first generation’ models have played a crucial role in 
identifying fundamentals useful for prediction. It was believed that the main cause of 
a speculative attack was a fiscal deficit financed by domestic credit creation. 
International reserves will gradually decline as the monetaiy authority monetized the 
budget deficit. The government reserve holdings will be depleted as they are used to 
defend the investors’ attack on the fixed exchange rate. In other words, the decline in 
international reserves played an important role in triggering the collapse of a fixed 
exchange rate.
Recent models have suggested that the countries might decide to abandon the parity 
with concern about the evolution of other key economic variables. A variety of factors 
may affect the authorities’ objective function and these could be used as leading 
indicators of a currency crisis, [see Ozkan and Sutherland (1995)]. A decision to 
maintain a fixed exchange rate by increasing the domestic interest rate may result in 
higher financing cost for the government. If the authorities aie concerned about the 
fiscal consequences of their exchange rate policy, the decision to abandon the parity 
may depend on the stock of public debt.
Recent models have also suggested that crises could occur without any noticeable 
change in economic fundamentals. The contingent nature of economic policies may 
give rise to multiple equilibria and generate self-fulfilling crisis. These models 
assimie tliat economic policies aie not predetermined but respond to changes in the 
economy and economic agents also take this relationship into account in forming their 
expectations. At the same time, the expectations and actions of economic agents also 
affect some vaiiables to which economic policies respond. Thus, the economy may
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move from equilibrium to another without a change in the fundamentals. However, 
models of self-fulfilling are difficult to predict as it may be difficult to find a tight 
relationship between fundamentals and crises; crises may sometimes occur* without a 
previous significant change in fimdamentals.
Goldstein (1998) published a book on which he explains how the Asian crisis arose 
and spread. The two main explanations ar*e financial sector* wealaiesses and external 
sector* problems. The conective policy measure that could help to end the crisis is also 
outlined. In addition, the shortcomings that occur* in the international financial system 
that requires reform ar e also suggested to reduce the chances of a recurrence.
Montes (1998) also published a book in an attempt to imderstand the South East Asian 
crisis. He suggests that the crisis originated from the banking sector* due to imprudent 
expansion and diversification of domestic financial market, fuelled by short-term 
private borrowings. However, this was true in the case of Thailand, but less so for* 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. According to him, although there was huge 
current accoimt deficit, the fom* Asian countries had a high saving rates and low 
inflation rates in the 1990s. Thus, the South East Asia vulnerability was due to ‘credit 
crunch’. Cited in Motes, a study done by Kaminsky and Reinliart (1996) states that 
there were only three banldng crises associated with the 25 balance of payment crises 
during 1970-1979. However, dining 1980-1995, there were 22 banking crisis 
coincided with 46 balance of payment crisis. This was due to financial liberalisation 
from the 1980s. Therefore, the SouÜi East Asian currency crisis is attributed to the 
‘twin liberalisation’ of domestic financial system and the opening of the capital
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account. In addition, he also suggests measures to insulate the domestic banking 
system for short-term volatility through regulatory measures and capital control.
Krugman (1999) also published a book on Asian crisis in which he explains how the 
event could have occurred, how the affected countries can recover, and how coimtries 
can prevent the crisis from reoccurring. The main question about the recession that 
spread across Asia was, how did it happen?. Krugman stated that what really 
happened was 'panic' which can be explained by a circular* process. He used figure to 
illustrate the process - loss of confidence; plunging cmrency, rising interest rates, 
slumping economy; financial problems for* companies, banlcs and households. Start 
anywhere in the circle, let say, with a decline in confidence would make both 
domestic and foreign investors want to pull their money out of the country, ceteris 
paribus, this would cause the cmrency to plunge in value. Since the central bank could 
not support the value of its cunency by buying it on the foreign exchange market, the 
only way it could prevent the cmrency's decline was to raise interest rates and pull the 
local cmrency out of circulation. However, both the decline in the currency's value 
and the rise in interest rates created financial problems for business, financial 
institutions and companies. Since many of them had dollai* debts, this became more 
bm densome as the number of local cuiTency per dollar increased. On the other hand if 
they had debts in local cmrency, it also became haider to service as interest rates 
soaied. This caused loss of confidence even fm*ther and the economy went into a 
meltdown.
63
3.4 Empirical Literature
Generally, a number of variables have been used in the empirical literature to 
characterise the period preceding cuirency crises. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) 
provide an extensive review on empirical studies on currency crisis. Their studies 
provide information on the numerous and vaned experiences with cuirency crises, 
which cover both industrial and developing countries. Frankel and Rose (1996) also 
present a study in which few indicators are examined to explain cuiTency crises. The 
study covers 105 developing countries for the period of 1971-1992. Indicators that 
have been used aie such as fiscal deficit/GDP, per capita GDP growth, 
reserves/imports, current account/GDP, etc. Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1995) 
investigates why some countries were more affected by the Mexican crisis than 
others. Indicators such as real exchange rate, saving/GDP, capital inflows/GDP, 
consumption/GDP, current account/GDP aie used.
3.4.1 Indicators
Based on the empirical studies, there aie a laige number of variables used as 
indicators of currency crises. Basically, all vaiiables can be divided into a few broad 
categories and subcategories. These include: -
i) CuiTent account: real exchange rate, cuirent account balance, trade balance, 
imports, term of ti*ade, price of exports, saving and investment.
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ii) Capital account: foreign direct investment, short-term capital, flows, capital 
flows, international reserves, and differentials between domestic and foreign 
interest rates.
iii) Debt: total external debt, short term debt, debt service, foreign aid, etc.
iv) International vaiiables: foreign real GDP growth, interest rates and price level.
v) Real Sector: real GDP growth, output, employment/unemployment, wages, 
and change in stock
vi) Fiscal Vaiiables: fiscal deficit, govermnent consumption, credits to the public 
sector.
vii) Political Instability
From the studies, it can be seen that vaiiables such as international reserves, the real 
exchange rate, credit growth, and domestic inflation have received a great deal of 
support as usefril indicators of cmrency crises. In addition, the trade balance, export 
performance, real GDP growth and the fiscal deficit also received support. It has also 
been observed that the cmrent account balance did not receive much support as a 
useful indicator of crises as the information provided by the behaviom of the current 
account balance to some extent may already be reflected in the evolution of the real 
exchange rate. This is proved as most of the studies in which the effect of the cmrent 
accoimt balance was found to be non-significant; the real exchange rate was included 
but had a significant effect.
In this study, the third set of vaiiables, debt, will be focused in explaining the Asian 
crisis. Specifically, variable such as debt/GDP, debt/export are used to calculate a 
solvency index^ to see whether there was evidence of insolvency prior to the crisis.
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3.5 Summaiy
Empirical studies show that tliere are a broad vaiiety of indicators that can be used to 
predict currency crises. Indicators such as the real exchange rate, the tiends of the 
international reserve, domestic credit, and domestic inflation have proved to be useful 
in predicting crises. Other indicators such as the trade balance export performance, 
real GDP growth, and money growth, M2/international reserves and fiscal deficit have 
also received support as useful indicators.
The debt vaiiable is the main focus of this study; the solvency index that is calculated 
in chapter six is based on the debt indicator i.e. total external debt, total debt service. 
However, instead of using debt as a percentage of GDP or export, a lineai* 
combination of these two indicators is used to avoid the moral hazai'd problem. Detail 
discussion on this issue is given in chapter 6.
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NOTES
* See Nixson and Walters (1999).
 ^ Salant was an economist worked at the Boaid of Governor of the Federal Reserve
system at that time.
See Flood and Marion (1998) for a full detail on the ‘first generation’ model.
A detail survey on this model is provided by Agenor, Bhandari and Flood (1992).
 ^Full detailed on this model is given in Flood and Marion (1998).
 ^Among major contributions to the literature on the ‘twin crisis’ are Velasco (1987), 
Goldfajn and Valdes (1997), Chang and Velasco (1998a, 1998b)
 ^In this study, the linear* combination of GDP and expor*ts is used to avoid the moral- 
hazar'd problem.
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CHAPTER FOUR
MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOK
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in chapter 2, there are several views that have been put forth about the 
root of the crisis, ranging from fundamental weaknesses, a deteriorating cmrent 
account, and a slow down in growth rate due to a high short-term debt. Wliile, others 
believe that it was a case of creditors and investors panic, a view, which states that the 
sudden shifts in market expectations and confidence, miexplained by fundamentals, 
were the cause of the initial financial turmoil. Wlien the crisis erupted, it caused panic 
in tlie domestic and foreign investors. Radelet and Sachs (1998), however, argue that 
it was partly caused by the faulty policy response of the IMF and the international 
financial community.*
In this chapter, the macroeconomic outlook of the four Asian comitries is analysed 
prior to the crisis. Specifically discussion on cmrent account deficit is presented in 
section 4.2, followed by tlie macroeconomic fundamentals prior to the crisis in section 
4.3. (i.e. real exchange rate, inflation rate, saving and investment, foreign reserves, 
etc). Section 4.4 discusses the issue of foreign debt, and a summary is provided in 
section 4.5.
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4.2 Current Account Imbalances
Evidence on current account imbalances can be used to analyse the Asian crisis. As 
stated in the literatuie the cmrent accomit deficit can be one of the sources that cause 
disruptive tensions in the financial markets. There are quite a number of studies that 
examine with financial and balance of payment crises. [See: Dornbusch et.al (1995), 
Mislrkin (1996), Kaminsky etal (1998)]. Cited in Corsetti e tal (1999) Lawrence 
Summers, the US Deputy Treasury Secretary, wi'ote in The Economist that any 
current accomit deficit which exceeds 5 percent of GDP has to be given close 
attention, especially if it is financed in a way tliat could lead to rapid reversals.^ By 
referring to tins figure, obviously several Asian comitries might have tlie problem. 
One can obviously notice that those countries that have sizable cunent account 
deficits in the 1990s were those cmrencies collapsed in 1997.
The four Asian comitries’ cmrent accomit in the 1990s is shown in table 4.1. Both 
Thailand and Malaysia experienced deficits over the decade. Thailand experienced 
over 6% of gross domestic product (GDP) in each year in the 1990s and reached about 
9% of GDP in 1995 and 1996. In the Malaysian case, the deficit was above 10% of 
GDP in 1993 but then dropped to 3.7% of GDP in 1996. Similarly, the Philippines 
also experienced the imbalances with a deficit of ar ound 5% of GDP for fom* year's, 
which was still high in the remaining years, while Indonesia experienced over 4% of 
GDP in 1990-1991. However, the deficit reduced again in 1995-1996 to 3-4% of the 
GDP.
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Table 4.1: Current Account (% of GDP)
Countiy 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Malaysia -2.3 -1.4 -3.4 -10.1 -6.6 -8.9 -3.7 -3.5
Indonesia -4.4 -4.4 -2.5 -0.8 -1.5 -4.3 -3.3 -3.6
Philippines -6.3 -2.5 -3.2 -6.7 -3.7 -5.1 -4.7 -6.1
Thailand -8.7 -8.0 -6.2 -5.7 -6.4 -8.4 -8.5 -2.4
Sources: International Financial Statistic, Corsetti, et.al (1999)
Compared to the 1980s, the current account deficits for these countries were far 
higher. In the late 1980s, the current account deficits averaged about 0.3% of GDP in 
the five countries (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines and Korea). In fact, 
during this time Malaysia experienced current account surpluses of 2.4% of GDP. 
Conversely, current account deficits averaged 4.0% of GDP between 1990-1996.
Based on the current account positions, it is clear' that there was preliminary evidence 
that the cur'rency crises were associated with an external competitiveness problem. 
Those countries with large current account deficit throughout the 1990s were the ones 
that came under attack in 1997. Apparently, the appreciation of the U.S dollar relative 
to the cmrencies of the liigh deficit countries i.e Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Indonesia approached 78, 52, 52 and 151% respectively.^ Countries that 
experienced small deficit or surpluses in their cmrent accoimt did not suffer a 
compaiable depreciation. Hence, it can be concluded that the problems in the cunent 
account may have played a significance role in the Asian crises. However, it is 
commonly argued that cmrent account deficits me not always a good predictor as can 
be seen in comitries such as Indonesia and South Korea with the smallest deficits were
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the hai'dest hit couiiti'ies, whereas Malaysia’s deficit was much larger in 1995 (8.9% 
of GDP) than it was in 1996 (3.7%).
As stated eaiiier, debt/GDP ratio is usually used to measure the solvency of a country. 
The so-called “resource balance gap” "* can be calculated which is the difference 
between the cmrent trade balance and trade surplus, required to stabilize the debt to 
GDP ratio in the long run. Accordingly, a country with a laige trade deficit to GDP or 
lai'ge debt to GDP ratio or laige differential between the interest rate and the growth 
rate of the economy will have a lar ger gap.
In calculating the ‘resomce balance gap’ one needs to malce assumptions about the 
long run differential between the real interest rate and the growth rate of the economy. 
It is aigued both at the theoretical and empirical level that the difference is positive in 
a steady state, although negative values are observed in the short run.
According to Corsetti et.al (1999), the trade balance adjustment required to stabilize 
the foreign debt to GDP ratio at the 1996 value for Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and 
the Philippines was 2.3%, 6.9%, 3.3% and 6.5% respectively (assuming that the 
differential between the real exchange rate and output growth is 1%). Obviously, the 
resource gaps were quite large in 1996.
With regar d to external imbalances, the issue of sustainability becomes complex. It 
can be related not only to the comitry’s ‘willingness to pay’ but also the creditor 
‘willingness to lend’. This is discussed in chapter 6. With the Asian’s cmrent accoimt 
position in mind, we proceed to the analysis of the macroeconomic fundamentals.
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4.3 Macroeconomic Fundamentals
4.3.1 The Growth Rates
A lai'ge cunent account deficit will not be a problem as long as a country has a high 
current and expected economic growth. The East Asian economies experienced a 
rapid growth with equity, which caused a reduction in poverty and increase in 
longevity. During the period fiom 1966 to 1996, per capita income grew at an average 
annual rate of 4.4 percent in Malaysia, 4.7 percent in Indonesia, and 5.2 percent in 
Thailand. This growth together with a relatively unchanged income distribution 
caused a dramatic drop in poverty rates. Specifically, figme 4.1 shows GDP growth 
rate in 1990s for the four' Asian economies. It is clear' that all countries had 
remarkably high growth rates in the 1990s. The average was more than 7 percent of 
GDP, except for the Philippines where growth rates were low in the early 1990s, but 
still averaged 5 percent after 1994. In 1996, the region experienced a marginal 
slowdown in growth (source; see Appendix C)
Specifically, the real GDP per capita annual growth averaged just over 5 percent for 
East Asia between 1965-1989. As stated in the World Banlc (1993), among the 
common featuies of this high perfoiinance were high saving and investment rates, 
high growth rates of human and physical capital, high productive growth, and high 
growth in manufactured exports. ^
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Despite the fact that dming 1960s to 1990s, the East Asia countries experienced a 
tremendous economic performance, the extent of economic meltdown experienced in 
late 1997 means that it might not be relevant to talk of an East Asia miracle. As 
defined by Morrisey and Nelson “ a miracle is something that cannot be explained, a 
surprise can be explained (in that one can identify the contributing factors) but was 
not anticipated”*". Following tliis it is argued by several authors (see Krugman (1994) 
and Yoimg (1992, 1994, 1995) that the Asian economic miracle was not due to total 
factor productivity (TFP) growth but rather to factor accumulation i.e. capital and 
labour inputs.
This view was controversial as it implies that the TFP growth contributes very little 
for the Asian economic growth and also the high rates of Asian economic growth 
would not be sustainable in the long run. Kingman's views were debatable and 
criticized by several authors who argued that the method used underestimate output 
and productivity due to errors in the measurement of the growth in productivity in the 
service sector. In addition, data availability and reliability differ substantially among 
countries, therefore the estimation of TFP is difficult to compare internationally, 
despite the same method being adopted, (see section 4.3.1.1 for furtlier discussion).
A high economic growth may also make a country more vulnerable to a crisis. As 
stated by Corsetti et.al (1999) this is due to overly optimistic beliefs that the economic 
expansion will persevere unabated in the future. Eventually, this will lead to an 
increase in both consumption and investment, and large capital inflows that can make 
it easy to finance the increasing demand. Under these circumstances, currency crises
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can be trigged by an external shock, which can lead to a sudden change in expectation 
and cause a rapid reversal of capital flows.
As pointed out by Corsetti et.al, although the argument of TFP can predict a 
slowdown of growth, obviously it cannot explain the Asian crisis in 1997. However, it 
does point out that tire high rate of growth of the 1990s into the future was not 
necessarily warxanted by frindarnentals. High growth rates can affect the savings and 
investment decision as it may have contributed to a lower riskiness and costs of a 
strategy of excessive reliance on foreign capital and curi'ent account imbalances.
4.3.1.1 Total Factor Productivity
Many attempts have been made to explain the East Asia economic success or 
‘miracle'. As mentioned in chapter 1, the economic performance of the countries was 
obvious in the 1990s compare to a few decades ago. Many have agreed that the most 
important reason for the East Asia economic success was the adoption of an export- 
oriented industrialization strategy. By contrast, other developing countries got trapped 
as they adopted import substitution.
The literature on economic growth focused attention on the question of which factor 
of production is the most important in maintaining long-rim sustainable growth. The 
early growth models i.e. Hari'od-Dornar, Ranis-Fei ^and big push suggested that 
investment and savings were the important factors that contribute to the long-run 
sustainable growth. However, in 1960s and 1970s it was thought that the 
teclinological change was the primary determinant of long-term growth. As capital is
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associated with diminishing returns and capital and technology are mobile across 
countries, over time there will be a process of growth convergence between developed 
and developing countries. In the 1980s, the new growth theory emerged, which once 
again stressed the importance of investment deriving from increasing returns to 
capital. The new growth theory also implies a divergence of growth between 
developed and developing countries overtime as capital accumulation is more rapid in 
developed cormtries and subject to increasing returns. However, there is doubt on the 
implications of the new growth theory as Young (1992, 1995) finds that Hong Kong 
and Singapore experienced similar rates of high economic growth, although Singapore 
had much higher rates of capital accumulation than Hong Kong. In his series of papers 
(1992, 1994, 1995) he argues that the East Asian countries experienced high growth 
rates tlirnugh an increasing rates of labour force par ticipation and through high rates 
of investment. Krugman (1994) also emphasizes that the economic growth of East 
Asia is not sustainable in the long run as the growth of the economies come much 
more from factor accumulation rather than improvement in TFP.
Yormg (1992, 1994, 1995) and Kim and Lau (1994), find that the productivity growth 
in East Asia countries are relatively low. These results are derived from the growth 
accormting approach based on the transcendental logarithmic (translog) production 
function.
Although the translog production function provides some theoretical justifications for 
the commonly used procedures in growth accormting studies, there exists problems of 
factor input measurements i.e. the measurement of capital inputs. Basically, the 
measurement of TFP depends on few things such as the specification of the
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relationship between input and output, the right measuiement of the factor inputs and 
also the weight used to the different categories of input in the aggregation of sub­
inputs. However, as stated by Chen (1997) data availability and reliability differ 
substantially among countries; therefore the estimation of TFP is difficult to compare 
internationally, despite the same methodology being adopted. Accordingly, the low 
TFP growth in East Asia could be related to the improper measurement of capital 
inputs.
4.3.1.2 Empirical Studies on East Asian Economic Growth and TFP.
From the literatrrre, the empirical results of studies on developed and developing 
cormtries are quite different. Most of the studies of developed economies indicates 
that TFP is more important source of growth than factor inputs i.e. Denison (1967) 
find that over 50% of output growth could not be explain by increases in factor inputs 
for eight European cormtries. Kanornori (1972) find that in 1955-1968, 60% of 
Japan’s output growth was explained by TFP. Chen (1977) formd that for the period 
of 1955-1970, 55.1% of Japan’s economic growth was due to TFP.
Empirical studies of growth accounting for developing cormtries in Asia began in the 
late 1960s. In most of the studies the role of TFP in economic growth is much less 
important than in the findings for developed countries. Table 4.2 shows a summary of 
empirical studies of the Asian cormtries. Most of the studies use the same method. 
However, they involved a different time period and therefore the adjustment made to 
the data is based on different assumptions.
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Chen (1977), does not make adjustments to the official data but he calculates the 
capital stock data for Singapore and Hong Kong using the conventional approach of 
accumulating investment to an assumed or derived base year- capital stock. For the 
definition of TFP, Chen includes tlie effect of resource reallocation. Therefore, the 
residual or TFP includes everything i.e. the quality changes of capital that are not 
reflected by the official price deflator, the quality change of laboui', the effects of 
resources reallocation and economies of scale, etc. In short, 50% of output growth can 
be explained by TFP, which by assumption includes most of the quality of factor 
inputs.
The World Bank (1993) study uses labour input adjusted for education attainment and 
capital input deflated by a modified deflator; therefore tlie residual or TFP excludes 
most quality changes in factor inputs. If TFP is considered as technological change, 
much of the quality improvement in factor inputs is therefore not counted as 
technological change; TFP is largely a concept of disembodied technological change.
Yormg (1995) makes an adjustment on the data of factor inputs to get rid of the 'scale 
effect' - .i.e. quality change in the process of the aggregation of sub-inputs. He 
classifies capital input into 5 categories, and cross-classifies labour by up to seven 
attributes. Therefore the residual or TFP or teclmological change in his estimates 
excludes quality improvements in factor inputs. His TFP by assumption is largely 
disembodied technological change.
Based on the above adjustments made to quality improvements in factor inputs, 
different studies achieved different results for TFP estimates. With a substantial and
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carefiil adjustments made to quality improvements in factor inputs i.e. in Young’s 
(1995) study, the residual or TFP estimates is relatively small. In short, when factor 
inputs are adjusted extensively for quality improvement, the estimation of TFP will be 
smaller.
Although the concept of TFP is very useful, there is a limitation of its usefulness for 
tlie study of economic growth. TFP should be used only for disembodied 
teclmological change. It depends on how factor input data are measuied. TFP can also 
include many other sources of growth because TFP is just a residual. Data availability 
and reliability aie major problems in developing countries; therefore it is quite 
difficult to make a comparison of different studies. Accordingly the importance of the 
residual would be smaller if capital utilization, capital input deflators, etc are taken 
into account.
4.3.2 Investment Rates/ Private and Public Savings
The cuiTent account is equal to the difference between national savings and 
investment, and therefore a deficit can occur due to a fall in savings or an increase in 
investment. As commonly known, borrowing from abroad is less ‘dangerous’ for 
sustainability if it is used to finance new investment, which leads to increased 
productive capacity and to higher frituie export receipts, rather than consumption. In 
this respect, a crurent account deficit, which is accompanied by a fall in saving rates is 
regarded as more problematic than a deficit accompanied by rising investment rates. 
According to Jomo (1998) in 1997, the savings-investment gap was 5% of GNP; this
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Table 4.2: The East Asia Total Factor Productivity Growth (%)
Chen
(1977)
World
Bank
(1993)
Kim and 
Lau 
(1994)
Young 
(1994 & 
1995)
Drysdale
and
Huang
(1995)
Collins 
and 
Bos worth 
(1996)
Sarel
(1997)
Period covered 1955-1970 1960-1989 ** 1966-1990 1950-1988 1960-1994 1978-1996
Indonesia 1.2* 0.8 1.2
Malaysia 1.1* 0.9 2.0
Philippines -0.4 -0.8
Thailand 1.5* 1.8 2.0
Hong Kong 4.3 3.6 2.4 2.3 3.1 -
Korea 5.0 3.1 1.2 1,7 2.1 1.5
Singapore 3.6 1.2 1.9 0.2 0.8 1.5 2.2
Taiwan 4.3 3.7 1.2 2.6 2.9 2.0
Notes to table: Estimates marked with an asterisk refer to periods otlier than the column label, as 
follows: in column (4): 1970-1985;
in column (3) ** : Hong Kong, 1966-1990; Korea, 1960-1990; Singapore, 1964-1990, Taiwan, 1953- 
1990
Source: Various Studies on TFP
gap was bridged by heavy reliance on foreign direct investment (FDI). However, high 
FDI and foreign debt have in tinn caused a growth of an income outflow abroad. As 
can be seen, the borrowed funds were used for investment, and the investment rate to 
GDP actually rose over the 1990s. It was between 37 percent and 45 percent of GDP. 
However, the social profitability of investment was falling over the 1990s.
Figure 4.2 shows the investment rates as a percentage of GDP of the four Asian 
cormtries (souice: see Appendix C). It can be seen that all the fbui' countries 
experienced high rates of investment throughout the 1990s. Most countiies had rates 
above 30% of GDP with the exception of the Philippines.
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A standard measnie of investment efficiency is the incremental capital output ratio 
(ICOR), it is the ratio between the investment rate and tlie output growth. Obviously, 
the ICOR had increased in the period between 1993-1996 compaied to 1987-1992, 
(except for Indonesia and the Philippines). This indicates that on average the 
profitability of new projects in the region was falling prior to the 1997 crisis, (see 
table 4.3)
Table 4.3: Incremental Capital Output ratio (ICOR)
Country 1987-1992 1993-1996
Malaysia 3.7 4.8
Indonesia 4.0 3.8
Philippines 6.0 5.5
Thailand 3.4 5.1
Source: J.P Morgan and Corsetti et.al (:1999)
Private and Public Savings
The sustainability of tlie cuiTent account imbalances can also be analyzed by looking 
at private and public savings. It is argued that a fall in national savings caused by 
lower public savings is more problematic than a fall in private savings which is a 
transitory phenomenon.^ An increase in public sector deficit will end up to a build up 
of foreign debt.
Figure 4.3 shows the saving rate in Asia, characterized by very high saving rates 
through out the 1990s (most of the cases 30% and in some cases 40%). However, the
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Philippines recorded the lowest rates where saving rates fluctuated between 17% to 
20%. In the Indonesian case, the saving rate fell below 30% after 1992 whereas in 
Malaysia the saving rate was below 30% until 1993 (souice: see Appendix C).
4.3.3 Inflation Rates
In evaluating the sustainability of the current account and external debt, the inflation 
rate is also one of the important factors. A high inflation rate may indicate a poor 
macroeconomic policy. Having a high inflation rate signals that the fixed/semi fixed 
exchange rate regime can be exposed to speculative attacks. Figure 4.4 shows 
inflation rate for the four Asian countiies (souice: see Appendix C). It is obvious that 
in the 1990s most of tlie countries’ inflation rates were relatively low except for the 
Philippines where its inflation rate was nearly 20% in 1990-91, but fell to 8% by 
1996. Nevertheless, there aie doubts about tliese countries’ ability to keep inflation 
low in the futuie as they have experienced problems in the banking and financial 
sector.
4.3.4 Openness
It is argued that economies that are relatively open ai e vulnerable to terms of trade 
shocks and also to restructured tiade policies in other countries. At the same time they 
aie less likely to face sustainability problems, as a lai'ge export sector strengthens the 
cormtries’ ability to service their debt obligations (see the discussion in chapter 5). By 
looking at the ratio of the average exports and imports to GDP, obviously the four 
Asian countries were markedly open. (See table 4.4). As can be seen, Indonesia has
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the lowest degree of openness, which is about 26-27%. For the Pliilippines and 
Thailand they aie 30-40% whereas Malaysia it is above 80%.
Table 4.4: Openness (average* exports and imports as a percentage of GDP)
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Malaysia 75.23 86.52 76.64 87.72 92.15 97.42 91.50 93.55
Indonesia 26.30 27.18 28.23 25.26 25.94 26.98 26.13 28.22
Philippines 30.40 31.09 31.58 35.58 36.98 40.26 44.90 54.20
Thailand 37.76 39.24 38.98 39.69 40.99 44.88 42.19 46.69
* average = [(Ex+Im)/2]/GDF 
Source: Corsetti et.al (1999)
With regal'd to the export growth rate, each country’s export growth is shown in table 
4.5. As can be seen the export growth rate began to slow down considerably in 1996. 
This was due to adverse developments, which cut into the competitiveness of 
exporters. Exports were slowed down by a significant deterioration in the term of 
trade as a result of an appreciation in the real exchange rate. This causes a further 
increase in cuiTent account deficits. However, Radelet and Sachs (1998a, 1998b) state 
that the changes in international condition i.e. the depreciation of Japanese yen and 
the terms of ti ade losses could not explain the sudden eruption of the currency crisis.
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Table 4.5: Export Growth Rate (1995-1996)® 
(percent)
Country Value Growth Volume Growth Unit value Change
1995 1996 1995 1996 1995 1996
Indonesia 13.4 9.7 10.3 4.8 2.8 4.7
Malaysia 26.0 5.8 15.6 13.6 9.0 -6.9
Philippines 31.6 16.7 17.0 18.8 12.4 -1.8
Thailand 25.1 -1.3 14.2 -0.7 9.5 -0.6
Source: Radelet and Sachs (1998)
4.3.5 Real Exchange Rate
An appreciation of the real exchange rate will cause a loss in competitiveness and 
worsen the trade balance, therefore jeopaidizing the sustainability of the current 
account. Based on data on nominal exchange rates in the 1990s, in the Malaysian 
case, the cuiTency moved between 2.5-3.5 (10 % range) in the 1990s. For Thailand, 
the baht was fixed to the dollar between 25.2 and 25.6, while in Philippines the 
peso/dollar fluctuated between 24 and 28 during 1990-1995. However, fiom spring 
1995 until early 1997, it was fixed at 26.2.
Based on several studies, it was shown that countries Üiat have an appreciation in their 
currencies experienced a larger deterioration of the current account while countries 
that had experienced a real depreciation had cuiTent accoimt surpluses. The real 
exchange rate of the four Asian countries is shown in figur e 4.5 (source: see Appendix 
C). In 1997, the real exchange rates appreciated by 19% in Malaysia, 23% in the 
Philippines, 12% in Thailand and 8% in Indonesia.
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4.3.6 Political Instability and Uncertainty
Besides all the factors discussed above, political instability can also reduce the 
willingness of the international financial community to provide cuiTent account 
financing. Expectation about the political and financial environment also gives rise to 
the balance of payments and exchange rates crisis paiticulaily when economic 
fundamentals aie not very sti'ong.
In the 1990s, a great deal o f political instability could be observed in Asia. In 1997, 
for instance there were cabinet reshuffles in Thailand, there was elections and tensions 
in Indonesia, etc. Eventually, events in each of the country added to the seriousness of 
the crisis and accordingly triggered both the domestic and foreign investors to 
withdraw.^
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4.4 Foreign Debt Accumulation
A country may have a short run liquidity problem when its reserve stock is less than 
its overall burden of external debt services. It is said to have a liquidity problem when 
panicking creditors are not willing to roll over existing short-term credit as a result of 
a rapid devaluation. In short, a crisis is a pur e liquidity shortfall, if a large fraction of a 
country’s external liabilities are short term.
As stated in the literature the debt/export ratio is of a great concern because of its 
negative effects on investment and savings. This can be explained by the resources 
used to service debt, which causes crowding out public investment and discourages 
private investment. In addition, the high debt/export ratio indicates debt overhang, 
leads to the anticipation of economic agents about future tax liabilities for its 
servicing, [see Borensztein (1990b) and Eaton (1987)]. The debt hypothesis states that 
since an indebted country benefits partially from increases in output or exports, for 
which some of the proceeds are paid to the creditors, there will be a disincentive 
effect not to initiate programs that will lead to future growth. However, several 
authors argued that a high debt/export ratio is not indicative of debt overhang as the 
disincentive effect only arises when it becomes impossible for a debtor to meet its 
contractual obligations, [see Kmgman(1988; 1989 and Sachs(1989)] If the high debt 
service/export ratio is serviced regularly it would not lead to distortions of production 
or investment decisions. Obviously a high debt/export ratio implies that funds have to 
be transfened abroad in the future, thus raising the implicit cost of domestic capital.
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Another important point of a high debt/exports ratio is that the high stock of foreign 
debt can be connected with lower investments. This can be explained in two ways. 
Firstly, interest payments on foreign indebtedness lower the funds available for 
investment in the domestic economy in the cuiTent period. Secondly, a country loses 
the amoimt of money that if  it had been invested domestically, would have had a 
multiple effect and been a catalyst for future investment.
Table 4.6 shows the foreign debt as a percentage of GDP for the fom Asian countries. 
Based on World Bank figures, it considers a debt to GDP ratio of less than 48% as 
low risk, 48 to 80% as medium risk. As can be seen fiom the table Indonesia 
experienced a relatively high ratio in 1991; 68% and it was 63% in 1997. For 
Malaysia it was around 40 percent since 1993. While for Thailand the ratio was about 
38% of GDP in 1991 and reached 60.6% in 1997. The Philippines experienced 71% 
of GDP in 1991 but then it dropped to 49.7% in 1996.
Table 4.6: Foreign Debt (as a percentage of GDP)
Countiy 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Malaysia 35.8 35.5 34.5 40.7 40.4 39.3 40.1 48.0
Indonesia 65.9 68.2 68.7 56.4 61.0 61.5 56.7 63.5
Philippines 69.0 71.5 62.3 66.1 62.4 53.2 49.8 55.3
Thailand 32.8 38.4 37.5 34.1 33.3 33.8 50.1 60.7
Source: World Debt Table (1999)
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Table 4.7 shows the share of short-term debt. As can be seen the figure was relatively 
modest; 32% in Malaysia, 26% in Indonesia, 37% in Thailand and 26% in the 
Philippines for 1997.
Table 4.7: Short term Debt (percentage of total)
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Malaysia 12.4 12.1 18.2 26.6 21.1 21.2 27.8 31.6
Indonesia 15.9 18.0 20.5 20.2 18.1 20.9 25.0 26.4
Philippines 14.5 15.2 16.0 14.0 14.3 13.4 19.3 26.0
Thailand 29.6 33.1 35.2 53.0 60.7 72.4 41.4 37.3
Source: World Debt Table (1999)
For the debt service ratio, the estimates for the Asian countries are considered low 
owing to the exclusion of the roll over of short-term liabilities. Specifically, the 
service ratio is defined as the interest on all debt plus tlie principal to be repaid on 
long term debts as a share of total exports. Tliis is shown in table 4.8. Obviously in 
1997 the debt service ratio was below 20% in most of the countiies except for 
Indonesia (30%). The Philippines experienced a rate above 20% imtil 1993, and 
dropped to 9.2% in 1997. The World Bank considers 18% as the warning tlireshold.
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Table 4.8: Debt Service Ratio as a Ratio of Exports
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Malaysia 12.6 7.4 9.1 8.4 9.0 7.0 8.2 7.5
Indonesia 33.4 34.3 32.6 33.6 30.7 30.9 36.8 30.0
Philippines 27.0 23.0 24.4 25.6 18.9 16.4 13.7 9.2
Thailand 16.9 13.0 13.8 13.7 13.5 11.6 11.5 15.4
Source: World Debt Table (1999)
However, if one looks at the ratio of short-term debt to foreign reserve and the ratio of 
debt service plus short term debt to foreign reserves, there might be a problem. The 
figures were quite high for most of the countiies. (see table 4.9).
As pointed by several authors, short-term debt is regarded as an important variable in 
predictive models and became crucial in discussions of the onset of crises. It indicates 
that any country has more short-term debt then reserves can suffer a self-fulfilling 
balance of payment crisis if its creditors reluctant to roll over loans, [see Radelet and 
Sachs(1998a), Corsetti et.al (1998)]. This variable is able to predict the crisis quite 
well. Based on BIS-Reporting banks, at tlie end of 1996, eleven of the forty-two 
countiies had ratios of short-term debt to reserves greater than one. For instance 
Indonesia had a ratio of 2.0, Thailand 1.2, in which they faced severe financial 
difficulties in 1997.
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Based on this finding, one can say that short-term debt larger than can be covered by 
reserves may be sufficient for an economic crisis. Nonetheless, it is not a necessary 
condition, as Malaysia has prudent policies toward short-term debt could not prevent 
the spread of the crisis.
As previously mentioned, the short-term debt to reserves is not very good measure of 
solvency. However, according to Furman and Stiglitz (1998), this variable matter for 
three main reasons. First, the ratio of short-term debt to reserves do measure 
liquidity. Second, a high ratio of short-term debt to reserves may signal imprudent 
macroeconomic policies. Third, the ratio of short-term debt to reserves is an indicator 
of the vulnerability of a cormtry to a self-fulfilling withdrawal of capital flight.
4.5 Summary
This chapter analyses the macroeconomic fundamental of the four Asian countries, 
which shows Üiat most countries had strong economic fundamentals prior to the crisis. 
This conclusion is reached on the basis of parameters such as low inflation rates, high 
savings rates, and liigh growth rates, etc. The current account deficit was a problem as 
cormtries that were under attack were the ones with large current account deficits. 
However, the commonly held view is that the current account deficit is not a problem 
as long as it is sustainable. A detailed discussion on this issue is given in chapter 6.
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NOTES
 ^For further details see Radelet and Sachs (1998).
 ^See Corsetti, et.al (1998).
 ^See Corsetti, et.al (1998).
As stated in Corsetti. et.al (1999) -  the current account identity is Bt+i = (1+r) Bt -Tt 
where B is the net debt position and T is the trade balance. Then divide both sides by 
crurent GDP. Now assumes that GDP grows at the constant rate g, Thus Yt+i/Yt = 
l+g%. Accordingly the above equation can be rewritten as (l+g)bt+i =(l+r) bt -Tt 
where b=B/Y and t=T/Y. Therefore the debt to GDP ratio to be constant in tlie long 
run at some level b, the trade balance surplus must be equal to (r-g)b.
^For further details see Krugman (1998).
^See Monisey and Nelson.
^For full explanation of the HaiTod-Dornar and Ranis-Fei models, see Ghatak (1978).
 ^ The transitory fall in savings today will be offset by higher savings in the future, 
when the anticipated increase in income actually materializes. A transitory fall in 
private savings (due to an increase in consumption) is determined by expectations of 
higher friture GDP growth raising permanent income.
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 ^See Krugman for further details.
As stated by several authors the World Bank estimates for the debt service ratio 
include interest payments on all foreign debt but principal payments only for long 
term debt so the roll over of short-term liabilities is not included.
11 For further detail, refer to Fiuman and Stiglitz (1998).
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CHAPTER FIVE
FOREIGN TRADE: ESTIMATING INCOME AND PRICE ELASTICITIES
OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
5.1 Introduction
The use of elasticities is one of the important tools in economics and is important in 
guiding decisions on a wide range of economic policies, such as taxation, foreign 
trade, distribution, forecasting, etc. Specifically, for the foreign tmde sector, 
elasticities provide a useful study on international linkages and trade policies. In 
addition, the role of elasticities is becoming increasingly important in dealing witli the 
debt crisis in developing cormtries. [Cline (1984), Dornbush (1985)]. The 
effectiveness of a trade policy \  for instance, is dependent upon the size of the income 
and price elasticities in both exports and imports. With knowledge of these 
elasticities, an appropriate policy can be designed to respond to problems faced by a 
cormtry.
Additionally, information about elasticities is not only crucial to the debtor country, 
but to the creditor as well. Decision on debt rescheduling, and stabilisation policies of 
a cormtry, usually depend upon the income and price elasticities in its foreign tmde. 
The solvency of a cormtry can be determined by using the prediction of the price 
elasticity of export demand and GDP supply; a solvency index of a cormtry can then 
be calculated.^ With this in mind, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze and
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estimate the ASIAN foreign trade sector. It has been the main leading economic force, 
and has provided the countries with high creditworthiness in international credit 
markets.
Specifically, the organisation of this section is as follows. Section 5.2 presents the 
literatme review of price and income elasticities in the developing countiies followed 
by the analytical framework in section 5.3. Data and estimation method is presented in 
section 5.4. Detailed estimation results are given in section 5.5 and finally in 5.6, a 
smnmaiy is presented.
5.2 Literature Review on Income and Price Elasticities of Exports and Imports
The issue of price and income elasticities has been discussed by economists for many 
years, either theoretically or empirically. Among the leading authors who have 
contributed in their writing on this issue are Prebisch (1950), Singer (1950), and 
Nurske (1959). All of them have stated that the price and income elasticities of export 
demand for the less developed countries (LDCs) are relatively small. On the other 
harrd, others [Balassa (1971,1978), Bhagwati (1988,1990), Khan (1974), Riedel 
(1984,1991)] have stated the irrelevance of this view as coimtries such as the newly 
industrialised economies (NIEs) have achieved great success due to the 
implementation of outward-oriented development strategies. These two different 
views can be explained by a shift in trade compositions i.e. from primary commodity 
to manufacturing goods.
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The focal point of the recent debate tries to explain the leading force of the rapid 
growth of the NICs exports; whether it is because of the high, and statistically 
significant price elasticities, or the high and statistically significant income 
elasticities, or both.
Generally, the literature has provided a wide range of estimates for the elasticities 
value; the elasticities dispersion turns out to be important as it leads to uncertainty in 
the balance of payment prediction for the debt rescheduling agreement, and also to the 
ongoing development plan of developing countiies. Focusing on this issue, several 
important papers will be reviewed, paiticulaiiy by some influential authors; 
Muscatelli et.al (1992, 1994) and Athukorala and Riedel (1994, 1996); who attempt to 
find a solution to the empirical estimation of the size of price and income elasticities 
of the developing coimtiies. Other related papers on income and price elasticities of 
industrial countries are also reviewed. In addition, papers discussing the method used 
for estimating income and price elasticity are discussed.
The empirical studies by Bond (1985), Cline (1984), Goldstein and Khan (1982), 
Muscatelli (1994, 1995), Marquez and Me Neilly (1988), O’Neill and Ross (1991) 
have supported the conventional view which states that the price elasticities of 
demand for the newly industrialised countries’ (NICs) exports ar e small. However, the 
world income elasticity of demand for the NIC’s exports is significant and high. On 
the other hand, otliers [Riedel (1984, 1988b), Athukorala and Riedel (1991)] have 
criticised the conventional approach, and have found that income elasticities are 
insignificant and the price elasticities of export demand are infinite.^
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However, some of the eaiiier empirical studies on foreign trade, which estimate 
export and import, concentiate on the demand side, and the supply side is totally 
ignored. As only one side of the market is focused, the method that is usually 
employed to estimate the elasticity of export and import tends to be the single 
equation method i.e. the ordinary least square (OLS). As has been criticised by Orcutt 
(1950), Herberger (1953) and Prais (1962), and pointed out by Goldstein and Klian 
(1962), among others, such methods caused the estimates to be biased and 
inconsistent, in the presence of any possible simultaneity between quantities and 
prices. Simultaneity, in particular*, implies correlation between the explanatory 
variables in the equation and the disturbance term, and so violates one of the 
conditions of the classical least squar e analysis.
The single equation method has continued to be used under the assumption that an 
individual country faces exogenous prices of its exports and imports, which supports 
the small country assmnption. Under these circumstances, the simultaneity bias 
disappears as prices, and the disturbance term, will no longer be correlated in the 
equation. Although, the small country equation can quite easily be accepted 
theoretically, it has been questioned empirically, especially with regard to its use in 
the formulation and estimation of export functions.
In the case of imports, it is easier to justify; apparently, the price of imports is 
invariant to an individual countiy’s demand. A study by Magee and Glyfason (1978), 
for example showed that in the case of the U.S, the price elasticity is quite high, 
meaning that the import price is not greatly affected by importers.
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specifically, a study by Houtliakker and Magee (1969) estimates the price and income 
elasticities of demand for both exports and imports for 15 industrial countries. Despite 
being aware of biases, they use the ordinary least square methods, and use an annual 
data set for the period of 1951-1966. However, for the United States more detail is 
analysed where trade destinations and commodity classes are used. From the result 
obtained, the income elasticity is significant where the value is between 1 and 2. 
However, for the price elasticity most of the countries showed that the estimate is 
insignificant and a few countries have incorrect signs."^
With regard to the model formulation, Khan and Ross (1976), evaluate the functional 
form of the aggregate import demand equations. As fr equently found in the literature, 
the quantity of import demanded is a function of the input price relative to the 
domestic price and the domestic income. They analyze the function form of the 
import equation for tluee countries: the United States, Canada and Japan using 
quarterly data over the period of 1960-1972. Based on the results gained using the 
Box-Cox (1964) analysis of transformations, it suggests that a log-linear form is better 
than a linear one.
Similarly, Boyland et.al (1980) examine three of the EEC: Ireland, Denmark and 
Belgium, to form the optimal functional form of aggregate import demand equation. 
They then compare their results with the study done by Klian and Ross (1976). 
Annual data set for the period of 1953-1975 is used and the log-linear form is 
employed. Similar* to results obtained by Khan and Ross, they agree that the log- 
linear functional form is the appropriate function for those coimtries’ import demand 
equations.
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Concerning the issue of simultaneity, many studies have been cairied out to deal with 
this problem. In eliminating simultaneity bias, equation of both demand and supply 
has to be specified explicitly. The estimation then can be evaluated by applying the 
OLS to the reduced form equation or employing the instrumental variable (IV), or two 
stage least square (2SLS) methods [Turnovsky (1968), Khan (1974)]. The alternative 
is to use a system method, specifically three stage least squares to estimate the 
structural equation simultaneously [(Gan, (1981), Goldstein and Khan (1987), Riedel 
(1988), Marquez and Me Neilly (1988), Muscatelli et.al (1992)], or the maximum 
likelihood method. [Goldstein and Klian (1978), Muscatelli et.al (1995).
Klian (1984) investigates the imporl and export demand for 15 developing countries, 
in which the impact of the price changes of traded and noii-traded goods on the trade 
flows of these countries is tested. Furthermore, it illustrates the importance of 
quantitative restrictions on the estimates. As usual, the log-linear form is used in the 
estimation. The two stage least square (2SLS) approach is used for both equilibrium 
and disequilibrium models. From the results obtained, both import and export 
equations for a single equilibrium are relevant. The price elasticities of imports and 
exports are indeed larger than would have been expected. However, income 
elasticities are low for both imports and exports.
Specifically, Goldstein and Khan (1978) examine the price elasticities for both export 
demand and export supply, where eight industrial countries are analysed. Their study 
covers the period of 1955-1970 and quarterly data on aggregate exports are used. As 
bias might exist tlnough the two-way relationship between export quantities and price,
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two models of export demand and supply are formed, and they are then estimated 
simultaneously where the full information maximum likelihood is used, as it is the 
best estimator for the asymptotic theory. The results obtained show that the estimated 
price elasticities of the export demand, for most of the countries, aie significantly 
different from zero. Specifically, the price elasticities of six of the eight countries are 
greater than unity. For all of the eight coimtries, the income elasticities are 
significantly different fiom zero at 1 % level. They find the Koyck-type disti'ibuted 
lag indicates tliat the adjustment that takes place to changes in the independent 
valuables is not very long, and usually it is less than one year*.
Aspe and Giavazzi (1982) examine both the simultaneity issues between the excess 
supply and demand functions for exports, and their interaction with the domestic 
demand for export goods. In particulai*, the case of Germany’s machinery is analyzed. 
Based on their findings, Orcutt’s suggestion on treating the domestic and foreign 
market simultaneously is reconfirmed, and suggests that price discrimination exists.
Maiquez and Me Neilly (1988) have developed a model which estimates income and 
price elasticities for non-OPEC countries based on the major SITC commodity 
groups. By using quarterly data for the period of 1973 - 1984 and based on 2SLS, the 
result obtained is between 1.4 and 1.9 for the income elasticity. In addition, the 
properties of the error term, the dynamic specification and parametric stability are also 
tested.
Besides the simultaneity issue, problems of specification and distributed lags also 
have to be clarified. These two terms are actually linked together to estimate a tiade 
model; one considers that adjustment is completed and in the other, only paif of the
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adjustment occuis in each period. For the partial adjustment model, there are lagged 
dependent variables used to estimate the trade equations [Klian (1974), Goldstein and 
Klian (1978)]. For instance, Goldstein and Khan use a distributed lag for the 
employment variable.
However, by using the partial adjustment model in the form of distributed lags, some 
problems might exist. As mentioned by Maddala (1977) among others, even though 
there is a serial correlation in the eiTor term, a distributed lag model can still produce a 
reasonable and significant coefficient. Therefore, the issue of serial correlation must 
be taken care of before one uses the distributed lag model. Also, by using the same 
full adjustment model and applying it to the partial adjustment model, a reduction in 
serial correlation will be shown since, by using the lagged dependent vaiiables, one 
might extract most of the serial dependence among the residuals. Based on this, one 
might wi'ongly conclude that the distributed lag model is superior to the fiill 
adjustment model. Moreover, the for the partial adjustment model tends to be 
higher than the full adjustment model, if  the serial correlation is not corrected.
Another argument regarding the size of elasticities of export is the issue of 
normalisation. As argued by Riedel, by using the conventional approach for which the 
export volumes are modelled as a demand equation, which depends upon the domestic 
price relative to world price, and on world income, the price elasticities of demand 
tend to be low and the income elasticities of demand tend to be very high. 
Accordingly, for a small country, the export demand function should be normalised 
for price rather than for quantity. Based on his study on Hong Kong, in which the 
equation is normalised for export price, the results obtained support the view that
105
price elasticities of demand are insignificant, Riedel argues that the results gained 
fi'om the previous studies are misleading, as the supply side influences aie neglected. 
By using the simultaneous equation method, results gained aie similar to the value 
generally accepted in which the value is between -0.5 to -1.0 for the price elasticities 
and between 2.0 to 4.0 for the income elasticities. (See Goldstein and Khan (1982, 
1985), Magee (1975), and Stern (1975). Furthermore, Athukorala and Riedel (1991), 
in their study on Korean exports of machinery and transport, showed similar* results.
The issue of normalisation then was challenged by several authors [ Faini et.al (1992), 
Muscatelli et.al (1992,1994), Muscatelli (1995)]. Specifically, Faini, Clavijo, and 
Semlali (1992), examine the empirical evidence of manufactured export demand 
functions for 23 less developed coimtries (LDCs). The issue of export growth in LDC, 
constrained by the international environment is analyzed, and, following this, the 
small country hypothesis is tested. The view that expor*t performance is determined by 
the supply factor is also evaluated. The LDC’s growth constraint is examined 
globally. They also analyze whether LDC’s exports compete with nor*thern products 
or with other LDCs. Based on a claim made by Cline (1982) that an outward shift in 
the LDCs export supply will cause a decline in prices, and therefore weaken the 
success of an export led strategy^, they find that almost 80% of the gain of 
devaluation on export revenue disappears when other* LDCs competitors retaliate.
Muscatelli et.al (1994) use the Phillips-Hansen cointegration method to test Riedel’s 
data, and find that the price elasticity of demand is actually low and income 
elasticities are high. Also, according to them, by using a more dynamic specification 
model of demand and supply, apparently the normalisation paradox disappear s.
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In contrast, Athukorala and Riedel (1994) have criticised the results obtained from the 
study above in which they were influenced by the choice of coefficient restriction. By 
using a more appropriate coefficient method and then applying it to the Phillips- 
Hansen cointegration method, the earlier results obtained by Riedel were reconfirmed. 
In addition, data quality is also crucial in estimating the trade model. As pointed out 
by Muscatelli et.al (1994), Athukorala and Riedel (1995), the use of unit price indices, 
as proxies for the import and export price, causes bias to the export timing in response 
to the price changes and to the elasticities estimates. In addition, the effect on the 
estimated long run elasticities, as a result of the dynamic mis-specification that might 
occur*, is less severe if one uses an aimual data set compared to the quarterly data set.
Another problem that needs to be taken into account is the issue of the aggregation 
level. Aggregation across different commodity groups, or different countries, must be 
well determined. Different groups of commodity can be aggregated only if the pattern 
of their export demand is compar able.
Specifically, O’Neill and Ross (1991) examine factors that determine the South 
Korean’s aggregate expor*ts to three destinations, namely; the US, Japan, and the EC 
for the period of 1970s and 1980s. Economic growth and relative price, which are 
determined by the exchange rate, and the development of domestic supply, are the 
main focus of the model. Their result shows that income elasticity of export demands 
tends to be higher in the United States.
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Muscatelli, et.al (1995a), investigate the four newly industrialised Asian economies 
(NIEs) export performance, on which they model their bilateral exports flow to thi'ee 
areas of exports destination: the US, Japan and the EC. Their results show that the 
estimated long run price, and income elasticity’s of export demand, to those three 
areas of destination are different. Generally, the price elasticity of exports is low, but 
the income elasticities are higher than those obtained in the previous study, and this 
can be explained by a difference in the composition of export products to each 
destination.
In a subsequent study, Muscatelli et.al. (1995b) develop a model of export demand 
and supply for six newly industrialised Asian economies (NIEs), by using the systems 
method. Their results show that the price elasticity of export demand for all the 
countries is significant and the reason is because of the non-price factors for example 
quality of products and marketing strategies.
Based on the above survey of literatur e, it is concluded that the elasticities issue is not 
conclusive. There are many factors that have to be considered i.e simultaneity, model 
specifications, data quality, the issue of normalization, and the level of aggregation 
across country and commodity, etc. Accordingly, consideration will be given to, if not 
all, some of the above problems in estimating income and price elasticities for the 
Four Asean countries. A review of the literatme is smnmarized in table 5.1
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Table 5.1: Summary of A Literature Review
Study Countries cover and 
sample period
Method used Comments
Houthakker and 
Magee (1969)
15 industrial countiies 
(1951-1966)
OLS Income elasticity is 
significant -  value between 
1 and 2
Khan and Ross 
(1976)
United States, Canada 
and Japan 
(1960-1972)
OLS Log linear form is better 
than the linear one
Sato
(1977)
Major industrial
countries
(1955-1970)
Using the cross-country 
export demand function
High price elasticity (>1)
Goldstein and Khan 
(1978)
8 industrial countries 
(1955-1970)
Export demand and export 
supply are formed and 
estimated simultaneously 
using FIML
Price elasticies for most of 
the countries are different 
fi'om zero. The price 
elasticities for six of eight 
countries are greater than 
one
Boyland et.al 
(1980)
EEC: Ireland, 
Denmark, Belgium 
(1953-1075)
Optimal function form of 
aggregate import demand
Same as Klian and Ross -  
log linear functional form 
is the appropriate function.
Aspe and Giavazzi 
(1982)
Gennany Examine simultaneously 
issue between the excess 
supply and demand 
fiinctions
Suggests that price 
discrhnination exist
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Table 5,1: continued
Price elasticities o f imports 
and exports are larger than 
what are expected. But 
income elasticities are low 
for both imports and
exports.
Khan
(1984)
15 developing
comitiies
2SLS
Marquez and Me
Neilly
(1988)
Nonopec countiies
based on the major 
SITC commodity
groups
2SLS Income elasticities between 
1.4 and 1.9
Riedel
(1988)
Hong Kong exports of 
manufactured good
Equation is normalised for 
export price
Price elasticities is high 
and income elasticities is 
insignificant
Athukorala
Riedel
(1990)
and Korean exports of 
machineiy tool
Price elasticities is high 
and income elasticities is 
insignificant
O’Neill and Ross 
(1991)
South Korea’s
aggregate exports to 
US, Japan and EC
Income elasticities of 
export demands are higher 
in the US.
Miistacelli, Stevenson 
and Montagna 
(1994)
Asian New Industiial 
Economies (NIEs)
Phillip-Hansen 
cointegration method
Stress that the inha-LDC 
competition is important
Faini, Clavijo and
Semlali
(1992)
23 Less Developed 
Countiies
110
Table 5.1: continued
M uscatelli
(1995a)
4 Asian NIEs to three 
areas o f exports 
destination: US, Japan 
and EC
The estimated long rim 
price and income 
elasticities o f export 
demand to those three areas 
are different.
M uscatelli
(1995b)
Six Asian (NIEs) System methods Price elasticity o f  export 
demand for all countries 
are significant due to non­
price factors
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5.3 Analytical Framework
There are quite a number of studies that estimate trade equations for ASEAN. 
However, since there have been many economic changes in the world generally, and 
in Asia, in particular, a re-examination, using the latest data available, and employing 
the cuiTent econometric teclmiques, is essential. Therefore, the purpose of tliis section 
is to develop the following model of foreign trade in which all the methodological 
issues concerning the trade equation estimation will be taken into consideration:
Long-run Export and Import Equations
log Qxt  ^= ao + ai log (Px/Pw)t + a: log Ywt + a.3 log Gcit + Uxt (1)
ai < 0, a2 > 0, as > 0
log Qmt  ^= bo + bi log (Pm/GP)t + bz log Ybt + Vmt (2)
bi < 0, b2 > 0
Wliere;
Qx = Exports of goods
Px = Price of exports
Pw = Price of world exports
Yw = a scale variable
Gci = Export composition index
Qm = Imports of goods
Pm - Price of home country imports
GP General price level
Yb. - Real income of home country
Ux, Vm, = error terms
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Following the same model that is frequently found in the literature, the quantity 
demanded is a function of relative price and income.^ These are the two important 
independent variables in demand for exports and imports equations. The prices of 
exports and imports are assumed to be exogenous, which follows from the small 
country assumption. As mentioned in the previous section, the simultaneity bias 
disappears as prices and the disturbances term, will no longer be conelated in the 
equation. The commonly used log linear functional form is employed instead of the 
linear* one as it implies that the elasticities are constant.^
Equation (1) is the demand for exports, which is dependent upon the relative price of 
exports with respect to the world price (Px/Pw), the scale variable (Yw) which 
captures world demand conditions and the export composition index (Gci).^ 
Homogeneity in prices is assumed to hold in the long run so that demand depends 
only on relative prices and the scale variable. The choice of scale variable may vary; 
some authors use (trade weighted) world income as a scale variable [Khan (1974), 
Goldstein and Khan (1978), Aspe and Giavazzi (1982), Marquez and Me Neilly 
(1988)] while others, e.g. Muscatelli et al. (1995), use trade weighted imports of the 
coimtry’s expor*t destination as a scale variable. In this study, world income is used as 
a scale variable. The coefficients of ai and a% are the price and income elasticities of 
foreign demand for home country exports and are expected to be negative and positive 
respectively.^ The coefficient ag is expected to be positive.
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Equation (2) is the import demand, which depends on the relative price of imports 
with respect to the general price level (Pm/GP), and the real income of the home 
country (Yb). The coefficients hi and b  ^ are expected to be negative and positive 
respectively.
5.4 Data and Estimation Method
5.4.1 List of Variables, their Description and Computations
Qx = Index of the volume of exports (1990=100)
Qm = Index of the volume of imports (1990=100)
Px = Index of the unit value of exports (1990=100)
Pm = Index of the unit value of imports (1990=100)
GP = The domestic price level, measured by each country’s consumer price
index (1990=100)
Yb = Nominal GNP deflated by domestic price level
Pw = index of the world export price (1990=100)
Yw = the index of the world income (1990=100)
GCI = Export Composition Index (1990=100)
The study uses the annual data for the period of 1963-1995.*^ The computations of 
these variables appear in Appendix A. 1.
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5.4.2 A Review of Cointegration and Error Correction Mechanism (ECM)
Basically, the concept of cointegration simply suggest that although the two variables 
aie nonstationary, they may still be moving together in time, meaning that a linear 
combination of those two variables might be stationary. In other words, although the 
two variables are nonstationary, there might still be a “genuine” long rim relationship 
between them.
There are quite a number of studies that survey or discuss the issue of cointegration. 
In fact, many recent econometrics textbooks now discuss the concept of cointegration 
[see Madalla (1992), Thomas (1993), Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), Greene 
(1993), Hamilton (1994)]. The concept of cointegration is discussed in detail in 
several econometric books for example Banerjee et.al (1993), Chaiemza and 
Deadman (1992) - especially in chapter 5. In addition, selected papers on 
cointegration are published which are edited by Engle and Granger (1991).
The cointegration analysis has become a useful teclmique in empirical 
macroeconomics, to model, or estimate, the long-run relationship for time series data. 
Thus, with the cointegration analysis, one can use nonstationary data and the spurious 
results are avoided. In short, the analysis provides an effective framework for testing, 
estimating and modelling the long run relationship using time series data.
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Cointegration
Two time series Xtaiid Ytai*e co-integrated if
i) both time series ar e integrated of the same order.
ii) there is some linear combination of the two series which is integrated of order 
zero, that is stationary (i.e. Ut = Yt - y Xt - 1(0))
In practice, obviously the long run relationships often contain more than two variables 
and the problem becomes much more complicated. As pointed out by Charemza and 
Deadman (1992), if variables in a long run relationship are of a different order of 
integration, and the order of integration of the dependent variable is lower than the 
order of integration of the explanatory variables, then there should be at least two 
explanatory variables co-integrated of this highest order, if the necessary condition for 
stationaiity of the error term is to be met. In addition, in the multivariate case there 
could be more than one stationary linear combination linking cointegrated variables.
Ordinary Least Squares estimates the cointegrating vector y, and the OLS residual 
from the cointegrating regression is given as
u , = Y , - y X ,
Cointegration implies tliat ût~I(0) so that cointegration can be tested by testing the 
null hypothesis (of non-cointegration) that ût~I(l). The Dickey-Fuller test and the test 
based on the Durbin-Watson statistic that was proposed by Sargan and Bhargava 
(1983) can be used to test the hypothesis. The standard Dickey-Fuller tables are not
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appropriate since ût is a generated variable. Appropriate tables are available in Engle- 
Granger (1987), MacKinnon (1991), etc.
Specifically, the DF/ADF tests for stationaiity of the estimated residual is as follows; 
The Dickey-Fuller (DF) Test
AÙ,  =  77«,_1 +  £■/
Under the null hypothesis, q = 0. On the alternative hypothesis, < 0, so that the t test 
is performed to test whether -q is significantly less than zero. The t statistic on q is the 
DF statistic.
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test
k
AÛ, =7]U,^^ +s ,
f= l
Under the null hypothesis, Tj = 0. On the alternative hypothesis, q < 0, so that the t test 
is performed to test whether q is significantly less than zero. The t statistic on q is the 
ADF statistic and has the same distribution as the DF statistic.
The Cointegrating Regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW) can also be used to test the 
null that q = 0. Under the null hypothesis of non-cointegration, the CRDW = 0 and on 
the alternative hypothesis of cointegration, CRDW > 0.
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Similar to the DW statistic, the CRDW is computed as;
CRD W  ^
where ût is the estimated OLS residual from the cointegrating regression. The critical 
values for the CRDW test can be found in table 2 of Engle and Granger (1987) and in 
table 4 of Engle and Yoo (1987). A useful rule of thumb suggested by Baneijee et.al 
(1987), is that if CRDW < R^ is indicating of non-cointegration.
Cointegration and Error Correction Mechanism
There are two main methods for estimating cointegrating relationships suggested in 
the literature: the Engle-Granger two-step approach and the Johansen approach.
The most widely used procedure is the Engle-Granger (EG) type of static long run 
regression. However, the estimated parameters in the static long run OLS are subject 
to bias in small samples since the lagged terms are ignored (see Banerjee et.al). One 
way to correct this problem is to include dynamic components (i.e. differences and 
lagged) to the cointegrating regression, [see Wickens and Breusch (1988), Phillips and 
Loretan (1991), Saikkonen (1991), Charemza and Deadman (1992), Cuthbertson et.al 
(1992)]. Other econometricians have suggested correcting the bias by appropriate 
coiTections and modifications to the static parameter estimates [see Engle and Yoo 
(1991), Phillip and Hansen (1990), Park and Phillips (1988), West (1988)].
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The second main method, due to Johansen (1988, 1991) and Johansen and Juselius 
(1990), is a system based approach which enables one to determine the number of 
existing cointegrating relationships in the variables.
A detailed analysis of cointegration and eiTor correction mechanism can also be found 
in Hylleberg and Mizon (1989). Meanwhile a variety of ways of presenting the 
cointegrated system, with emphasis on the error correction model representations, is 
given by Phillips and Loretan (1991). These models have become the most common 
approach in incorporating the economic theory relating to the long-run relationship 
between variables and the short run disequilibrium behaviour*.
Engle-Granger Two-Stage Procedure
This method has been used widely in the literature. It was originally introduced by 
Engle and Granger* (1987), where they suggest that the estimation should take place in 
two stages.
In the first stage, all dynamics are ignored and the long run parameters are estimated 
by OLS. By using all the relevant tests described in the previous sections, let us 
assume that the variables in question are foimd to be cointegrated. Now the second 
stage can proceed.
In the second stage, a short run model with an error-correction mechanism (ECM) by 
the OLS is estimated. The Granger Representation Theorem (GRT), states that if a 
pair of var iables ar e cointegrated, there will exist an ECM relating these variables.
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Given tlie long run cointegrating relationsliip;
Yt=yXt + ut 
The simple ECM can be wr itten as
+ À2(Y — +£,
where St is an error term, ût is tire ECM term. At this stage the estimated X2  and other 
short run parameters are obtained. It is also permissible to include the first differences 
of other 1(1) variables that do not appear* in the long run relationship; meaning that 
these variables affect Y only in the short run. The estimated X2 in this short run 
equation should be negative and statistically significant, as this is the necessary 
condition for the variables to be co-integrated. Combining the two steps will provide a 
model incorporating botli the long run and the dynamic short rim components.'^
Nevertheless, the Engle-Granger two-stage procedure has been criticised for* small 
sample bias present in the OLS estimation of the cointegrating equation. This bias is 
carried over* into the second stage, (i.e. the disequilibrium error) estimates of the short 
run parameter*. An additional problem arises when dealing with tliree or* more series 
since there can be more than one cointegrating vector and tlie Engle-Granger* 
procedure can only identify a single vector. Another* shortcoming of the OLS is that, 
due to non-normality of the distribution of the estimators of the cointegrating vector, 
no sensible judgement can be made about the significance of the par ameter.
The dynamic OLS (DOLS) can be applied. The potential of simultaneity bias and 
small sample bias among regressors is dealt with the inclusive of lagged and led
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values of the first differences of the 1(1) variables, [see Phillips and Loretan (1991) 
and Saikkonen(1991)]. The robust standard eiTors facilitate valid inference to be made 
upon the coefficients of the variables entering as regressors in levels.
Based on this model, the long run export demand and import demand equations aie as 
follows;
Long-run exports demand
Z=(aO, a l, a2, a3), X=[l, (px/pw), (Yw), (Gci)]
J=m 7=/?
= z'x, + pw),_j + +wx,
7 = -w  7— H j - ~ P
Long-run imports demand.
Z=(bO, b l, b2,), X=[l, (pm/gp), (Yb)]
Since an investigation of the short run dynamics are also of interest in this analysis as 
a comparison to a long-run estimations, and important for several other factors of 
modelling, the VECM is also employed in facilitating inferences regarding the short 
run.
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As demonstrated by Engle and Granger, once a nimiber of variables are found to be 
cointegrated, there always exists a conesponding error-correction representation 
which implies that changes in the dependent variable are a function of the level of 
disequilibrium in the cointegrating relationship, which captuied by the error 
correction term, as well as changes in other explanatory variables.
The general vector error-correction for export demand with 
Z = (aO, a l, a2, a3); X = [1, (px/pw), (Yw), (Gci)]
fl j=^ iii j=n j=p](pjAQx,_j + Y,ajA{px/pw),_j +Ÿ,ÀjAGci,_j +
7=1 7=07=0 7=0 ,/=0
;=1
And the general VECM for import demand with 
Z = (bO, b l, b2); X = [1, (pm/gp) (Yb)]
= 'Ÿ^(f)jAQm\-j + ^ 5 j A { P m l  gp),_ j- \-Y u^ A ^i-i + ^ u v  t-\-Z'X,_^) + £,
7=1 7=0 7 -0  /=1
Wlien the variables are cointegrated, then in the short term, deviations from this long­
term equilibrium will feed back on the changes in the dependent variable in order to 
force the movement towards the long-term equilibrium. In other words if the 
dependent variable is driven directly by this long-term equilibrirmi error, then it is 
responding to this feedback. The short-term effect is reflected by the significance tests 
of the ‘differenced’ explanatory variables.
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Johansen — Maximum Likelihood Approach (VAR model)
The Johansen (1991) method is the most widely used procedure for estimating 
multivariate cointegrating systems. Assume that the vector of variables Z has the 
following VAR representation;
Z, = ^  AjZ,_j + £,/=!
where Zt consists all n variables of tire model and St is a vector of random err ors. This 
model can be reformulated into a vector error-correction (VECM) form as follows;
k - \AZf = ^FjAZ,_i  +ZZZ,_^ +G( /=!
where Fj = - ( I - A i - . . . . - Ai) (i= l....,k -l) 
n  = -( I - Al - . Ak)
Johansen (1988, 1991, 1996) and Johansen and Juselius (1992) base a test for 
cointegration on the rank of the n  matrix. Wlien the n  matrix has a full ranlc equal to 
n, then it can be shown that Z must be stationary. If the rank of f l  is zero, then 11 is a 
null matrix and there is no cointegration. If the ranlc of IT is equal to r<n then EE can 
be written as the product of two matrices, a  and p, i.e. IT = ap  in which the 
cointegrating space is defined by p and the adjustment factors are defined by a. This 
parameterization separates out the short run adjustment and long run equilibrium. The
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n  matrix contains information on the long run relationship; n  = ap  where a  is the 
speed of adjustment to disequilibrium , and p is a matrix of the long run coefficients.
The Johansen approach provides direct estimates of the cointegrating vectors and 
allows testing the nmnbers of cointegrating vectors. In a VAR model explaining N 
variables tliere can be at most r = N-1 cointegrating vectors. Generally, the statistical 
properties of the Johansen approach are much better and the cointegrating test is of 
high power compare to the Engle-Granger method.
In practice, the Johansen approach also has a few disadvantages. First, if the sample 
size is small, the estimates obtained for cointegrating vector p may not be well 
determined. Second, if the cointegrating vector is not a unique one, there will be an 
identification problem and it may be difficult to disentangle economically meaningfiil 
cointegrating vectors. As a consequence, a strategy is to use both approaches and 
compare the results.
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5.4.3 Preliminary Data Analysis
Since the time series data is used, the issue of nonstationarity can be a major problem 
for the empirical econometrics analysis where most macroeconomic time series are 
subject to some type of trend. By using MICROFIT 4.0 version, data for all countries 
is tested to see whether all variables are non stationary.
Specifically, the relevant tests for integration level can be examined in several ways; 
i.e. the Integration Durbin Watson (IDW) statistics test and regression-based t tests 
i.e. the Dickey-Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. [See Dickey and 
Fuller (1979)]. The regression based-t tests and the DF tests have received much 
attention in the applied econometric literature, therefore, both the Dickey-Fuller (DF) 
and an Augmented Dickey- Fuller (ADF) test are used in this study. These are both t 
tests and rely on rejecting the hypothesis that the series is a random walk in favour of 
stationarity. The first step in our empirical analysis is then to test the order of 
integration of all variables.
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Table 5.2: The DF/ADF Test for Unit Roots (Export)
Variables Levels 1** Differences
Country DF ADF(l) DF ADF(l)
Malaysia
Qx“ -1 .4 4 7 5 -1 .3313 -5 .3 4 0 4 -4 .6 9 5 7
Px/Pw -1 .8 8 5 2 -2 .3 0 2 9 -4 .5 3 1 6 -4 .9 7 4 0
Yw -3 .0 7 1 9 -3 .1 1 4 4 -6 .1905 -4 .9 3 5 2
Gci -2 .2 6 3 9 -1 .9793 -6 .2593 -8 .5 2 9 6
Indonesia
Qx“ -0 .7 8 1 0 -3 .2 4 1 4 -4 .4 1 2 2 -3 .4 6 9 3
Px/Pw -0 .8 9 3 4 -1 .3 5 1 2 -3 .7388 -2 .7 7 6 9
Yw -1 .4 6 6 9 -2 .1 2 7 6 -3 .8 6 6 0 -2 .8 5 6 8
Gci -3 .0363 -3 .2 6 9 9 -7 .3673 -7 .3 0 2 9
Thailand
Qx“ -1 .7 7 8 0 -1 .7 3 9 9 -5 .1 1 0 6 -3 .5113Px/Pw -1 .6 5 4 4 -1 .9 1 1 6 -5 .1 2 9 6 -5 .3 1 5 0
Yw -3 .2 1 0 7 -2 .1 6 8 8 -6 .7 8 4 6 -3 .5 1 5 7
Gci -2 .8161 -3 .0 0 1 4 -4 .8 6 3 8 -4.9256
Philippines
Qx" -1 .7 0 2 7 -2 .2 0 5 3 -4 .0105 -3 .2 1 1 6
Px/Pw -1 .3 3 8 0 -1 .8 1 3 9 -3 .9623 -3 .7 4 2 7
Yw -3 .8 8 3 7 -2 .9 3 1 2 -7 .5241 -5 .4 2 9 0
Gci -3 .2 3 9 7 -2 .5 2 5 7 -7 .9373 -5 .4891
Notes to table: All variables aie in log.
Variables are as follows; total export index (Qx^), relative price (Px/Pw), a weighted (by the share o f  
exports) average o f  the ti ade paitners GDP (Yw) and export composition index (Gci). Critical value is 
-3 .551.
All econometi'ic computations have been can ied out by Microfit 4.0 Version [see Pesaian and Pesaran 
(1997)]. In most o f the cases, the intercept terms are included in the relevant DF and ADF equations. 
An augmentation o f one seems to sufficient to secure lack o f autocorrelation o f the error terms, 
however, in some cases, no augmentation was necessaiy.
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The DF/ADF test for the unit roots for both export and import equations for all 
countries are shown in table 5.2 and table 5.3.
Table 5.3: The DF/ADF Test for Unit Roots (Import)
Variables Levels I Differences
Country DF ADF(l) DF ADF(l)
Malaysia
Qm" -0 .5 2 6 8 -0 .5 6 3 6 -4 .9 9 2 2 -4 .9 7 1 4
Pm/Gp -1 .3 7 9 4 -1 .9 2 9 6 -4 .2 7 1 0 -3 .3 6 8 6
Yb -1 .4 9 4 0 -2 .0 9 1 6 -3 .9 6 3 0 -3 .9443
Indonesia
Qm“ -1 .7411 -2 .5 5 9 9 -3 .1 2 8 0 -3 .6 0 5 0
Pm/Gp -3 .1421 -1 .2691 -9 .1 2 7 9 -9 .3 0 0 0
Yb -1 .3 5 7 2 -1 .8071 -2 .9 9 0 0 -3 .6 7 0 0
Thailand
Q,n“ -0 .7 7 5 7 -1 .5 1 4 6 -3 .8 2 7 0 -3 .9 3 6 0
Pm/Gp -1 .0663 -1 .8 5 9 6 -3 .4775 -3 .2 4 2 2
Yb -1 .6 1 3 4 -2 .5 1 9 0 -3 .8321 -3 .7 3 1 8
Philippines
Qm“ -0 .8 4 2 6 -0 .7381 -8 .4 8 9 7 -7 .3153
Pm/Gp -0 .6 8 8 2 -0 .7 7 0 4 -3 .6138 -3 .8 1 7 0
Yb -1 .4 3 0 4 -1 .8 2 1 4 -3 .8 7 7 4 -3 .2 5 8 8
Notes to table: All variables are in log
Vai iables are as follows; total import index relative price (Pm/Gp) and the real income (Yb). 
Critical value is -3.551
All econometi'ic computations have been carried out by Microfit 4.0 Version [see Pesaran and Pesaran 
(1997)]. In most o f the cases, the intercept terms are included in the relevant DF and ADF equations. 
An augmentation o f one seems to sufficient to secure lack o f autocorr elation in the eiTor terms, 
however, in some cases, no augmentation was necessary.
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As can be seen in table 5.2 (exports) and table 5.3 (imports), none of the calculated 
values are less than the critical values. All vaiiables aie 1(1) in levels but stationaiy in 
first differences. Since all variables in export and import demand equations are 
integrated of order one, we can proceed with the estimation for the long run 
relationship.
5.5 Estimation and Results
5.5.1 Testing for Cointegration
5.5.1.1 The OLS Residual-Based Test
Table 5.4 reports the ADF residual based test results for cointegration for the export 
demand equations. Charemza and Deadman (1992)- Table 2, provide approximate 
critical values for the cointegration test for 30 observations with m=3 at 5% level of 
significance which are -3.71 (lower bound) and -3.50 (upper bound). Specifically, one 
would reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration if the value was below -3.71; and 
would not reject the null if the value were above -3.50. Values between -3.71 and -  
3.50 lie in the inconclusive region. Therefore, based on the test statistics, for the case 
of Malaysia and Indonesia, the null hypothesis of no cointegration for the 
corresponding residual obtained fiom the long run export demand equation, can be 
rejected at 5% level of significance.
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Table 5.4: ADF Residual-based Test for Cointegration 
The Long-run Export Equations
Test Statistics Critical Values*
DF ADF(l) 5% 10%
U L u L
Malaysia -4.24 -4.33 -3.50 -3.71 -3.16 -3.33
Indonesia -2.67 -3.90 -3.50 -3.71 -3.16 -3,33
Thailand -3.58 -3.64 -3.50 -3.71 -3.16 -3.33
Philippines -3.62 -3.27 -3.50 -3.71 -3.16 -3.33
Notes to table:
*The critical values are obtained fi-om Charemza and Deadman (1992) with 30 numbers o f  observation 
and m=3. One also can refer to other sources o f  critical value tables i.e MacKinnon (1991), Engle- 
Granger (1987, Table II and III), Engle and Yoo (1987)
However, for Thailand long run export demand equation, the corresponding residual 
obtained from the equation is in the ‘inconclusive region’ at 5% level of significance 
although the null of no cointegration can be rejected at 10% level of significance. For 
the case of Philippines the null of no cointegration can also be rejected at 10% level of 
significance.
For the import demand equation, one can reject tire null hypothesis of no cointegration 
at 5% level of significance for the case of Malaysia and Indonesia. For the 
Philippines, one can reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 10% level of 
significance. For Thailand, the corresponding residual obtained from the equation is 
slightly below the upper bound critical value. However, it is assumed that all variables 
are cointegrated as the standard tests are over-cautious in rejection of the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration. This emphasizes type 1 error whereas type 2 error i.e. 
failing to reject the null when it is false, is more important here. Consequently, we 
should be generous in inteipreting the statistics. Accordingly, all variables involved in
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the equations aie cointegrated, or, in short, the long run relationships among variables 
are not spurious. This is shown in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5; ADF Residual-based Test for Cointegration 
The Long-run Import Equations
Test Statistics Critical Values*
DF ADF(l) 5% 10%
U L u L
Malaysia -2.99 -3.69 -3.15 -3.31 -2.80 -2.96
Indonesia -2.13 -3.29 -3.15 -3.31 -2.80 -2.96
Thailand -1.79 -2.34 -3.15 -3.31 -2.80 -2.96
Philippines -1.89 -2.80 -3.15 -3.31 -2.80 -2.96
Notes to table;
*The critical values are obtained &om Charemza and Deadman (1992) with 30 numbers o f  observation 
and m=2. One also can refer to other sources o f  critical value tables i.e MacKinnon (1991), Engle- 
Granger (1987, Table II and III), Engle and Yoo (1987)
The CRDW is used to see whether all the variables are cointegrated. Engle and Yoo,^^ 
provide a CRDW critical value for n=50; the two variables case is 0.78 at 5 percent 
level of significance and 0.69 at 10 percent level of significance.B y looking at the 
CRDW test statistics, the value of CRDW for Malaysia’s export demand is 1.42, 
Indonesia: 0.91; Thailand: 0.92 arrd the Philippines: 1.34. These are all larger than the 
5% critical values and therefore the null of no cointegration is rejected.
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5.5.1.2 The DOLS
The dynamic OLS paiameter estimates of the long-run export demand with all 
variables in levels, along with their approximate asymptotic standard errors for all 
countries are presented in Table 5.6. Based on the results obtained, for most cases 
both the long run income and price elasticities have correct signs as anticipated. The 
long run income elasticities vary from 0.15 (Philippines) to 1.37 (Thailand). In all 
cases, they are significant. The long-run price elasticities vary from -0.26 (Indonesia) 
to -2.41 (Thailand). The export composition index is included, however it is only 
significant for Malaysia, and so is dropped for the other thr ee countries.
Table 5.6; The DOLS Export Demand Equations (long run)
Country Px/Pw Yw Gci ser
Malaysia -0.35 0.21 1.69 0.05 0.99
(0.0646) (0.0621) (0.1715)
Indonesia -0.26 0.53 - 0.12 0.96
(0.1076) (0.0488)
Thailand -2.41 1.37 - 0.12 0.98
(0.3911) (0.0723)
Philippines -0.32 0.15 - 0.12 0.87
(0.1273) (0.0656)
The price elasticities in the import demand equations are correctly signed and are 
significant. The long run price elasticity of import demand vary from -0.27 
(Philippines) to -1.50 (Thailand). The income variable was also correctly signed and 
significant for all cases. The long run income elasticities vary fr'om 0.35 (Philippines) 
to 0.90 (Malaysia). Table 5.7 reports the result for impoif demand equations that show 
the correct sign for both the income and price elasticities.
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Table 5.7; The DOLS Import Demand Equations (long run)
Country Pm/Gp Yb Ser R"
Malaysia -1.24 0.90 0.24 0.93
(0.858) (0.1169)
Indonesia -0.41 0.46 0.14 0.96
(0.1974) (0.0996)
Thailand -1.50 0.70 0.09 0.98
(0.1505) (0.0215)
Philippines -0.27 0.35 0.15 0.88
(0.0898) (0.069)
The Short run Elasticities (ECM).
The vector error-correction model estimates tlie short-run parameters. As can be seen 
from table 5.8, (for both exports and imports equations), the coefficients appear to 
have the predicted signs and for most cases they are statistically significant. Based on 
the results, several points can be made. First, the statistical significance and 
magnitude of the error correction teim indicates that the relative price and income 
(export composition index for the Malaysian case) do, as a component of the long-run 
cointegrating relationship thiough the lagged error correction term, jointly influence 
export demand over the long-term. Second, the eiTor correction term is significant 
with an adjustment coefficient o f -0.53839 (i.e. Export demand -  Malaysian case), 
indicates that in the case we are off the long-run demand curve, overall demand 
adjusts to its long-run equilibrium level with about 53.8% of the adjustment talcing 
place within the first year.
The sign of the error correction term coefficient indicates that changes in the demand 
adjust in an opposite direction to the previous period’s deviation from equilibrium. If 
the error correction term is not significant, this implies that in this estimated model,
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any short-run adjustment to long term equilibrium is primarily through the other 
variables in the system and not through the channel of export demand. The error 
correction model estimates provide a quantitative assessment of the short-run price 
and income elasticity of exports and imports demand. For example, the short-run price 
and income elasticities of export demand for Thailand are -0.205 and 0.388 
respectively.
The diagnostic tests for both exports and imports demand for all countries are also 
acceptable. For example, the p-value for the LM-F test of the null of no 
autocoiTelation for Malaysia's export demand is 0.62, therefore we do not reject the
Inull of no autocorrelation. Similarly, for Indonesia's export demand, the p-value for i
the LM-F test of the null of no autocorrelation is 0.35, thus we do not reject the null of 
no autocoiTelation. There is also no evidence of non-normality or functional 
misspecification for all countries.
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Table 5.8; The Short-run Estimated Export and Import Demand (ECM)
Malaysia
Export
AlQx,'' = 0.014 -  0.1735A(lpx/pw), + 0.329AlyW(- 0.1803AIGcit+ 0.I81AlQxn‘‘ 
(0.0883) (0.1579) (0.1949) (0.1344)
-0.538U t-i 6 1 
(0.1165)
=0.71
S. E of Regression =0.06
DW- Statistic = 2.03
F stat (5,25) = 12.23
LM- F (1,24) = 0.246 (0.62) RESET -F  (1,24) = 0.229 (0.64)
Normality CH-SQ(2) = 1.973 (0.37) Heteroscedasticity F-(l,29) = 0.003(0.96)
Import
Aigmt"* = -3.744 -1 .2 1 9A(lpm/gp) t + 1.188Alyb t+ 0.454AlQm‘^ t-i -  0.750U t-i + s
(0.599) (0.356) (0.178) (1894)
R^ = 0.48
S. E of Regression =0.18
DW- Statistic =2.14
F stat (4,25) = 5.77
LM- F (1,24) = 1.35 (0.26) RESET-F  (1,24) = 1.53 (0.23)
Normality CH-SQ(2) = 31.72 Heteroscedasticity F-(l,28) =0.20(0.66)
Indonesia
Export
AlQxt^ = -0.228 -  0.292A(lpx/pw) t+ 1.27Alywt -  0.348 Um + s t 
(0.167) (0.3392) (0.1166)
R^ = 0.44
S. E of Regression =0.11
DW-Statistic =1.69
F stat (3,27) = 7.03
LM -F (1,29) =0.92(0.35) RESET-F (1,27) =4.30(0.05)
Normality CH-SQ(2) = 2.73 (0.26) Heteroscedasticity F-(l,29) = 1.67 (0.21)
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Import
AlQmt^ = 0.04 -  0.294(lpm/gp)t + 0.476Alybt+ 0.56AlQmt_/ -  0.58U t-i + £ t 
(0.339) (0.1552) (0.1696) (0.1525)
=0.61
S. E of Regression =0.10
DW-Statistic =2.19
F stat (4,21) = 8.425
LM -F (1,19) = 0.67 (0.42) RESET-F (1,19) =7.84(0.10)
Normality CH-SQ(2) = 1.26 (0.32) Heteroscedasticity F-(l,24) = 1.15 (0.29)
Thailand
Export
AlQxt*^  = 0.09 - 0.205A(lpx/pw)t+ 0.388Alywt +0.723A(lpx/pw)t-i -  0.29 U n + £ 
(0.247) (0.236) (0.257) (0.105)
R^ = 0.30
S. E of Regression = 0.08
DW- Statistic = 1.83
F stat (4,25) = 2.64
LM- F (1,24) = 0.13 (0.72) RESET-F (1,24) = 0.47 (0.98)
Normality CH-SQ(2) = 1.27 (0.53) Heteroscedasticity F-(l,28) = 1.32 (0.26)
Import
AlQnit^ = -0.019 -  1.402A(lpm/gp)t + 1.225Alybt + 0.935Alybt-i - 0.508Ut-i + St
(0.2996) (0.2267) (0.3045) (0.1182)
R^ = 0.62
S. E of Regression = 0.07
DW- Statistic = 1.88
F stat (4,24) = 9.916
LM -F (1,23) = 0.03 (0.86) RESET-F (1,23) = 3.70 (0.10)
Normality CH-SQ(2) = 0.99 (0.61) Heteroscedasticity F-( 1,27) = 0.04 (0.83)
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Philippines
Export
AlQxt^ = 0.396 - 0.646A(lpx/pw)t+ 0.520Alywt- 0.1414 Ut-i + St 
(0.1275) (0.3144) (0.0766)
=0.51
S. E of Regression =0.10
D W -Statistic =1.73
F stat (3,26) = 9.21
LM- F (1,25) = 0.09 (0.77) RESET -F  (1,25) =0.16 (0.70)
Normality CH-SQ(2) = 0.07 (0.97) Heteroscedasticity F-(l,28) = 0.32 (0.58)
Import
AlQmt*' = -0.025 - 0.294A(lpm/gp), + 0.494Alybt + 0.428AlQm‘' t-i - 0.582U t-i + s t 
(0.227) (0.203) (0.1527) (0.12044)
= 0.58
S. E of Regression = 0.09
DW- Statistic = 1.49
F stat (4,24) = 8.60
LM -F (1,23) = 1.23 (0.28) RESET-F  (1,23) =0.28(0.61)
Normality CH-SQ(2) =1.01(0.60) Heteroscedasticity F-(1,27) =0.13 (0.73)
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5.5.2 The Johansen Maximum Likelihood Approach (VAR)
The Basic Steps of the Johansen Procedure.
First by using the Augmented Dickey Fuller Test with a constant and time tiend, the 
order of integration of each variable in the multivariate model is tested. Second, by 
restricting the intercept in the long-run model, the model is specified whether it 
should include intercept and the time trend. Third, the lag length should be 
determined. The lag length is selected for each country by using the Schwarz 
Baryesian Criterion (SBC) and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Fourth, the 
number of cointegrating vectors is tested. This can be done by testing for reduced 
ranlc, finding the presence of r < (n-1) cointegrating vectors in (3, which means finding 
the number of r linearly independent columns in Tt. This method uses a reduced rank
regression which provides n eigenvalues > % 2 ..... >^p and their corresponding
eigenvectors. The null hypothesis that there are at most r cointegration vectors can be 
tested using the likelihood ratio test (the tiace statistic).
=-21og(e) = -7’^ lo g (l-A ,)
/= r+ l
where r = 0,1,2.........n-2,n-l
Q is the restricted likelihood divided by um*estiicted maximised likelihood. Another 
test of significance of the lar gest 7c is the maximal eigenvalue (A,-max-statistic), which 
is
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.^nax = - r i O g ( l - 4 , J  
where r = 0,1,2..... ,n-2,n-1
Fifth, estimates and inference for the parameters of the cointegrating vector. After 
determining the number of cointegration vectors, try and interpret them in the 
structural economic relationships underlying the long-run model.
Specification of the Cointegrating VAR Model.
Information fi’om the unrestricted VAR model in Microfit 4 was used to determine the 
order of the VAR for all the countries. The Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC), and 
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) were used to determine the optimal lag 
length. For Malaysia, k = 2; Indonesia, k = 1; Thailand, k = 2; the Phillipines, k = 1. 
(For the exports demand).
The log-likelihood ratio statistics were then used for testing zero restrictions on the 
coefficients of a subset of deterministic/exogenous variable. In all cases, the presence 
of an intercept could not be rejected.
The results of the Johansen Juselius cointegration tests for all countries are shown m 
Table 5.9. The trace statistic and the eigenvalue (maximiun) test show that there exists 
only one cointegrating relationship for all the cases.
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Table 5,9; The Johansen Maximum Likelihood
Cointegration Test - Exports
Malaysia; Cointegration with Unrestricted Intercepts and No Trends in the VAR
(k=2)
Eigenvalue i^nax T^racc Ho = i- Ka = P-r Critical Value
95% L-max 95% trace
0.70729 39.31401 55.1817 0 1 27.42 48.80
0.26291 9.7613 15.8678 1 2 21.12 31.54
0.15325 5.3231 6.1064 2 3 14.88 17.86
0.0241842 0.78339 0.78339 3 4 8.07 8.07
Indonesia; Cointegration with Unrestricted Intercepts and No Trends in the
VAR (k=l)
Eigenvalue i^nax T^race Ho = r Ha = P-r Critical Value
95% L-max 95% trace
0.60813 29.9783 53.9768 0 1 27.42 48.80
0.43334 18.1758 23.9985 1 2 21.12 31.54
0.16377 5.7233 5.8228 2 3 14.88 17.86
0.031024 0.099431 0.099431 3 4 8.07 8.07
Thailand; Cointegration with Unrestricted Intercepts and No Trends in the VAR
(k=2)
Eigenvalue ^mnx T^racc Ho = r Ha =  P-r Critical Value
95% L-max 95% trace
0.65517 33.0058 39.6372 0 1 21.12 31.54
0.17991 6.1485 6.6315 1 2 14.88 17.86
0.015457 0.48291 0.48291 2 3 8.07 8.07
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Philippines; Cointegration with Unrestricted Intercepts and No Trends in the
VAR (k=l)
Eigenvalue n^iax T^race Ho = i* Ha =  P-r Critical Value
95% L-max 95% trace
0.51959 21.2602 35.7503 0 1 27.42 45.70
0.25767 8.6410 14.4902 1 2 21.12 28.78
0.16226 5.1345 5.8492 2 3 14.88 15.75
0.024346 0.71476 0.71476 3 4 8.07 8.07
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Table 5.10: The Johansen Maximum Likelihood
Cointegration Test - Imports
Malaysia: Cointegration with Unrestricted Intercepts and No Trends in the VAR
(k=2)
Eigenvalue m^nx T^racc Ho =  r Ha = P-r Critical Value
90% L-max 90% trace
0.51084 22.17 27.83 0 1 19.02 28.78
0.15299 5.14 5.67 1 2 12.98 15.75
0.016594 0.52 0.52 2 3 6.5 6.5
Indonesia: Cointegration with Unrestricted Intercepts and No Trends in the
VAR (k=2)
Eigenvalue n^wx T^rnce Ho = r Ha = P-r Critical Value
90% L-max 90% trace
0.48118 17.72 27.99 0 1 19.02 28.78
0.28714 9.14 10.28 1 2 12.99 15.75
0.041468 1.14 1.14 2 3 6.50 6.5
Thailand: Cointegration with Unrestricted Intercepts and No Trends in the VAR
(k=2)
Eigenvalue ^max T^race Ho = r Ha = P-r Critical Value
90% L-max 90% trace
0.62767 29.64 31.63 0 1 19.02 28.78
0.06386 1.98 1.99 1 2 12.98 15.75
0.3434E-3 0.0103 0.010304 2 3 6.50 6.5
Philippines: Cointegration with Unrestricted Intercept and No Trends in the
VAR (k=2)
Eigenvalue i^nax T^race Ho =  r Ha = P-i Critical Value
90% L-max 90% trace
0.46026 18.50 28.30 0 1 22.26 36.28
0.20704 6.96 9.80 1 2 16.28 21.23
0.090358 2.84 2.84 2 3 9.75 9.75
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The Johansen likelihood ratio statistics were used to determine the number of 
cointegrating vectors r. Both the maximal eigenvalue and the trace tests were used, 
testing the null hypothesis of r cointegrating vectors for r = 0, followed by r :S 1 and r 
^2 .
For the export demand equation, in most cases the maximal eigenvalue test (X-max 
test) indicates that the null hypothesis of zero cointegrating vectors is rejected at 95% 
critical value except for the case of the Philippines. [See Pesaran and Pesaran, 
Microfit 4 (1997)]. The trace test confirms that there is only one cointegrating 
relationship among the variables for all countries except for the case of the 
Philippines. However, based on the choice of tlie number of cointegrating relations 
using model selection criteria, both the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and the 
Hannan-Quinn Criteria (HQC) select one cointegrating relationship.
For the import demand equation, the maximal eigenvalue test and the trace test, 
indicate that the null hypothesis of zero cointegrating vectors is rejected at 90% 
critical value except for the case of the Philippines and Indonesia. Nevertheless, based 
on the choice of the number of cointegrating relations using model selection criteria, 
the Schwarz Bayesian Criteria (SBC) selects one cointegrating relationsliip for both 
the Philippines and Indonesia.
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The estimation of the normalized cointegrating vector then is obtained as the 
existence of the relationship among the variables is accepted. This is shown in Table 
5.11.
For most of the cases, the price and income elasticities of export demand ai*e all 
correctly signed. In the Malaysian case, the long run price and income elasticities ai*e 
-0.35 and 0.20 respectively. They are both statistically significant. The export 
composition index also has the predicted sign and is also significant with the value of 
1.71. In the Indonesian case, the long run price and income elasticities are -0.3 and 
0.67, respectively and both are statistically significant. For the case of Thailand, the 
price and income elasticities have the predicted sign and both are significant. The long 
run price elasticity is -2.69 and the long run income elasticity is 1.43. For the 
Philippines, the long run price elasticity is -0.25 and the long run income elasticity is 
0.17. They are both correctly signed and significant.
A restriction is imposed on the export composition index (GCI) that a4 = 0, obviously 
for the Malaysian case, the is statistically significant, and therefore the null 
hypothesis of no relationship between the export demand and the export composition 
index is rejected.
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For the import demand equations, in all cases die price and income elasticities are all 
coiTectly signed and are significant (see table 5.11). These results suggest that both 
relative price and real income aie crucial in determining import demand.
Comparison between the Engle-Granger Two-Step Method and the Johansen VAR 
approach can be seen in table 5.11. Previous empirical studies on exports demand, as 
discussed eailier, supported the conventional view which states that the price 
elasticities of exports demand are small. Results fi'om the Engle-Granger two-step 
procedure then aie inline with this conventional view. The low price and income 
elasticities of exports demand can be explained by the aggregate data used in this 
study.
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Table 5.11: Comparison between Engle-Granger Two-Step Method and the
Johansen VAR Approach.
Country Variables Exports Variables Imports
E-G Johansen E-G Johansen
Malaysia
(px/pw) -0.35 -0.35 (pin/gp) -1.24 -2.19
(0.0646) (0.056) (0.858) (0.734)
Yw 0.21 0.20 Yb 0.90 1.02
(0.0621) (0.053) (0.1169) (0.096)
Gci 1.69 1.70
(0.1715) (0.1473)
Indonesia
(px/pw) -0.26 -0.30 (pm/gp) -0.41 -0.51
(0.1076) (0.104) (0.1974) (0.213)
Yw 0.53 0.67 Yb 0.46 0.42
(0.0488) (0.051) (0.0996) (0.121)
Thailand
(px/pw) -2.41 -2.69 (pm/gp) -1.50 -1.75
(0.3911) (0.510) (0.1505) (0.196)
Yw 1.37 1.43 Yb 0.70 0.74
(0.0723) (0.096) (0.0215) (0.026)
Philippine
(px/pw) -0.32 -0.25 (pm/gp) -0.27 -1.34
(0.1273) (0.186) 0.0898) (0.741)
Yw 0.15 0.17 Yb 0.35 0.99
(0.0656) (0.061) (0.069) (0.759)
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5.6 Summary
Based on the analysis, one can observe the existence of cointegration among variables 
for both export and impoif demand. The results for exports and imports demand are 
reasonably good and both the price and income elasticity of exports and imports 
demand, have cori'ect signs as anticipated. The inclusions of the export composition 
index in the export demand equation (i.e. Malaysian case) lower tlie value of the price 
elasticity. The commodity type effects are implicitly captured by the income and price 
effects if they are not included in the equation (i.e. for the Malaysian case, it is 
significant). However, non-price competition such as quality and marketing strategy 
should also be included in the export demand model to give accurate estimations. 
Meanwhile, the inelasticity of export demand for most countries are expected, as the 
bulk of these countries exports ar e in the fonn of strategic raw materials used for 
industrial purposes. In other words, the income elasticity, which is less than one can 
be explained by the aggregate data used in this study, i.e. the inclusion of data on 
agricultural goods and food. As is known, the price elasticity differs across the 
commodity group where the price elasticity of manufactured goods is higher than that 
of agricultur al products. Similarly, it applies to the income elasticity of demand.
Fluihermore, the unit value indices are used in this study due to data problems. As 
mentioned earlier, the use of export and import unit value indices might also affect the 
results obtained. Unit value indices have proved to be less reliable proxies, especially 
when the class of exports is not homogenous.
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Based on the results obtained, two important implications for policy considerations 
can be drawn. Firstly, foreign income is a significant variable in the export demand 
equation, suggesting that foreign disturbance in the form of fluctuation in foreign 
economic activities is likely to be transmitted to those countries. Secondly, the 
Marshall-Lerner conditions are met for Malaysia and Thailand. For example for 
Malaysia, the estimates obtained are -0.35 and -1.24 for the price elasticities of 
export and import demand respectively. The sum of these is -1.59, therefore the 
Marshall-Lerner condition are satisfied easily, suggesting that appreciations 
(depreciations) in exchange rates can worsen (improve) the current account in a 
period of one year. Tliis is also true for Thailand where the sum of the price 
elasticities of export and import demand is -3.91. For the case of Indonesia and the 
Philippines, however, the sum of the price elasticities of exports and imports are -0.67 
and -0.59 respectively. This can be explained by the J-ciu've, in which import and 
export demands tend to be relatively inelastic due to the existence of lags. The J-cirr ve 
also shows that currency depreciation takes time to affect the curTent account.
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NOTES
’ For defining and measming trade strategy see Bhagwati (1990), Liang (1992),
Milner (1994) and the references therein.
 ^This is done following method used by Cohen (1985).
 ^Based on their study on Hong Kong’s total exports of manufactines and South 
Korea’s exports of machinery.
The inadequate results obtained are claimed due to some limitation i.e short time 
series and inadequate data.
 ^ For the issue of trade policy see Athukorala and Riedel (1991), Cline (1982), 
Greenaway and Milner (1993), Mustacelli et.al (1991b, 1994).
 ^For a detailed description of the variables and data sources, see Appendix A.
 ^ For choices of functional form (i.e. linear vs. log-linear) see Klian and Ross (1977) 
and Boylan et.al (1980).
 ^The world price and income indices facing a country, are calculated using a similar 
method to that used by Houthakker and Magee(1969) and Goldstein and Klian 
(1978). Further details see Appendix A.
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 ^ These signs aie expected according to economic theory. The higher the price of a 
coimtry’s exports relative to other countries, ceteris paribus, the smaller the demand 
for the country’s exports. The higher the level of foreign income, ceteris paribus, the 
larger the foreign demand for the country’s exports.
Similarly, these signs aie expected based on economic theory. The higher the 
import price relative to the domestic price, ceteris paribus, the smaller the demand 
for imports. The higher the real income of the country, the higher the demand for 
imports.
The following coimtries have a shorter data range: exports -  the Philippines (1963- 
1992), imports -  Indonesia -  (1967-1995).
See table 5.8 -  The short run estimated export and import demand.
See Engle and Yoo (1987-Table 4).
14 One can also see Engle-Granger (1987)- CRDW critical values for n=100, the two 
variable case.
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CHAPTER SIX
A SOLVENCY MODEL FOR THE FOUR ASIAN COUNTRIES
6.1 Introduction
The ‘fundamentalists’ state that the causes of the Asian crisis were the weaknesses in 
fundamentals i.e. a deteriorating current account, the slow down in growth, short term 
debt reaching dangerous levels, etc. However, current account deficits are not a 
problem as long as they are sustainable. As mentioned earlier, tlie notion of solvency 
is used in the literature for assessing current account sustainability. Indicators such as 
debt/GDP, debt/export are usually used as a measure of a country's indebtedness. 
Nevertheless, this static measure fails to take into account the dynamic aspects of 
solvency i.e. growth rate, interest rate. With regard to the debt crisis in 1980s, Cohen 
(1985) argued that the change in the relationship between the interest rate paid on the 
debt and the expected growth of exports was the cause of this crisis.* If the interest 
rates were below the growth rate of export earnings of a coimtry, then the wealth of a 
country in present value terms would be infinite and there would be no solvency 
problem. Apparently, in the 1980s the real interest rates were higher than the rate of 
growth of most Less Developed Coimtries (LDCs), and this created problems for 
those coimtries.
In the case of Asian, in the 1990s there was evidence that most of the affected 
countries experienced a slowing down in their growth rates. Taking this into account 
the dynamic measure of indebtedness that was introduced by Cohen can be used to
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assess these countries' ability to repay their debt. These countries need to know the 
fraction of a country’s resources, which has to be transferred to the creditors in order 
to be considered solvent. Following the same method used by Cohen (1985) the 
solvency indices for all countries will be calculated. Specifically, the outline of this 
chapter is as follows: Section 6.2 presents a review on debt/solvency. Section 6.3 
presents econometric studies on solvency. Section 6.4 explains the model in which the 
intertemporal budget constraint is discussed. Section 6.5 describes the solvency index 
followed by section 6.6, which presents an invariant measure of wealth. Section 6.7 
discusses the repudiation threat followed by section 6.8 on assessing the solvency of 
an indebted country. The derivation of the calculation of the solvency index is given 
in section 6.9. The application to the fom* Asean countiies is presented in section 6.10 
followed by section 6.11, which is the estimation of GDP supply. Section 6.12 
presents the calculation of the solvency indices for the foui’ Asean countiies. Finally 
section 6.13 provides a summary.
6.2 A Review on Debt/Solvency
Looking back to the 1980s debt crisis, being unable to roll over short-term debts that 
were due, Mexico was pushed to the brink of default. This was soon followed by a 
withdrawal of creditors from developing countries, which led to debt rescheduling, 
defaults and renegotiations. As can be seen in 1990s, there have also been several 
dramatic reversals in large scale lending to emerging markets, for instance Mexico, 
Turkey, Venezuela in 1994, Argentina in early 1995 and the East Asian countries in 
1997. Accordingly for Mexico, Argentina, Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand, an 
outstanding amomit of international loans were arranged to prevent defaults on debt
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servicing. Obviously all of these episodes have several similar characteristic i.e. 
sudden shifts in financial flows; they cause a severe contraction within the debtor 
countries.
As stated by Radelet and Sachs (1998b), most observers have tried to explain the 
Asian crisis by two types of fundamental factors. First, sudden changes in 
international market conditions that affect the ability of debtors to repay their 
outstanding loans i.e. shifts in interest rates, commodity prices or trade conditions. 
Second, sudden changes in the debtor country that cause creditors to reassess the 
country’s ability to service the foreign debt i.e. change in political leadership or 
economic policy or in the burden of debt. However, in the case of the crisis in 1994- 
95 (Argentina, Mexico, Turkey, and Venezuela) the first factor seemed to be stable 
because the U.S interest rates were moderate. As argued by Dombusch, Goldfajn and 
Rodrigo Valdes, the Mexican crisis can be explained by the second factor, which was 
poor macroeconomic management within country. In the case of the Asian, neither of 
both factors seemed to be relevant. Conditions in international financial markets, 
commodity market and the trading system were fine as well as the domestic factors.
Radelet and Sachs (1998b) suggest the third category to explain the Asian crisis, 
which is the intrinsic instability in international lending. As pointed out by other 
researchers this factor also was the explanation for the Mexican crisis.^ Accordingly 
as stressed by Radelet and Sachs “international loan markets are prone to self- 
fulfilling crises, in which although individual creditors may act rationally, market 
outcomes produce sharp, costly and fundamentally unnecessary panicked reversals in 
capital flows’’^
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With regards to debt issues, there are different views about the diagnosis of the debt 
problem. According to Eaton (1989), the three main reasons are, i) illiquidity, ii) 
insolvency, iii) unwillingness to pay. Accordingly, in explaining the existence of 
external debt problems different tlieoretical models have been developed. An illiquid 
borrower does not have enough ready cash to repay current debt servicing, however it 
has the net worth to repay the debt in the long term. It is viewed that the debt crisis is 
seen as temporary, and the problem will be solved by new financing ari'angements. 
Under these circumstances, it is necessary for the debtor country to ask for additional 
loans as the difficulties that occur are for a short run, especially if it is also believed 
that tire country has a bright prospect in the long run. This is known as “illiquidity 
approach” in the debt literature."*
For the second reason, it is viewed that the debtor country does not repay the debt 
because it is unable to pay, meaning that the lending is tied by a solvency constraint. 
Here an insolvent borrower lacks the net worth to repay outstanding debts out of its 
future earnings. Traditionally, the static measures of external debt i.e. debt/exports 
ratio or debt/GDP ratio or debt service ratio, are usually used to evaluate the ability- 
to-pay of an indebted country. It simply says that to be solvent, a country must repay 
all its foreign debt to its creditors. Consequently, it is believed that the problem that 
occurs reflects insolvency; then rescheduling or new loans will not improve the 
situation, in fact these will add burden to the country’s existing debt.
As stated by Radelet and Sachs the illiquidity-insolvency model can be used to 
explain herd-behaviom* in financial market, which is “cases where creditors act on the 
basis of the actions of other creditors, not on the basis of debtor’s fundamentals, as
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perceived by the individual investor”  ^ (see chapter 2, section 2.3.2). On the other 
hand, Baneijee (1992), Mishkin (1999) and Stiglitz (1999) examined in detail the role 
of asymmetric information among creditors as a cause of market instability. 
Accordingly each individual creditors would rationally respond to the action of other 
creditors rather than the private information^ The simple example on herd-behaviour 
is given by Radelet and Sachs (1998).^
As in a household or a government, a nation faces a budget constmint, which is its 
balance of payment constraint. Generally, a nation is solvent if it can meet its 
intertemporal budget constraint. In other words, the country’s net debt does not 
exceed the present value of cuirent and future primary (non-interest) surpluses, [see 
CuiTie and Levine (1991), Ghatak and Levine (1994), Wickens and Uctum(1993)].
D t=[PVt;TBt(r)] (6.1)
where Dt is the nation’s net external debt at time t, PV denotes the present discounted 
value, at time t, of the entire planned or expected fiiture stream of tr ade surpluses (TB) 
at the discounted rate of r. Equation 6.1 indicates that the present discounted value of 
future trade balance surpluses is equal to the nation’s current net external debt. 
Alternatively the solvency condition can be written as;
(6.20
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provided that the “no-ponzi game” condition hold
Equation (6.1) and (6.2) denote the national solvency that the debtor country faces 
when r>0. In both equations, it is assumed that r>0 and therefore the condition where 
r<0 is ruled out and the nation cannot play a successful “ponzi-game”: the nation 
camiot forever pay the interest on its outstanding external debt through borrowing. In 
other words, a debtor country with Dt>0 at time t will have to run primary smpluses 
sometime in the future in order to service its external debt.
For the third reason, the debtor country may be liquid and able to pay its debt but 
miwilling to do so. Under these circumstances, new lending may be constrained by 
‘repudiation risk’. The boiTowing coimtry will compare the perceived costs and 
benefits dealing with repayments. If the cost is greater than the benefit, the borrower 
will threaten to abandon its obligations and face retaliation from creditors. However, 
the cost of default is high enough to prevent the debtor country from defaulting. These 
includes the seizure of assets, exclusion from futme borrowing, decline in the 
trustworthy reputation."
Based on these three main reasons, three different policy strategies for debtors, 
creditors and the relevant international institutions can be drawn. Proponents of the 
‘liquidity view’ believe that the debt problem is only temporary due to the 
imfavourable global economic environment, and therefore should be solved by 
rescheduling and new lending. Meanwhile the ‘ability to pay’ proponents view that
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the debt problem is not a short-run payment problem and therefore has to be solved 
with some debt relief rather than rescheduling.
6.3 Econometric Studies on Solvency (ability-to-pay)
There are many econometric studies in the literatuie. Studies by Frank and Cline 
(1971); used eight indicators to identify external servicing difficulties. Among the 
explanatory variables used are debt service ratio, import/GNP ratio, and 
imports/reserves ratio, per capita GNP, export growth, amortization/debt ratio, 
compressibility of imports. The study cover 26 countries for the period of 1960-1968 
and of the eight variables, only three ar e statistically significant which are debt service 
ratio, imports/reserves ratio and amortization/debt ratio.
Feder and Just (1977) use logit analysis to analyze the ability-to-pay of the debtor 
countries. The economic indicator of debt servicing capacity that is employed is based 
on Avramoric’s et.al (1964) study. Seven of the indicators are the same as used by 
Frank and Cline (1971) and two additional variables are capital inflows and growth of 
per capita domestic product. They find that six variables, which are debt service ratio, 
import/reserves ratio, per capita income, outstanding debt/cuiTent amortization ratio, 
capital inflows/debt service ratio and real export growth rate are statistically 
significant.
Following the study by Feder and Just (1977), the logit/probit/tobit models are used 
substantially to analyze the debt servicing capacity of debtor countries. Some of the 
major contributions are fiom Cline (1984), Edwards (1984), Feder e tal (1981),
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Kliaras (1984), McFadden et.al (1985), Hajivassiliou (1987, 1989), Lee (1991), etc. 
Study by Hajivassiliou (1987, 1989), Lee (1991) and McFadden et.al (1985) use the 
framework of credit rationing and a tlieory of LDC boiTOwing with potential 
repudiation developed by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a). Meanwhile Lee (1991) uses 
the multi period willingness to pay model developed by Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a). 
Here he differentiates between sovereign debt and non-publicly guaranteed private 
external debt. Based on the willingness to pay model, the probability of default is said 
to be a frmction of several variables which ar e interest rate on international lending, 
per capita GDP growth rate, total external debt/GNP ratio, growth rate of 
industrialized countries’ GNP, government debt held domestically/GDP ratio, and 
variability of changes in per capita GDP. By using logit analysis he finds that three 
variables which are interest rate on international lending, per capita GDP growth rate 
and total external debt/GNP ratio are statistically significant in explaining both 
commercial and official rescheduling cases.
However, earlier empirical studies fail to differentiate between liquidity and solvency 
problems, which is important for a decision to reschedule i.e the question of debt 
servicing capacity. Accordingly, this has led to a separate solvency literature. Here, 
only the long-run aspects of debt capacities are taken into consideration. In this 
solvency literature the net external debt (D) and the net discounted present value of 
future income stream (PV) of a debtor country are compared. The country is 
considered to be solvent as long as D < PV. The issue of solvency has received much 
attention in recent years.^ Sach (1984) uses a two period models while others (i.e 
Buiter and Patel (1992), Cohen (1991), Currie and Levine (1991), Ghatak and Levine 
(1994) employ infinite horizon models. In the two period models, both the principal
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and interest on external debt incimed in the first period have to be repaid by the end 
of the second period, and therefore solvency requires that second period income 
exceed or equal external indebtedness and debt service obligation.
In an infinite horizon framework, however principals would not have to be repaid, but 
the present value of debt service payments must exceed the value of the principal. 
Accordingly, if r>n, the solvency budget constraint requires that the discoimted 
present value of the stieam of future income is not less than the current external debt 
level. This is what so called a ‘no-ponzi game’ (or transversality) condition, in which 
the ‘dynamic inefficiency’ is ruled out .*** Nevertheless, if r<n, the discounted value of 
the future income is said to be infinite and the nation can play a successful ‘ponzi 
game’ [see Cohen (1991), Cmi'ie and Levine (1991)]. In this case, the country has 
infinite net wealth and therefore can borrow as much as it wishes and remain solvent. 
With equation (6.5) and (6.6), assuming r>n, a country with D>0, at time t will have 
to run primary surpluses sometime in the future in order to sei*vice its external debt. 
Solvency does not require that the debt to repaid, it is just impossible indefinitely to 
finance the interest bill through new borrowings. This means that sometime in tire 
future primary surpluses must be attained and any further borrowing will not be high 
enough to pay the entire existing debt interest.** The solvency evaluation requires that 
the net external debt grows at a slower rate than the interest rate.
In recent years, unit root test and the cointegration analysis are used to test whether 
government spending and revenue (i.e. government’s budget constraint) and country’s 
exports and imports (i.e. nation’s budget constraint) are cointegrated. Here the 
existence of a genuine and stable long-run relationship is a necessary condition for the
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countiy to satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint and for the current account 
deficits to be sustainable in the long run. Major contribution come from Hamilton and 
Flavin (1986) and subsequently developed by Trehan and Walsh (1991), Wilcox 
(1989), Hakkio and Rush (1991), Smith and Zin (1991), Corsetti and Roubini (1991), 
Buiter and Patel (1992), Wickens and Uctum (1993).
Based on the observations of the tliree decades from 1950s to the early 1980s, it is 
obvious that the real growth rate was greater than the interest rate (i.e. n>r), but in the 
early 1980s, the hierarchy between the two rates has changed and this has caused 
problems to all debtors countries in financing high interest rate payments out of slow 
growth. And for 1990s, there was evidence that those affected Asean countries 
experienced a slowing down in the growth rate.
6.4 The Model
In this model, we are concerned with the solvency of an indebted nation. Therefore, 
the domestic budgetary problem is eliminated and the government’s wealth is the 
same as the nation’s wealth.
00  y
no+c).v=0
(6 3)
Based on equation (6.3), we have two possibilities which are;
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i) The rate of interest is above the rate of growth of the economy (rt>nt). Under 
this circumstance, the country’s wealth is said to be finite and a fixed fraction 
of its resour ces should be transfeiTed to creditors to be considered as solvent.
ii) The rates of interest are below or equal the rate of growth of the economy 
(rt<rit). In this case the country’s wealth is infinite and therefore there is no 
solvency problem.
In the second case where rt<nt, time can solve the external debt problem, whereby 
rescheduling the external debt can always reduce the debt/GDP or debt/exports ratio 
of a nation. As argued in the literature, in the long run the real interest rates exceed the 
growth rate (i't>nt) of the economy. This restriction is imposed as the case of i't<nt 
there is no solvency problem.
Based on the situation of the real interest rates is greater then the growth rates of the 
economy, the nation is said to have a finite wealth and it cannot play a successful 
“ponzi-game”. As in a household or a government a nation faces a budget constraint, 
which is its balance of payment constraint. Generally, a nation is solvent if it can meet 
its intertemporal budget constraint. In other words, the coimtry’s net debt does not 
exceed the present value of cuiTent and futiue primary (non-interest) smpluses. [see 
Cmxie and Levine (1991), Ghatak and Levine (1994), Wickens and Uctum (1993)]
The Intertemporal Budget Constraint
Generally, the basic accounting identity for an open economy dming period t can be 
written as follows;
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Yt = (1 + nt) Yt-i (6.4)
Dt = (1 + Tt) Dt-i- TBt = (1 + rt)Dt-i+ (IMt — EXt) (6.5)
where
Y = gross domestic product
D = net external debt (gross debt-gross assets)
n = growth rate
r == the world real interest rate
TB = trade balance
EX = exports
IM = imports
Basically at any time t, the nation produces Y and its aggregate spending is given as;
At — Ct“l" It 4- Gt
Therefore
Yt = At + (EXt-IM t) (6.6)
The left-hand side of equation (6.6) represents the nation’s aggregate income at the
end of period t and the right hand side of (6.6) denotes total expenditur e
The tr ade balance of the nation can be expressed as
TBt = (EXt -  IMt) = Yt - At (6.7)
where TBt -  rDt-i is the cur rent account of the nation.
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Based on this framework, solving forward in time the intertemporal budget constraint 
that a nation must obey can be written as
TB,
n a  + r.)
.y=0
(6 8)
or
Z)o =  y/=o
Y,~A, 
][J(l + r.v)
,y=0
Equation (6.8) simply means that the external debt at the end time t must equal to the 
present value of the future net surplus if the country is solvent, 
provided that
— = 0
n  (!+''*■)
A-O
(&9)
This condition is so-called the ‘no-ponzi’ game condition in the economic literature 
(or transversality), a coimtry caimot roll over its external debt forever. If the left hand- 
side of equation (6.9) is greater than zero and the debt stock is greater than the future 
expected payments, it means that the coimtry has a debt overhang problem. In other 
words, the present discoimted value of a nation’s external debt must tend toward zero 
in the long run. The only constraint that transversality condition imposes on the debt 
is that rt>nt, in the long-run meaning that the numerator in equation (6.9) must grew 
less rapidly than the denominator. However, a debtor coimtry may also face a problem 
in choosing its consumption pattern according to its intertemporal budget constraint as
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creditors may impose a credit ceiling due to threat of default. Therefore, lenders might 
want to be sure that the boiTowers’ external debt is not very high so that the debtor 
country prefers not to service its debt.
6.5 The Solvency Index
Cohen (1985) develops a solvency index to measure the fixed fraction of a debtor 
country’s earning that should be allocated to the repayment of the external debt to 
satisfy the solvency condition. If a country’s trade siuplus is greater or equal to the 
fixed fraction, a debtor country is considered as solvent. As long as nt>i\, in the long- 
rim the debtor country’s wealth is infinite (in discounted present value term) and there 
is no solvency problem. The country’s income can repay any level of initial debt in 
finite time. However, if  nt<r„ the country’s wealth is finite and the external debt level 
must be compared with the present value of futur e revenue.
The solvency index actually calculates the minimuiu level of external debt repayment 
when r,>nt. The index weights the external debt/exports ratio by an average measure 
of the difference between expected real growth and real interest rates in the future. 
Here the hierarchy of these two rates in time is taken into consideration. Thus the 
index is superior to the tr aditional static measures of solvency, i.e. external debt/GDP 
ratio or external debt/exports ratio, etc. In this case, although a country has a small 
foreign debt, it may be less solvent if the growth rate is slower compared to a coimtry 
with a larger foreign debt but grows faster. Empirically, Cohen (1985), showed that 
the debtor countries (in 1983) with a few exceptions needed to repay 15% of their 
exports to be said solvent. The solvency indices for few countries were calculated i.e.
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Turkey (7.7%), Argentine (16.4%), Mexico (12.11%) and Brazil (15%). By 
comparing these percentages to the actual transfers, all these countries successfully 
passed the solvency test.
Based on Cohen’s study, there was criticism of the use of exports as a denominator 
instead of GDP. He then tackled this problem, in his following study and used the 
weighted average of botli exports and GDP. This is called the Invariant Measure of 
Wealth (IMW). By using the IMW, which is the linear' combination (weighted 
average) of the country’s GDP and exports, it will not be affected by the 
overvaluation and devaluation of the domestic cunency.
It is argued that if the creditors prefer basing their lending on the GDP measure, this 
will encourage the debtor country to change its relative price structure in such a way 
as to artificially increase the value of its GDP (i.e. by overvaluing its cmi'ency). The 
other way ar ound if creditors base their estimations on the export measure; that is the 
coimtry will devalue its currency ineffectively.
Cohen and Sachs (1986) stated that the debtor country has the ability to repudiate its 
external debt. Regarding the repudiation issue, Cohen takes a different view from the 
traditional willingness to pay view. He states that it is difficult to calculate the cost of 
default due to its complexity and ‘information asymmetry’ as to whether a given 
default is due to debtor’s objective inability to pay or not. He argues that if a debtor 
country has not defaulted at the curr ent (at time t) value of it external debt/IMW, this 
means that the value is not yet too high. If not, the debtor country would have 
defaulted. This simply means that, if a debtor country at time t prefers to repay a fixed
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fraction n, of its resources (ttIMW) to creditors rather than default, by implication 
(ceteris paribus) the coimtry will also be willing to repay in the future. Therefore the 
ttIMW can be associated with the primary surplus (TB) in equation (6.8).
(6.10)
(6.11)
provided that the following ‘no-Ponzi game’ condition, holds
In the long run, it is assmned that the real interest rate is higher than the growth rate. 
Observations of the thr ee decades from the 1950s to the ear ly 1980s show that the real 
growth rates were higher than the interest rate (i.e nt>r,). However, in the early 1980s 
there was a change in which the interest was higher than the growth rate. Empirically, 
CiuTie and Levine (1991), in their study compare the aimual individual GDP growth 
rates for G7 countries with global real ex post short term interest rates. It is shown that 
rt<iit for the 1970s but rt>Ut for the 1980s. Similarly, Ghatak and Levine (1994) in their 
study, support that i\>nt as this was the situation for most LDCs since the begimiing of 
the 1980s. As the result, the nation faces the so called ‘no Ponzi’ game condition.
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6.6 An Invariant Measure of Wealth
Following Cohen (1998a), here we assume that the government owns the export 
industry and only the government has access to the world financial and good markets. 
It sells the exports good abroad and sells domestically the imported goods. However, 
the domestic prices set by the government may not reflect the world price. We then 
need to decide how to define the best estimation for the countries’ resources. As 
argued in Cohen’s paper (1991) there is ‘moral hazard’ problem by using either GDP 
or exports. If  the creditors base their lending on the GDP measm e, this encom ages the 
debtor country to change its relative price structure in such a way as to increase 
artificially the value of its GDP. On the other hand, if creditors base their lending on 
the export measme, this induce the country to change its policy in the opposite 
direction. Thus, to avoid this problem, the best way is to use an appropriate measure 
of weighted average of these two measurements, as called “invariant measme of 
wealth” by Cohen (1991). Accordingly,
IMW = a(EX) + (l-a)(GDP) 
where EX is real exports and GDP is real home output. Following the method 
proposed by Cohen (1987, 1988a, 1991a) the IMW is calculated as the linear 
combination and it does not depend on the real exchange rate.
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6.7 Repudiation Threat
Following Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Cohen and Sachs (1986) and Cohen (1988), 
we assume that the government is able to repudiate its external debt. With regard to 
this, the creditors may impose sanctions on the defaulting country. The defaulting 
country will then suffer two penalties; first, the country loses its access to 
international capital markets so that it is forced into financial autarky. Second, there is 
a direct penalty on production following debt repudiation (i.e. loss of efficiency 
following increased difficulties in foreign trade). Thus, GDP becomes 
GDPt = (l-l)IM W t
The nation’s resource base is scaled down by a factor X hence tire cost of debt 
repudiation is A,IMW. Given the path of the nation’s wealth, the nation will select its 
pattern of consumption, subject to the constraint Dt (1+r) < max Wt. The equilibrium 
then will be characterized by the two following conditions; i\.=l or X<1. In the case 
where 1=1, the country can never profitably repudiate its debt. In this case the credit 
markets work efficiently and the indebted countries only face the intertemporal budget 
constraint. On the other hand, if X<1, this leads to a tlrr eat of repudiation, subsequently 
the lenders should impose a credit ceiling on borrowers to prevent from a default 
decision. Accordingly, the credit ceiling that imposed by creditors can be determine 
knowing that the indebted countries would never pay more then cost of repudiation, 
which is A.IMW.
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6.8 Assessing the Solvency of an Indebted Country.
The creditors might want to impose a credit ceiling which will keep the country from 
defaulting. However, the calculation of the appropriate credit ceiling is quite 
complicated. A country is willing to service its debt today based on its expectations on 
future credit ceilings. Consequently we need to find the path Dt of maximum wliich 
the external debt of the country must never exceed if the creditors are to get their 
money back.
The debtor countries are not allowed to boiTow more than a fr action (let say n) of its 
wealth, in which AJMW is the cost of repudiation. Knowing the cost of repudiation, 
the solvency index can be used to determine whether a debtor country would default 
or service its debt.
6.9 Derivation of the Calculation of the Solvency Index
Following Cohen (1985), the solvency indices for tlie four Asian countries will be 
calculated. However, before proceeding, it is necessary to clarify the proxy that used 
to calculate the nation’s resoui’ces. As mentioned earlier, the use of GDP or exports 
alone, will create distortions. As stated by Cohen, the creditors will face the ‘moral 
hazar d’ problem; that is if they use GDP as their lending base, the debtor country may 
change its relative price structure since this will increase mlificially the value of its 
GDP (i.e. overvaluing its currency). On the other hand, if lenders base their lending 
on export measure, this will encourage the country to change its policy oppositely (i.e.
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by devaluing its currency). Therefore, the linear* combination of GDP and exports will 
be used
IMW = a E X  + (l-a)G D P 
Where EX =exports
GDP =real output 
a  =the weight of expoi*ts 
(1 -a) =tlie weight of tlie home output 
by using IMW, a small change in the real exchange rate would not affect the WA.
dIMW ^ odEX   ^ ( l-a )d G D P  ^  ^
de de de
where e = real exchange rate which is defined as e = PW/PX where PW is the world 
price facing the country and PX is the domestic prices (express in US dollar), d is the 
total derivative operator. The above expression then can be written as
dGDP
dGDP dEX 
de de
^ ___________ {elGD PXdG D PIde)___________
ie! GDP){dGDP /  de) -  {{e /  GDP){dEX  /  de)]
jjGDPa i]GDP -  [{EX  /  GDP){riEX)]
(6 .12)
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Wliere i^EX = the elasticities of Export
qGDP = the elasticities of GDP with respect to real exchange rates 
EX/GDP = the export share in home output
As the estimation of export demand and output supply equations use real exchange 
rate as e= PX/PW, the expected signs of the long run elasticities in equation (6.12) 
have opposite signs. Thus the appropriate weights for export and output can be written 
as;
-  riGDPa  - -  {rjGDP) + [{EX /  GDP){riEX)]
(613)
As mentioned eariier, the solvency index measures the fixed fraction (let say %) of a 
coimtry’s resource IMW that it should allocate to repay its external debt.
With regards to debt repudiation, the cost of repudiation is (ÀIMW), as mentioned 
eariier there ar e two possibilities which ar e 1 = I or A, < 1. If A. = 1, the thr eat of debt 
repudiation is not to be credible, meaning that the indebted country does not an option 
to repudiate its external debt. However if A, < 1, this will cause a threat of debt 
repudiation. As a result, a credit ceiling is required to prevent the lenders from default.
Based on this, the creditors know that the lenders would never pay more than cost of 
repudiation A,IMW when the credit ceiling binds. The equation for a credit ceiling can 
be expressed as
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Z j  /+.Vri(i+o)
J=r+1
The wealth of a country is given as,
rio+o)
7= /+ l
It is the present discounted value of the country’s future resources. Consequently, a 
credit ceiling imposed by creditor is
D, ^ XIMW,
This means that, debtor countries are not allowed to borrow more than a fraction (tc) 
of its wealth, in which A,IMWt is the cost of repudiation. Knowing the cost of 
repudiation, the solvency index can be used to determine whether a debtor country 
would default or service its debt.
Accordingly, a solvency index is 
ÀIMW,
If Ô < 1, the country is solvent but if 5 > I, the country might not want to fully repay 
its debt. However, since the creditors do not know exactly the cost of repudiation, the 
simple definition is used instead. By definition, a country is considered to be solvent 
if  and only if there is a path of external indebtness which satisfies the transversality 
condition and which the countiy is willing to repay rather than defaulting at time t.
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A debtor country will repay its debt at time t, by a fixed fraction, which is;
r i o + o )j=i+i
71 is a fixed fraction of a country resource that should be allocated to repay the 
external debt in order to satisfy the intertemporal external solvency condition. The 
solvency index is proportional to the debt/resource ratio and to the difference between 
growth rate and interest rate. In order for a country to be considered solvent, it 
requires that the external debt grow slower than the real interest rate, meaning that the 
debtor’s resources must grow faster than the debt. As stated earlier one can easily 
evaluate whether a country is solvent or not by comparing n to the observed 
proportion.
In evaluating whether an indebted country which transfers a fixed fraction of its 
resources to the creditors is solvent or not, the country’s resource base (IMW) needs 
to be calculated. As shown in equation (6.13), in order to calculate the countries 
IMW, the export demand elasticities and GDP supply elasticities are required. Based 
on this, the solvency index can be calculated.
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6.10 Application to the Four Asian Countries 
Calculation of the IMW
Referring to equation (6,13), two long run elasticities; which are export demand 
elasticity and GDP supply elasticity together with the export share in GDP are needed 
to calculate the weight of exports and GDP.
In chapter 5, the long run export demand elasticities for all countries are estimated. 
Here, the estimation of each country’s GDP supply elasticities is then carried out.
6.11 GDP Supply
The long run GDP supply function is given by; 
log GDPt = Co + Cl log (Px/Pw)t + Cl log Kt + Ut
Cl > 0, ci> 0
(6.14)
Where GDP
PX/PW
K
= the real GDP of the coimtry 
= the real exchange rate or relative price 
= capital stock -  Following Muscatelli, it is constmcted by 
using the gross fixed capital formation, where the capital 
output-ratio is multiplied by GDP. The capital-output ratio 
is derived on the basis of a tluee year moving average of 
incremental GDP and gross fixed capital formation for 
1966. (Data is gathered from the International Financial 
Statistics, various issues).
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Equation (6.14) is the GDP supply, which depends upon the relative price of exports 
to the world price (Px/Pw), and the stock of capital (K). The coefficients of c l and c2 
are expected to be positive.
Following the same metliod that is used in Chapter 5, the test of unit root is employed 
to see whether all variables are stationary. Based on the DF/ADF test, all variables are 
1(1), and since all variables are of the same order, the estimation for the cointegrating 
parameter is estimated using the dynamic OLS where lags and leads are included.
The ADF residual based test for cointegration is carried out and this is shown in table
6.1. As can be seen all countries pass the test except for Thailand. However, it is
believed that all variables ar e cointegrated for the reasons explained earlier, (chapter 5
-  section 5.5.1).
Table 6.1: ADF Residual-based Test for Cointegration 
The Long-run GDP Equations
Country Test Statistics Critical Values
DF ADF(l) 10%
u L
Malaysia -3.21 -4.13 -2.80 -2.96
Thailand -1.82 -2.05 -2.80 -2.96
Indonesia -3.19 -3.31 -2.80 -2.96
Philippines -2.90 -3.30 -2.80 -2.96
Notes to table:*Tlie critical values aie obtained from Charemza and Deadman (1992) 
with 30 nmnbers o f observation and m=2. One also can refer to other sources of 
critical value tables i.e MacKhmon (1991), Engle-Granger (1987, Table II and III), 
Engle and Yoo (1987)
The estimated long run GDP is shown in table 6.2.
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Table 6.2: The DOLS GDP Supply Equations (long run
Country (px/pw) k ser R'
Malaysia 0.33 0.60 0.05 0.99
(0.0955) (0.0579)
Indonesia 1.10 1.98 0.13 0.98
(0.2450) (0.2162)
Thailand 2.92 1.48 0.07 0.70
(1.0372) (0.6532)
Philippines 1.78 1.89 0.25 0.92
(0.2828) (0.2285)
W es to table: va ue in par ent lesis is standard error.
The relationship between GDP and both relative price and capital stock is positive as 
expected. All variables have conect signs, and these prove to be sensible magnitude 
and all are significmitly different from zero at the 5 percent level.
The second step o f Engle-Granger error correction model (ECM) is then employed. 
From the result obtained the coefficient of the first lag of the residual for all countr ies 
are negative and significant. It measures the speed of adjustment to which GDP 
adjusts to its equilibrium level. The error correction term with an adjustment 
coefficient of -0.1645, indicating that in the case we ar e off the long-run supply cur ve, 
overall supply adjusts to its long-rim equilibriiun level with about 16.4% of the 
adjustment taking place within the first year (i.e. Malaysian case).
The statistical significance and magnitude of the error correction term indicates that 
the relative price (px/pw) and capital stock do, as a component of the long term 
cointegrating relationship tlirough the lagged error correction term jointly, influence 
GDP supply over the long term.
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Table 6.3: The Short-run Estimated GDP (ECM)^^
Malaysia
AGDPt = 1.1574 + 0.3444 A(PX/PW)t + 0.646 A(K), 
(0.10652) (0.08225)
0.1626 A(K)t-i - 0.1645 Ut-i + et 
(0.0891) (0.07433)
= 0.86
DW = 1.67
RSS = 0.04
SER = 0.04
F-Stat(5,25) = 31.41
Indonesia
AGDPt = 0.123 + 0.444 A(PX/PW)t + 0.865 A(K)t- 
(0.2332) (0.1336)
R^ = 0.74
DW = 1.50
RSS = 0.12
SER = 0.07
F-Stat(3,20) = 18.69
Philinnines
AGDPt = 0.102 + 0.147 A(PX/PW)t + 0.589 A(K)t -  
(0.1614) (0.114)
— 0.03 Ut-i + e t 
(0.030)
R^ = 0.7
DW = 1.98
RSS = 0.10
SER = 0.06
F-Stat(4,25) = 14.36
-1 -(0.1070)
(0.0798)
(0.0920)
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Thailand
AGDPt = 0.123
= 0.61
DW = 1.39
RSS = 0.06
SER = 0.05
F-Stat(3,26) = 13.76
(0.401) (0.1676) (1.0155)
The IMW can be estimated based on the estimated GDP supply elasticities. From 
equation (6.10),
a  = [rjGDP +  [{EX /  GDP){riEX)]
By replacing the relevant long run elasticities to the above equation, the weight for of 
export and GDP for each country is obtained. (See table 6.4)
Table 6.4: The weight of Exports and GDP
Country a IMW
Malaysia 0.66 (0.66) Ex + (0.34) GDP
Indonesia 0.94 (0.94) Ex + (0.06) GDP
Philippines 0.95 (0.95) E x + (0.05) GDP
Thailand 0.79 (0.79) E x + (0.21) GDP
Notes to table: the value of a  is obtainec by using equation (6.10) in which t
price elasticity of export demand and price elasticity of GDP supply together 
with the share of exports to GDP ai e used.
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6.12 Solvency Indices
Based on the estimation in section 6.5, the solvency index can be calculated.
D, =
n o + 0 )yw+i
As mentioned eaiiier, n is the fraction that is needed to service the debt. Assuming 
that the growth rate (of the IMW) and the interest rate are constant (i.e i*t = r and nt 
=n), the following is obtained.
A= Z
^  (! + '•)
jr[(\ + ri)YIMW,
i = I (1 + r)
( r - n )  
Hence,
D,TV = { r - n )
So, TT is the debt/IMW ratio, which it takes into account the difference between the 
growth and interest rates.
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The solvency indices for the four Asian countries in 1996 (prior to the crisis) are 
calculated based on the above formula. Here, one needs to know the external debt at 
the end of 1996 and also the resource base of each country at the end of 1997. In 
addition, the future growth of the IMW and the real interest rate need to be forecast. 
Two different hypotheses about the friture growth and interest rate are made: 
pessimistic and optimistic. Accordingly, two different scenarios under which the 
difference between friture growth and interest rate are assumed constant. First, the 
pessimistic view in which the different between interest rate and growtli rate is 5.5 
percent. Second the optimistic view in which the different between those two rates is 
1 percent. As stated by Corsetti et.al (1998) the optimistic view is the realistic one.
All variables use to calculate the solvency indices are shown in tahle 6.5. Based on tlie 
value of a  shown in table 6.4, the wealth average (IMW)is calculated for each 
country. The ratio of net debt/exports, net debt/GDP and net debt/IMW are also 
shown in the table.
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Based on total debt and IMW under two different scenarios, results obtained are 
shown in table 6.6
Table 6.6: Solvency Index and Actual % Paid
Year/country Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Debt/IMW*5.5% Debt/IMW*1.0% TDS/IMW
Malaysia
1990 0.76% 0.14% 10.7%
1991 0.71% 0.13% 6.0%
1992 0.28% 0.05% 7.7%
1993 - - 7.2%
1994 0.33% 0.06% 7.4%
1995 0.64% 0.12% 6.6%
1996 0.74% 0.14% 9.0%
Indonesia
1990 9.63% 1.75% 27.9%
1991 9.30% 1.69% 27.8%
1992 9.67% 1.74% 28.1%
1993 8.47% 1.54% 28.0%
1994 9.08% 1.65% 24.6%
1995 9.51% 1.73% 25.6%
1996 9.13% 1.66% 32.4%
Thailand
1990 1.71% 0.31% 11.1%
1991 2.04% 0.37% 8.89%
1992 1.87% 0.34% 9.35%
1993 2.09% 0.39% 8.84%
1994 2.31% 0.42% 9.0%
1995 2.70% 0.49% 8.9%
1996 3.35% 0.61% 10.9%
Philippines
1990 11.5% 2.10% 25.5%
1991 8.96% 1.63% 19.0%
1992 7.98% 1.45% 21.8%
1993 7.10% 1.29% 20.0%
1994 5.61% 1.02% 13.8%
1995 4.34% 0.79% 12.7%
1996 3.30% 0.60% 8.9%
Notes to table: TDS is total debt service. 
Obtained from the formula in table 6.4.
IMW is the invariant measure of wealth
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As can be seen in table 6.6 these are Hie fixed fraction of each country’s IMW that 
have to be allocated to the foreign debt service to be declaied solvent under 
pessimistic and optimistic scenario. As the actual total debt service that each country 
paid in 1996-1997 period were greater than these indices, all countiies were 
considered as solvent (see the forth column in table 6.6). Fuither details on calculation 
of solvency index and percentage that were actually paid by each country can be seen 
in appendix B. 1 and B.2.
6.13 Summary
In evaluating the creditwortliiness of each country the invariant measure of wealth 
(IMW) is used instead of using exports or GDP alone. By using the IMW, which it is 
the weighted average of the comitry’s exports and GDP, the ‘moral hazard’ problem 
discussed earlier is avoided. From empirical results obtained, tire solvency conditions 
are satisfied in ail countries. The countries are said to be satisfying their intertemporal 
external solvency condition as long as they allocate a fixed fr action (tt) of their IMW 
to service the external debt, where ti is the fraction required to satisfy the national 
budget constraint. It is clear that all countries passed the solvency test in the late 1997. 
Indonesia had the highest ratio of repayments to IMW to remain solvent, (i.e. 9.13%) 
in 1996/1997. Other countries show an index of between 1% to 4%. In the Philippines 
and Thailand case, it is shown that less than 4% of their IMW would be enough to 
repay their debts.
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However, from table 6.6, the actual percentage paid by each country was higher than 
the one that was required to be declared solvent. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
for all countries the solvency conditions were satisfied and they do not seem to have 
had an external insolvency problem. As mentioned in chapter 2, there aie several 
other hypotheses explaining the Asian crisis i.e. the financial bubbles and declining 
returns to investment, moral hazard wliich led to banks and other financial institutions 
in Asian to a situation of overindebtedness, imprudent domestic financial 
liberalisation and capital account opening, etc. Based on the empirical results of this 
chapter, it gives support for the view that the Asian crisis can be explained by the 
short-term illiquidity problem and creditors panic rather than insolvency.
184
NOTES
 ^ See Cohen (1985), Dornbush (1984) and Simonsen (1984).
 ^For further details see Cline (1984,1985), Cooper and Sachs (1985).
 ^See Radelet and Sachs (1998b).
 ^For fuither details see Cline (1984,1985). Also Cooper and Sach (1985).
 ^See Radelet and Sachs (1998b).
 ^For further detailed see Baneijee (1992), Mishkin (1999).
 ^See Radelet and Sachs (1998b).
* For further details of costs of default, see Kaletsky (1985), Ki'ugman and Obstfeld 
(1991).
 ^For further details of solvency issues, see among others Bailey and Cohen (1987), 
Buiter (1990a, 1990b), Buida Wyplosz (1993), Cohen, d. (1985, 1987, 1988a, 
1990b), Cooper and Sach (1985), Currie and Levine (1991), Eaton, et al (1986), 
Ghatak and Levine (1994), Glick (1987) and Simonsen(1985).
See Blachard and Fischer (1988), Buiter and Patel (1992), Currie and Levine 
(1991).
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11 For further details see Buiter (1990a), Cuirie and Levine (1991).
The same subscription used by Cohen (1988a) is used here; IMW which is the 
weighted average of exports and GDP of a country.
A are the first difference and U t-i is the error correction term.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
7.1 Introduction
The Asian cuiTency crisis has once again brought up the debate of the causes of 
cui'rency crisis. Many have argued the core of the crisis was the result of deteriorating 
market fundamentals. Others have argued that the cause is a self-fulfilling crisis or 
investor’s herd behaviour. Can the weakness of economic fimdamental explain tire 
cause of crises or is it rather the act of a speculator and of panic and herding 
behaviour of investors in fear of financial losses? Is it the problem of illiquidity or 
insolvency?
This chapter presents the main conclusions of the thesis. The significance of the 
findings and the limitation of the study are also included. Areas of futme research are 
suggested at the end of the chapter.
7.2 Conclusions
The macroeconomic outlook of the four Asian countries prior to the crisis was 
examined in Chapter Four. Based on the analysis present in Chapter Foiu, apparently 
all the countries had sound macroeconomic fundamental prior to the crisis. Although 
these countries experienced a current account deficit, this is not normally a problem as
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long as it is sustainable. The notion of solvency is usually used in the standard 
theoretical criteria for assessing die current account imbalances. A country is 
considered to be solvent if the discounted value of the expected stock of its foreign 
debt in the infinitely neai* futme is non-positive. This means that a country that 
accumulates foreign debt at a rate that is faster than the real cost of borrowing cannot 
expect to do so forever.
This study covers the period 1963-1995, includes foui' Asian countries and uses time 
series data. Specifically, the solvency index for each country is calculated prior to the 
crisis. In order to calculate these indices, the price elasticities of demand and GDP 
supply are needed. For the export demand equation, the new variable i.e. the export 
composition index (GCI) is added as an explanatory variable. However, this variable 
is only significance for the Malaysian case, and therefore it is dropped for other three 
countries. The Engle-Granger two-step Procedure is then employed to estimate the 
long run and short-run estimation. The results obtained prove all variables are 
cointegrated. The Johansen Maximum Likelihood is also used as a comparison with 
the Engle-Granger method.
The solvency index is calculated based on the price elasticity of demand and GDP 
supply and the main results indicate that all comitries were solvent prior to the crisis. 
The current account deficit experienced by most affected countries was not a problem 
as long as they were solvent. The solvency index for Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand 
and the Philippines were 0.74%, 9.13%, 3.35%, 3.30% respectively (with an 
assumption that r-n=5.5%). The amount tliat was actually paid in 1997 was greater 
than a fraction needed to be considered solvent (i.e. Malaysia 9%, Indonesia 32.4%,
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Thailand 10.9% and Philippines 8.9%). This supports the view that the explanation of 
the Asian crises was the self-fulfilling losses of confidence. Obviously, participants in 
the financial markets respond to ‘signals’ in sometimes herd-like fashion. Information 
that is available is subjected to these participants interpretation and they can alter in a 
short notice.
From the analysis and supported by the empirical findings, it suggests that the crisis 
was a matter of short-term liquidity difficulties and panic rather than insolvency. 
Specifically, the four Asian countries have experienced an impressive economic and 
social performance for the past few decades. Besides the sound macroeconomic 
fundamental, these countries also have good records on total factor productivity which 
reflect on human development performance i.e. health and education (see Ranis and 
Stewart, 1998).
A further external credit could solve the problem. The financial system should then 
encourage the external private creditors to maintain their credit level rather than 
permitting them to ‘take-off (i.e. not to roll over their short term credit) and also to 
restructure their short-term credit over a longer term. As can be seen in chapter 2 
(section 2.7) tire four Asean countries are experiencing positive growth rates in 
1999/2000. Most of the countries began to gain back their momentum toward 
recovery after experiencing negative growth rates in 1998. This once again supports 
the view that the cause of Asian crisis was an illiquidity problem rather than 
insolvency.
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7.3 Significance of the Findings
i) The solvency index that presented in this study has advantages compared to the 
static measure of external debt i.e. debt/GDP and debt/exports. The use of invariant 
measiu'e of wealth (IMW) as the proxy of country’s resources avoids the possibility of 
a moral hazard problem faced by the creditors. If the gross domestic product (GDP) 
measur e were used by creditors as their lending base, this would encourage the debtor 
country to change its relative price structure in such a way as to increase artificially 
the value of its GDP (i.e. by overvaluing its cunency). Conversely, if  tire export 
measure were used as a lending base, this would induce the country to devalue its 
currency. By using the weighted average of these two measures, it would not create 
such a distortion. Besides that, the solvency index takes into consideration the 
dynamic aspects; it includes future expectation of output growth and real interest 
rates. So, based on this index all parties such as debtors, creditors, policy makers can 
benefit. By refening to this index, creditors can decide whether to extend tlie 
maximum level of credit; that is tiIMW.
ii) The trade policy can be analyzed based on the size of income and price elasticities 
of exports and imports presented in chapter five. By looking at these elasticities, both 
debtor and creditor countries can benefit. The structural adjustment and stabilization 
policies as well as debt rescheduling agreements basically depend on foreign trade 
projections which, in turn, depend on income and price elasticities. As for creditor 
countries, observing the restrictive and protective policy taken by industrial countries 
indicates that there will be a decline in the exports of debtors' countries, hence leading 
to problems in financial markets.
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Based on the foreign trade model presented in chapter five, the comprehensive 
estimates of price and income elasticities are obtained. In estimating trade flow, 
consideration is given to the issue of nonstationary since data used is a time series 
data. The cointegration analysis is employed to tackle this problem; to make sure that 
the relationship is not spurious. The DF/ADF unit root test is carried out to see 
whether all variables are I (1),
Specifically the Engle-Granger two step procedure is used to estimate the import and 
export model. Results obtained are reasonably good and most of them have expected 
signs.
Two important implications for policy consideration can be derived from the 
estimation. One is that foreign income is a significant var iable in the export demand 
equation, which indicates that foreign disturbances in the form of fluctuations in 
foreign economic activities are likely to be transmitted to these countries. The other is 
that the Marshall-Lerner conditions are easily met for the two countries. In the case of 
Malaysia, the estimates for price elasticities of exports and imports demands were -  
0.35 and -1.24 respectively. Their sum of -1.59 certainly satisfies the above 
condition. Similarly, in the case of Thailand, the sum of price elasticities of both 
exports and imports demand was -3.91. Therefore, the estimates do suggest that 
depreciations (appreciations) in exchange rates can effectively improve (worsen) the 
crurent accoimt in the period of one year. However, for Indonesia and the Philippines, 
the sum of price elasticities of exports and imports demand for each case is less than 
one. The inelasticity of imports and exports demand might be explained by the
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existence of lags. By using the J-cuive, it can be seen that the currency depreciation
will take some time to affect the cuirent account.
7.4 The Limitation of the Study and Areas for Future Research
There are several limitations, which might affect the significance of the findings.
They are;
i) The lack of data on several independent variables. The use of unit values for 
exports and imports price is certainly not without drawbacks. However since 
the actual transactions or contractual prices for these countries’ exports and 
imports ar e not available, this proxy has been used.
ii) The results obtained should be better with the inclusion of non-price 
competition such as quality, marketing strategy, etc. Unfortunately, measures 
of non-price competition such as quality, marketing strategy, etc are not 
available.
iii) The value of solvency indices for each country depends on the estimations 
from both export demand and GDP supply. The small number of observation 
might affect the empirical results obtained as can be seen some of the 
elasticities of the two methods used show some differences. Using a large 
sample size might give us better results.
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The limitation of the study discussed above, point to several areas for future research 
e.g. the use of both demand and supply in the trade model instead of using the single 
equation might give us a more accurate estimation, hence better solvency indices. 
Besides the proxy used for foreign indebtedness, i.e. debt/IMW, others proxies such 
as debt service and interest service ratios also can be used.
Also this study focuses on the solvency of a country and the government budget 
constraint is not included. Further resear ch then can be carried out to see whether the 
government is solvent or not [see Hakkio and Rush (1991), Trehan and Walsh 
(1991)].
With regard to a cmrency crisis, further research can be done using several indicators 
that can add to a country’s vulnerability to a crash. Specifically, several indicators 
such as fiscal deficit/GDP, current accormt/GDP reserves/imports can be used to 
analysed whether a country is vulnerable to a crisis or not [see Frankel and Rose 
(1996)]
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APPENDIX A 
(Appendix to Chapter 5)
A.1 The Computation of the Variables of Exports Demand.
All data required for the estimation were gathered and verifies from various issues of 
the International Financial Statistics, and the World Tables of the World Bank. The 
trade share statistics used to compute the foreign variable were taken from the United 
Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. The data is defined as below, and 
they ar e in the indexes of the base year 1990. All data is expressed in US dollar'.
Qx = Index of the volume of exports (1990=100) calculated by using the 
following formula 
Qx = EXUS/Px
Where EXUS and Px are exports in US dollar s and export price index 
in US dollar* term respectively.
Qm = Index of the volume of imports (1990=100) calculated by using the 
following formula;
Qm = IMUS/Pm
Wliere IMUS and PM are imports in US dollars and import price index 
in US dollar term respectively.
Pw = index of the world export price (1990=100) calculated by using the 
method of Houthakker and Magee (1969) and Goldstein and Khan 
(1978)
where
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—  I s  s 5
/
each country’s export partners are; Japan, the US, U.K, Germany, and Netherland. aji 
is the weight of market i in exporter j ’s (i.e Malaysia) exports to five main export 
markets. PMx is the US dollar based import price index in export market i 
(1990=100).
Yw = the trade-weighted ‘world’ real income, calculated as a weighted 
average of real incomes of five major export partners of each country. Express as an 
index (1990=100) facing tlie country.
i
' ^ ^ J i  ~   ’^ )
;
(Same as defined earlier)
GCI = The export composition index
The index is constructed as follows. The exports good is divided into four* groups 
(Ci,....C4).
Cl = Total exports of agricultural products and crude material.
C2 = Total exports of tr aditional manufacturing sectors
C3 = Total exports of scale intensive sectors
C4 = Total exports of specialised supply and science based sectors.
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Following Muscatel et. al. (1995b) the export composition indexes is constructed 
using the formula below. The index GCI lies over interval (0,1). The weights chosen 
are ai=0, a2=0 .3 3 , a3=0.67, 34= 1 , over tlie interval (0,1).
4
GCI, = 4Zc,,
1=1
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APPENDIX B 
(Appendix to Chapter 6) 
B.l. The Computation of Solvency Indices
Year Scenario I Scenario 2
Debt/IMW * 5.5% Debt/IMW * 1.0%
Malaysia
1990 5574.0/40422.9*5.5% = 0.76% 5574.0/40422.9*1.0% = 0.14%
1991 5899.0/46184.3*5.5% = 0.71% 5899.0/46184.3*1.0% = 0.13%
1992 2559.0/49971.7*5.5% = 0.28% 2559.0/49971.7*1.0% = 0.05%
1993 - -
1994 4128.0/69159.3*5.5% = 0.33% 4128.0/69159.3*1.0% = 0.06%
1995 8455.2/73160.0*5.5% = 0.64% 8455.2/73160.0*1.0% = 0.12%
1996 9667.2/71434.9*5.5% = 0.74% 9667.2/71434.9*1.0% = 0.14%
Indonesia
1990 62413.0/35621.8*5.5% = 9.63% 62413.0/35621.8*1.0%= 1.75%
1991 63900.0/37852.1*5.5% = 9.30% 63900.0/37852.1*1.0%= 1.69%
1992 66284.6/37910.1*5.5% = 9.57% 66284.6/37910.1*1,0%= 1.74%
1993 60394.6/39093.0*5.5% = 8.47% 60394.6/39093.0*1.0%= 1.54%
1994 68842.4/41643.9*5.5% = 9.08% 68842.4/41643.9*1.0%= 1.65%
1995 72346.4/41763.1*5.5% = 9.51% 72346.4/41763.1*1.0%= 1.73%
1996 67084.8/40185.2*5.5% = 9.13% 67084.8/40185.2*1.0%= 1.66%
Thailand
1990 14860.0/47604.6*5.5%= 1.71% 14860.0/47604.6*1.0% = 0.31%
1991 19108.5/52104.3*5.5% = 2.04% 19108.5/52104.3*1.0% = 0.37%
1992 19550.0/57437.0*5.5%= 1.87% 19550.0/57437.0*1.0% = 0.34%
1993 24775.4/63898.4*5.5% = 2.09% 24775.4/63898.4*1.0% = 0.38%
1994 30220.0/72189.2*5.5% = 2.31% 30220.0/72189.2*1.0% = 0.42%
1995 36230.8/73987.2*5.5% = 2.70% 36230.8/73987.2*1.0% = 0.49%
1996 40068.9/66062.2*5.5% = 3.35% 40068.9/66062.2*1.0% = 0.61%
Philippines
1990 29656.0/14071.7*5.5%= 11.5% 29656.0/14071.7*1.0% = 2.10%
1991 25175.7//15399.3*5.5% = 8.96% 25175.7/15399.3*1.0%= 1.63%
1992 22700.0/15628.6*5.5% = 7.98% 22700.0/15628.6*1.0% = 1.45%
1993 23328.4/17997.5*5.5% = 7.10% 23328.4/17997.5*1.0% = 1.29%
1994 22717.7/22223.9*5.5% = 5.61% 22717.7/22223.9*1.0%= 1.02%
1995 19784.3/24737.7*5.5% = 4.34% 19784.3/24737.7*1.0% = 0.79%
1996 17611.1/29181.5*5.5% = 3.30% 17611.1/29181.5*1.0% = 0.60%
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B.2 Actual Percentage Paid by Each Country
Year TDS/IMW
Malaysia
1990 4333.0/40422.9= 10.7%
1991 2780.0/46184.3 = 6.0%
1992 3861.5/49971.7= 7.7%
1993 4230.1/58721.6= 7.2%
1994 5143.7/69159.3 = 7.4%
1995 4816.8/73160.0= 6.6%
1996 6432.8/71434.9= 9.0%
1997
Indonesia
1990 9968.0/35621.8 = 27.9%
1991 10447.3/37852.1 =27.8%
1992 10647.0/37910.1 =28.1%
1993 10920.2/39093.0 = 28.0%
1994 10264.0/41643.9 = 24.6%
1995 10729.4/41763.1 =25.6%
1996 13005.5/40185.2 = 32.4%
1997
Thailand
1990 5295.0/47604.6= 11.1%
1991 4633.0/52104.3 = 8.89%
1992 5371.8/57437.0= 9.35%
1993 5649.1/63898.4= 8.84%
1994 6566.7/72189.2= 9.0%
1995 6612.3/73987.2 = 8.9%
1996 7191.7/66062.2= 10.9%
1997
Philippines
1990 3590.0/14071.7 = 25.5%
1991 2929.3/15399.3 = 19.0%
1992 3414.3/15628.6 = 21.8%
1993 3661.9/17997.5 = 20.0%
1994 3151.0/22223.9 = 14.2%
1995 3132.7/24737.7 = 12.7%
1996 2609.8/29181.5= 8.9%
1997
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Appendix C
Sources for Figures and Chart.
Figui'e 2.1 : Export Market Growth for the Four Asian Countries 
International Monetary Fund (1998)
Figure 4.1: GDP Growth Rates (1991-1997)
International Monetary Fund (1998)
Figure 4.2: Investment Rates (% of GDP)
Asian Development Bank (1998)
Figur e 4.3: Saving Rates (% of GDP)
Asian Development Bank (1998)
Figme 4.4: Inflation Rates (1991-1997)
International Monetary Fund (1998)
Figure 4.5: Real Exchange Rate (1990-1997)
JP Morgan
(Data are for the end of period. Average 1990=100)
Chart 2.1 : Share of Exports products to the United States 
Kochhar K., P Loungani and M. Stone (1998)
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